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IX 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Starting in the 1950s, management science focused its research activities on social 
responsibility of organizations (Bowen 1953; Carroll 1999; McWilliams et al. 2006; 
Schwerk 2010). Since that time, many terms for 'social responsibility' were 
introduced, and even these terms have different definitions. The most common terms 
in use are 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR), 'corporate citizenship' (CC), 
'sustainability', 'sustainable development', 'ethical behavior', and 'philanthropic 
behavior' which nowadays advanced to omnipresent topics in scholarly research, as 
well as among practitioners (Garriga and Melé 2004; Sparkes and Cowton 2004; 
Mohr and Webb 2005; Green and Peloza 2011). Especially CSR is subject of intense 
research (Lockett et al. 2006). At the beginning, scholars tried to shape a common 
and suitable definition of CSR; later, attempts were made to harmonize the new-
developed understanding of CSR with the traditional economic theory and 
statements of economist Milton Friedman (Friedman 1970; Carroll 1991; Bénabou 
and Tirole 2010). Today's research goes a step further and aims for an economic 
justification by correlating CSR and the financial performance of corporations to 
design a positive business case. Science is putting a lot of effort in finding business 
reasons for or against CSR by analyzing the 'big' corporate figures, e.g., stock 
quotation, revenue, profit; but with the strong focus on identifying a positive business 
case, research misses a better understanding of the motives underlying social 
behavior in general and in business organizations (Moskowitz 1972; Ullmann 1985; 
Andreoni 1989; Maignan and Ferrell 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2001; Hansen and 
Schrader 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Understanding the behavior of individuals 
is crucial to link CSR with business success. Milton Friedman (1975) predicted that 
corporate executives would rather execute their own social preferences at the 
shareholders' expense than administrate, as loyal agents (see Jensen and Meckling 
1976), the shareholders' wish for profit maximization. According to Stout (2012: p. 
105), the underlying assumption is "the idea that [corporations] ought to be run to 
maximize shareholder value as measured by share price". This one-dimensional 
approach to measuring management performance is in line with scientific theories 
(e.g. Jensen 2002), but no law1 requires managers to solely focus on an increase in 
corporate profit or share price (Stout 2012). A share price might be an easily set 
standard to control executive managers' decisions, but in reality, as pointed out by 
Stout, managers need to balance interests of different stakeholders or different 
1 Stout refers to US law; something comparable applies to the German Stock Corporation Act, 
described in Appendix 6.1.2. 
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shareholders. Thus, a manager must not solely focus on the share price and the 
maximization of shareholder value; in order to address a broader utility function, he 
needs to consider the social aspirations of shareholders or business owners (Albach 
2007). This aspiration needs to be conveyed to managers, e.g. in the form of written 
behavioral company guidelines like a 'code of conduct' (COC) (Byrne 1988; McCabe 
et al. 1996; Fisher and Lovell 2006; Knouse et al. 2007). But how do managers act if 
they are not informed or uncertain about the shareholders' social preferences? Do 
they use their own social preferences to decide about donations in the company's 
name? And can a code of conduct govern the manager's behavior by resolving 
uncertainty? This thesis is going to provide an insight into managers' behavior and 
their more or less careful administration of donations from company money 
(shareholders' money) in the context of CSR. 
To understand what exactly is lacking in today's research it is necessary to gain an 
overview of literature's definitions of CSR, the integration of CSR into today's 
business life to achieve a positive business case, and to give an overview of the 
psychology of individuals' pro-social behavior. Based on the gained insights, the 
individual's potential conflict of interest is described. This all is presented in 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 puts Friedman's prediction to the test and discloses how people deal with 
other people's money. 166 students were invited to participate in a real donation 
experiment. In a neutrally framed experiment, the participants were asked to donate 
money out of their own financial property; in a business framed economic 
experiment, they were asked to donate money out of someone else's financial 
property. The recipient was the German charity 'SOS-Kinderdörfer weltweit'2. 
The experiment of Chapter 3 is modified in Chapter 4 in order to analyze the 
usefulness of codes of conduct within organizations. 168 students participated in an 
experiment in which a code of conduct was designed to govern the donation in favor 
of the German charity 'Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz'3. 
Overall, this work aims at generating a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between organizational CSR engagement and the individual behavior of the people 
who actually form the organization. 
 
 
 
 
2 SOS Children's Villages International 
3 Unofficial translation: German Foundation for Monument Protection 
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2. PRO-SOCIAL ACTING WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 
AND THE FORGOTTEN INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1953, Bowen introduced the term 'social responsibility' in his work 'Social 
Responsibilities of the Business'. In his opinion, corporations have the responsibility 
to align their activities with the society's goals, values, and expectations. From that 
time on, social responsibility found its way into organizations and business decision 
making under the term 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR). Not only business 
focuses its attention on CSR: in management literature, researchers published from 
1992 till 2002 around 176 articles with focus on CSR (Lockett et al. 2006). 
The evolution of social responsibility in organizations from the 1950s until today is 
described and discussed by several authors. At the beginning, the debate focused on 
the question whether companies should take responsibilities beyond their economic 
obligations (e.g. McGuire 1963). Carroll (1979) was one of the first to develop a 
highly regarded definition of the term CSR. Further insights into the development in 
the course of time are provided by Carroll (1999), and a timeline in tabular form by 
McWilliams and Siegel (2006) and Schwerk (2010). 
Today's business cannot be imagined without the terms corporate social 
responsibility, sustainability, and corporate citizenship. These expressions are often 
mistakenly used synonymously by business owners and academics. A definition of 
CSR and a demarcation from the other two concepts is crucial for further research; 
these topics will be dealt with in the following sections. 
 
2.1.1. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Up to now, CSR is part of many approaches and is interpreted in various ways, 
therefore the term needs to be defined for the thesis on hand. Garriga and Melé 
(2004: p. 51) wrote: "The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) field presents not 
only a landscape of theories but also proliferation of approaches, which are 
controversial, complex, and unclear". 
A good way to achieve a basic understanding of CSR and to arrive at a suitable 
definition is to take the responsibilities of a corporation as a starting-point. With 
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regard to these responsibilities, there are two views: a narrow view and a broad view4 
(Schwalbach and Schwerk 2008; Matthes 2009). 
A typical opinion leader representing the narrow view is Friedman (1970). In his 
opinion, a company's only responsibility is profit maximization – the shareholders are 
the driving factor. Other authors like Albach (2007) do not support this narrow view 
with the sole focus on profit maximization. In Albach's opinion, the corporation's utility 
function should include the fulfilment of human needs. This increased field of 
responsibilities can be described as the 'broad view', it goes beyond the neoclassical 
economic responsibility and includes interests of the other stakeholders. McGuire 
(1963: p. 144), for example, mentioned: "The idea of social responsibilities supposes 
that the corporation has not only economic and legal obligations, but also certain 
responsibilities to society which extend beyond these obligations". In 1973, Davis 
(1973: p. 312) wrote that social responsibility "refers to the firm's consideration of, 
and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal 
requirements of the firm". Comparable understandings of CSR in recent times were 
published by McWilliams and Siegel (2001). McWilliams (2006: p. 1) defines CSR as 
"situations where the firm goes beyond compliance and engages in 'actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond interests of the firm and that which is 
required by law' ". The term 'beyond' is also used by other authors (e.g. Waddock 
and Graves 1997; Vogel 2005; Calveras et al. 2007). 
 
2.1.2. The Four Responsibility Dimensions of CSR 
 
Based on the general idea of 'beyond', Carroll (1979 and 1991) – "one of the most 
prestigious scholars in this discipline"5 (Garriga and Melé 2004: p. 52) – developed 
four dimensions of responsibilities defining CSR: economic, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic.6 These responsibility dimensions were derived from corporate 
stakeholders' and society's expectations (Carroll 1979; Maignan et al. 1999). In their 
quantitative research, Maignan and Ferrell (2003) give support for the selected 
dimensions by proving that consumers, as one stakeholder group, differentiate 
between these four dimensions (Matthes 2009). With his responsibility dimensions, 
Carroll gives guidance in which fields business organizations should take social 
responsibility. But Carroll insufficiently explains who benefits from the socially 
4 Narrow and broad applied within the context of corporate governance. 
5 Carroll's dimensions were used by many other authors (e.g. Wartick and Cochran 1985; 
Wood 1991; Swanson 1995). 
6 When introducing the four dimensions in 1979, Carroll called them: economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary. In 1991, Carroll renamed the fourth dimension by the term 'philanthropic'. 
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responsible actions (Maignan and Ferrell 2003). Clarkson (1995) elaborates that a 
corporation cannot be responsible for stakeholders who are not under their influence 
– like the whole society. He argues that a corporation is responsible for the 
influenceable stakeholders; thus only the local society benefits. Stakeholders have 
expectations concerning CSR and are beneficiaries at the same time. 
Carroll's dimensions are built one on top of the other, with the 'economic' dimension 
as foundation, followed by the 'legal' dimension; these two responsibilities are 
fundamental to CSR. "Before anything else, the business institution is the basic 
economic unit in our society. As such it has a responsibility to produce goods and 
services that society wants and to sell them at a profit." And these business actions 
need to be accomplished "within the framework of legal requirements" (Carroll 1979: 
p. 500). With the following 'ethical' and 'philanthropic' dimensions Carroll takes up the 
term 'beyond', presents "the new responsibilities of the corporation", and reflects "the 
new, broader, social contract between business and society" (Carroll and Shabana 
2010: p. 90). The core of the 'ethical' dimension is the corporation's obligation to do 
"what is right, just, and fair, and to avoid or minimize harm to stakeholders 
(employees, consumers, the environment, and others)" (Carroll and Shabana 2010: 
p. 90). The CSR pyramid is finalized by the 'philanthropic' dimension, requesting 
business organizations to be good corporate citizens. "This includes actively 
engaging in acts or programs to promote human welfare or goodwill" (Carroll 1991: p. 
42). The 'philanthropic' dimension can be differentiated from the 'ethical' dimension, 
as philanthropic acting by organizations need not automatically include ethical or 
moral aspects. All dimensions are not intended to be mutually exclusive. The 
dimensions should simultaneously be considered and executed. Carroll (1991: p. 43) 
summarizes his concept: "the CSR firm should strive to make a profit, obey the law, 
be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen". Figure 1 gives an overview of the 
dimensions of responsibility with the width of each pyramid layer indicating its 
importance. Besides Carroll, other authors like McWillams and Siegel (2001) have 
developed comparable concepts with categories 'beyond' necessary economic and 
legal obligations; all these concepts have an altruistic or philanthropic dimension. 
A summarizing comparison of the authors' interpretations shows that the ethical and 
philanthropic dimension, i.e. responsibilities beyond economic and legal obligations, 
constitute the essence of CSR (Kotler and Lee 2005; Mohr and Webb 2005; Carroll 
and Shabana 2010). 
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Figure 1: Four dimensions of CSR 
(adapted from Carroll 1979 and 1991) 
 
2.1.3. Distinguishing Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Besides CSR, many other concepts are used to address the new role of 
corporations. Two main topics are quite often linked with CSR: sustainable 
development and corporate citizenship. 
 
2.1.3.1. Sustainable Development 
 
The chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Mr. 
Brundtland, stated: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs" (Brundtland and Khalid 1991: p. 43). That this is not the only available 
definition is shown by Pezzey (1992). Including the definition of Mr. Brundtland, he 
identified 50 different definitions and interpretations (Lorson et al. 2014).7 The 
sustainable development approach was not designed to fit the corporate level, but 
rather the macro level – to "help society as a whole" (Loew et al. 2004: p. 13). 
However, a relevant corporate contribution is necessary to help improve the macro 
level (Garriga and Melé 2004). This contribution on corporate level can be referred to 
as corporate sustainability and "requires the integration of social, environmental and 
economic considerations to make balanced judgments for that long-term" (World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development 2000: p. 2). To measure and report 
7 See Lorson et al. for a classification into three different clusters: Brundtland-Report, 
microeconomic application, own definition. 
Required
Required
Desired
Expected
Economic
Legal
Philanthropic
Ethical
 "Responsibility to produce goods and services  that society wants and to sell  
them at a profit“
(Carroll 1979: p. 500)
 Not acting just for profit but doing "what is right, just, and fair"
(Carroll 1991: p. 42)
 "[A]voidance activities, such as 'not lying' or 'not accepting bribes' " 
(Carter 2004: p. 6)
 Responsibility to comply with law – "society's codification of right and wrong" 
(Carroll 1991: p. 42)
 Positive and negative obligations put on businesses by the laws and 
regulations of the society where the organization operates
 Promotion of "human welfare or goodwill"
(Carroll 1991: p. 42)
Beyond
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those activities the 'triple bottom line' was introduced: people, planet, profit (Elkington 
1997). The difference between CSR and sustainable development is not exclusive of 
CSR contributions to sustainable development (Loew et al. 2004). See Table 1 for a 
comparison of CSR and sustainable development. 
 
2.1.3.2. Corporate Citizenship  
 
The differentiation between corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship 
(CC) is not even clear to scholars; often, the interpretations of these terms overlap or 
the terms are interchangeably used (Lorson et al. 2014 based on e.g. Hemphill 2004; 
Rego et al. 2010). In a comparison of the two terms, Valor (2005) found out that 
Maignan (1999), for example, used the term CC in 1999 and, in a comparable work, 
the term CSR in 2002 (Maignan and Ralston 2002). In 1998, Carroll related the 
explanation of his four dimensions to the term CC, but earlier (1991) and later (1999) 
he related the dimensions to the term CSR. In an effort to clarify the inconsistent 
usage of the terms, Matten and Crane (2005) draw a distinction between the 'limited 
view of CC' and the 'equivalent view of CC'. The 'limited view' corresponds with the 
philanthropic dimension of CSR defined by Carroll in 1991. In accordance with 
Carroll's paper of 1998, the 'equivalent view' represents the interchangeability of both 
terms. The thesis on hand uses Carroll's definition of 1991, typically used by 
researchers in the Anglo-American area8, and thus favors the 'limited view of CC'. 
However, the concepts are very closely linked, as Table 1 presents. 
 
 
 
  
8 See Lorson et al. for an overview of CSR definitions in the Anglo-American and European 
area. 
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   Corporate social 
responsibility 
 Sustainable 
development 
 Corporate 
citizenship 
 
                   Responsible 
to whom 
 Stakeholders, community, current 
generation9 
  Mankind, whole 
society10 
 Current and future 
generations10 
 Intergenerational 
justice10 
 Identical to CSR11  
                   Freedom 
to act 
 Voluntary basis12  Voluntary activities 
and involuntary 
responsibilities13 
 Identical to CSR11  
                   Time 
horizon 
 React on current social topics; 
includes also short-term topics14 
 Development of 
future sustainable 
concepts (shape 
proactive)15 
 Identical to CSR11  
                   Addressing   Beyond economic needs and 
defined by law; focus on ethical 
and philanthropic actions16 
 Altruistic elements (potential 
conflict between social 
expectations & business 
goals)17 
 Integration of all three 
dimensions is not a special 
subject in current literature18 
 Two dimensions: environment, 
social (EU, German definition)19 
 Focus on social & environment; 
economic is only a potential 
result18 
  Three dimensions: 
economic, 
environment, 
social20 
 Simultaneously, 
equally and 
integratively 
addressing all three 
dimensions 
(achieve 'triple-
win')20 
  Philanthropic 
actions (e.g. 
financial 
contributions)21 
 Give something 
back21 
 
                   Fit to 
business 
 Support of core business, but no 
recommendation to question 
company's core business 
activities or business model22 
 Sustainable 
management as 
strategy within core 
business22 
 Identical to CSR11  
         
Table 1: Comparison of CSR, sustainable development and corporate citizenship 
 
9 Carroll (1991 and 1998); Maignan et al. (1999); Commission of the European Communities 
(2001); Matthes (2009); Carroll and Shabana (2010) 
10 Loew et al. (2004); Bassen et al. (2005) 
11 Lorson et al. (2014) 
12 Commission of the European Communities (2001); Loew et al. (2004) 
13 Loew et al. (2004) 
14 Hansen and Schrader (2005); Müller and Schaltegger (2008) 
15 Müller and Schaltegger (2008) 
16 Section 2.1.2 
17 Müller and Schaltegger (2008); Bénabou and Tirole (2010) 
18 Hansen and Schrader (2005); Müller and Schaltegger (2008); Bénabou and Tirole (2010) 
19 Appendix 6.1.1 
20 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2000); Loew et al. (2004); Müller 
and Schaltegger (2008) 
21 Carroll (1991 and 1998) 
22 Müller and Schaltegger (2008) 
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2.2. CSR WITHIN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In the previous sections, Carroll's understanding of CSR was presented. Up to now, 
the theoretical discussion if private for-profit organizations are allowed, from a 
scientific point of view23, to introduce CSR in their business activities and the 
discussion of the underlying organizational motivation for implementing CSR (e.g. 
strategy, financial benefits) is inconclusive. Business companies are required to put a 
higher value on ethical and social behavior: company stakeholders24 like investors 
want to invest their money in socially acting companies (Sparkes and Cowton 2004), 
consumers tend to look for products from correctly acting companies (Mohr et al. 
2001; Mohr and Webb 2005; Green and Peloza 2011), and employees want to work 
in a company supporting social aspects (Dawkins 2005). 
 
2.2.1. Stakeholders Requesting Social Responsibility 
2.2.1.1. Investors 
 
Most corporations need investors to provide financial resources (see Springer Gabler 
Verlag: Investor); thus, attracting them is highly important. Investors do no longer 
evaluate corporations by their financial performance alone. They extend their 
evaluation criterions by social and reputational aspects. Rating agencies responded 
by introducing several stock market indices. In 1990, the 'MSCI KLD 400 Social 
Index'25 was launched, the 'FTSE4Good Index'26 in 2001, followed by the 'Corporate 
Responsibility Index'27 in 2002, and the 'Calvert Social Index'28 was reconstituted in 
2011. These indices rate companies, among other criteria, with regard to their social 
responsibility. 
 
23 Appendix 6.1.2 shows an example that is in accordance with German legislation. The thesis 
on hand does not include an extended discussion on legal aspects. 
24 Stakeholder definition by Freeman (1984: p. 46): "any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of organization's objectives". 
25 MSCI (http://www.msci.com/resources/factsheets/index_fact_sheet/msci-kld-400-social-ind 
ex.pdf; http://www.msci.com/products/indices/esg/socially_responsible/, checked on 
5/10/2012) 
26 FTSE The Index Company (http://www.ethicalinvestment.co.uk/FTSE_4_Good.htm; http:// 
www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp, checked on 5/10/2012) 
27 Business in the Community (http://www.bitc.org.uk/cr_index/, checked on 5/10/2012); 
Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c06400dc-9095-11e0-9531-00144feab49a.html 
#axzz20zRF7lGQ, checked on 5/10/2012) 
28 Calvert Investments (http://www.calvert.com/sri-index.html, checked on 5/10/2012) 
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2.2.1.2. Consumers 
 
Depending on the type of business, two types of consumers can be differentiated as 
the main buyers of a corporation's products: private consumers and professional 
purchasing managers. This differentiation29 is based on two types of companies: 
consumer firms and industrial firms. For both, revenue is needed to achieve profit. 
For companies acting in the 'business-to-consumer market'30, private consumers are 
the – if not the only – revenue driver (see Springer Gabler Verlag: consumer). For 
companies acting, in particular, in a 'business-to-business market'31, professional 
purchasing managers are the ones 'consuming' and driving revenue. In Germany, for 
example, private consumption in 2006 was 1,347 billion Euro (Räth and Braakmann 
2007). In the same year, German purchasers handled a revenue of incoming goods 
totaling more than 956 billion Euro32 (Hennchen 2009). These figures illustrate that 
understanding and addressing these stakeholders is highly important for 
corporations. 
 
2.2.1.3. Employees 
 
No corporation can work without employees. Today's companies need to compete for 
the best employees, and employees aspire to work for an employer caring about their 
social attitudes (Dawkins 2005). The result of the 'Cone Millennial Cause Study' 
(Cone Communications 2006: p. 4) verifies the socially conscious employee: "69% 
feel that their company's social and/or environmental activities make them feel loyal 
to their company"; "79% want to work for a company that cares about how it impacts 
or contributes to society"33. 
 
2.2.2. Matching Neoclassical Economic Theory and CSR 
 
Investors, consumers, and employees are only three out of many stakeholders a 
corporation does not want to annoy in today's highly competitive international market; 
and corporations are aware of their need to address their stakeholders' requests. 
29 Deshpande and Zaltman (1987) differentiate in a similar way. 
30 See Springer Gabler Verlag (business-to-consumer market) for further explanations. 
31 See Springer Gabler Verlag (business-to-business market) for further explanations. 
32 Processing industry 
33 1,800 participants between 13 and 25 years old, out of 28% of respondents describing 
themselves full time employees. 
10 
 
                                                
Thus, the implementation of ethical and social behavior is an important topic. But 
does neoclassical economic theory allow a CSR implementation? 
The discussion on this question can be held with regard to business's general 
mission. A neoclassical view of a firm, and Milton Friedman as a famous 
representative, state profit maximization as a firm's main mission. Ethical and 
philanthropic dimensions of CSR leading to a diminution of profit (e.g. Elhauge 2005; 
Hay et al. 2005; Reinhardt et al. 2008) are, at first sight, counterproductive, and thus 
CSR has no justification in organizations. 
Friedman is often quoted as a representative of neoclassical economic theory and as 
an opponent of CSR. A closer look at the usually cited article by Friedman (1970) in 
the New York Times Magazine entitled "The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits" reveals that Friedman is not generally against the CSR definition 
as presented by Carroll. Friedman's (1970: p. 1) statement: "That responsibility is to 
conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom" matches the CSR 
dimensions: economic, legal, and ethical. Friedman rather questions the motivation 
of corporate executives for socially responsible acting in the name of the company 
and implies that managers promote their own social agenda at the expense of 
company owners or shareholders. This might result in a conflict of interest, as 
managers spend someone else's money on the basis of their own social preferences, 
possibly not matching shareholders' profit maximization preferences. But what if 
shareholders do have social preferences and are willing to sacrifice money for social 
projects? In this case, corporation executives are obliged to act on behalf of the 
shareholders, reflect their social preferences, and even implement profit-reducing 
CSR. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) termed this passing-on of sacrificing profit 
'delegated philanthropy'. The shareholder is not driven by profit maximization alone, 
but rather by value maximization inclusive of social aspects. Furthermore, this is in 
line with Friedman's (1970) understanding of corporate behavior. A general 
prohibition of social responsibility in organizations is questionable; thus the door is 
left open for organizations themselves to determine if they want to allow CSR 
activities. Besides interpreting the implementation of CSR as the fulfillment of a 
philanthropic wish, economic science is also trying to match CSR with the traditional 
economic profit maximization theory. Today's market forces can push corporations to 
implement CSR to satisfy socially conscious stakeholders like consumers, investors, 
or employees. A CSR program aims at convincing investors to provide financial 
resources, consumers to buy products, and employees to work for the CSR company 
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instead of another firm. With CSR activities beyond today's regulatory compliance 
level, the company can also be prepared for future regulations and achieve a 
competitive advantage or protection against future penalties by reducing risks. These 
profit maximizing and risk reducing features of CSR led different authors (e.g. Baron 
2001; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Porter and Kramer 2006) to understand CSR as 
part of the business strategy. Baron (2001) introduced the term 'strategic CSR' for a 
socially responsible, profit maximizing strategy. The two presented forms of CSR – 
CSR driven by shareholders' social preferences and CSR driven by stakeholders' 
social preferences – show that there is no reason to exclude CSR from business 
operations. 
Kitzmüller (2008 and 2010) developed a model to conjoin the different fields of CSR 
usage. In his model, shareholders' and stakeholders'34 preferences are the main 
driving forces for the form of CSR. The preferences can be social (value 
maximization) or neoclassical (profit maximization), generating two shapes of CSR 
with different effects on the corporation's profit: 'conviction CSR'35 and 'strategic 
CSR'36. Figure 2 presents the CSR matrix by Kitzmüller with minor adaptions. 
 
 
Figure 2: CSR matrix 
(adapted from Kitzmüller 2010) 
34 It has to be assumed that Kitzmüller (2010) did not perceive owners and shareholders to be 
constituents of a superior group 'stakeholders', otherwise his model would be inconsistent. 
Therefore, the adaptation of Kitzmüller's model for the thesis on hand excludes owners and 
shareholders from the stakeholder group. 
35 Kitzmüller (2008) used the term 'not for profit CSR'. The wording of the term indicates that 
profit making is forbidden from the start. Kitzmüller intended to express that profit is not the 
main driving force, but rather the conviction to act socially responsibly. Baron (2001) 
differentiated between altruistic CSR and strategic CSR. 
36 As defined by Baron (2001). 
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When shareholders have social preferences, the corporation will implement 
conviction CSR. With conviction CSR in place, the company can address 
stakeholders with social preferences as well as stakeholders with neoclassical 
preferences, but with different effects on the company's profits. Socially-minded 
stakeholders can or cannot approve of the company's CSR program. If they approve 
of the program and, e.g., buy the company's products, total profit can be increased, 
even if the shareholders are willing to accept a reduction in profit through CSR. The 
effect on the company's profits can be negative or positive. Stakeholders with 
neoclassical preferences will probably not approve of a company's CSR activities; as 
a result, profits will be reduced. Shareholders with neoclassical preferences can 
implement a strategic CSR program with the goal to address stakeholders with social 
preferences and to maximize profits. When shareholders and stakeholders have no 
social interest, no CSR will be implemented. 
The CSR matrix summarizes and shows that CSR is in line with traditional economic 
understanding and its opinion leaders like Friedman; and this opens the way for 
organizations to think freely about implementing CSR. Organizations will not explicitly 
distinguish between conviction CSR and strategic CSR, because shareholders 
normally do not reveal their preferences in every detail; and even if asked, 
shareholders will possibly not be able to state their social preferences. In addition, a 
line between the two CSR shapes is not easily drawn. Business will probably 
implement a mixed form of conviction CSR and strategic CSR – taking into account 
social and neoclassical preferences. 
These thoughts about the matching of economic theory and CSR are merely 
theoretical; they do not promise that the described effects on profit will occur in real 
business operations, nor do they guarantee that all social preferences of 
shareholders can be successfully transferred into a CSR concept to be executed by 
corporate managers with the aim of addressing stakeholders. 
Many researchers (e.g. Alexander and Buchholz 1978; McGuire et al. 1988; 
Waddock and Graves 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Loew et al. 2004; Lee 
2008; Margolis et al. 2009; Blomgren 2010) focused their work on the monetary 
benefits and on the explanation of "the tight association between CSR and the 
financial performance of corporations" with the result of demonstrating "that 
investment in CSR will eventually pay off" (Lee 2008: pp. 63 & 64). These research 
results are presented in the next section. 
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2.2.3. The CSR Business Case  
 
At best, CSR should achieve a win-win situation (Bénabou and Tirole 2010) and 
result in a positive business case (Carroll and Shabana 2010). Today's researchers 
wrote several articles to clarify the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance or economic performance. One of the first authors contributing to this 
topic is Moskowitz. Already in 1972, he focused on social awareness of corporations 
and identified a positive link to their economic performance. In the following years, an 
extensive amount of research followed – with different results. McWilliams et al. 
(2006) presented an overview of different empirical papers focusing on economic 
factors in the context of CSR (see comparable analyses by Ullmann 1985; Roman et 
al. 1999; Maignan and Ferrell 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2001; Hansen and Schrader 
2005; Margolis et al. 2009; Matthes 2009; Carroll and Shabana 2010; Schwerk 
2010). The identified results range from "showing a negative relation between CSR 
and firm performance, to showing no relation, to showing a positive relation" 
(McWilliams et al. 2006: pp. 11 & 12). Roman et al. (1999) showed that non-uniform 
results in the field of the 'social business case' have a long history by presenting an 
overview of authors from the 70s, 80s, and 90s with 32 analyses reporting a positive 
effect, 14 reporting no effect, and five reporting a negative effect. A positive 
correlation, for example, is described by McGuire et al. (1988) and other authors 
(Frooman 1997; Griffin and Mahon 1997; Waddock and Graves 1997; Key and 
Popkin 1998). In contrast, Vance (1975) and Ullmann (1985) identified a negative 
correlation. A third group could not find evidence for any correlation (Alexander and 
Buchholz 1978; Aupperle et al. 1985). These findings indicate that research in this 
field is not yet completed, as the above mentioned papers present no clear picture. 
The differing results do not clearly support the existence of a positive relation 
between CSR and a positive business case. 
 
The reasons for the non-uniform research outcomes might be manifold, as the 
authors 
 applied different methodologies (e.g. event study, regression 
analysis) (McWilliams et al. 2006), 
 used different variables (e.g. annual reports, pollution performance 
index, reputational scales) (Ullmann 1985) and measurements 
(e.g. operational setting, level of abstraction) (Griffin 2000; based 
on the insights from Rowley and Berman 2000), 
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 focused their research on corporations with different business 
activities (e.g. consumer sector, governments as customers, or 
other corporations) (Lev et al. 2010). 
 
The predominant problem for most of the analyses are the missing of a generally 
accepted definition of the terms 'CSR' and 'social' and mixing conviction CSR and 
strategic CSR (e.g. CSR, corporate social performance, social disclosure) (Ullmann 
1985). Hillman and Keim (2001) demand that science needs to differentiate between 
stakeholder management (strategic CSR) and social issue participation (conviction 
CSR) to understand the link between CSR and financial performance. With regard to 
the missing differentiation and to different definitions of CSR and financial 
performance, it is not surprising to arrive at different results. As a consequence, the 
thesis on hand follows a strict differentiation between conviction CSR and strategic 
CSR to ensure unequivocalness for analyses of the CSR business case. In contrast 
to previous research, the following sections focus on conviction CSR, which entails 
an increased difficulty in measuring its impact on the business case. While strategic 
CSR follows a devised strategy with traceable positive effects, conviction CSR is not 
anything planned and the identified effects on profit are mixed (Kitzmüller 2010). For 
a successful investigation into the effects of conviction CSR on an organization, the 
researcher must be fully informed about the CSR action itself and, furthermore, about 
the motives of the acting person. This kind of research is especially helpful for 
corporations without a strategic CSR approach to answer the question if conviction 
CSR can nevertheless positively affect the business case. 
In addition, as previous research results are very discordant, science needs to look 
for other ways to explain a potential payoff for corporations and adjust the typical 
working assumption that socially responsible activities and every CSR activity are 
directly linked to a financial benefit (Rowley and Berman 2000). Already in 1985, 
Aupperle et al. summarized: "Perhaps ... [the] merits [of CSR] simply do not show up 
on the 'bottom line'; perhaps superior methodologies or qualitative approaches are 
required" (Aupperle et al. 1985: p. 462). Kurucz et al. (2008) interpreted the idea that 
CSR does not necessarily show up on the bottom line by separating the standard 
business case into four modes of value creation: 'cost and risk reduction', 
'competitive advantage', 'reputation and legitimacy', 'synergistic value creation'. With 
these modes they make it transparent that the benefits of CSR may relate to the 
bottom line (e.g. cost reduction), but do not necessarily correlate directly to financial 
benefits, and that the positive effects of CSR rather result in an improvement of the 
organization as a whole (e.g. synergistic value creation for multiple stakeholders). 
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Furthermore, the interactions between the modes can be very complicated (Kurucz et 
al. 2008). A reputation improved by CSR can lead to a better brand rating, thus 
attract new customers, and that again can increase organizational revenue. These 
complex interactions make it difficult to prove the cause of the positive business 
case. In order to reduce complexity and to divide the 'CSR business case' question 
into smaller, analyzable parts, further research should take the lessons of previous 
publications to heart. To focus analyses, the research purpose should concentrate on 
one of the above-mentioned modes of value creation. Thus interdisciplinary scholars 
use a bottom-up approach and focus their activities on building up a picture of 
specific stakeholder groups and their reaction on CSR measures. Due to the focus 
on specific groups and the findings on these groups, researchers can concentrate 
their efforts, achieve more detailed insights, and are able to recommend business 
managers how to adjust CSR measures to achieve a positive business case in the 
way that CSR shows up on the bottom line. To improve the bottom line, corporations 
can reduce costs or increase revenue. The thesis on hand will focus on the revenue 
side and thus on purchasing activities of private consumers and purchasing 
managers and on how socially responsible acting can increase the revenue created 
by these groups with a positive effect on the CSR business case. This proceeding 
ensures that the desired field of the CSR business case is isolated and only one 
mode of value creation is addressed: 'competitive advantage'. 
If corporations want to increase their revenue by addressing these groups by CSR 
measures, then it is important for them to understand the behavior of the respective 
individual decision makers. Only the understanding of the individual psychology of 
pro-social behavior enables corporations to use CSR for influencing the individual 
decisions of private consumers and professional purchasers to achieve a competitive 
advantage. In the next section, the psychology of pro-social behavior will be 
described to achieve a fundamental understanding of human need for socially 
responsible acting. 
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2.3. PSYCHOLOGY OF PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Some human activities are less for the actor's benefits, but more for the benefits of 
others. This pro-social behavior manifests in helping a friend, donating blood or 
donating money to charity organizations (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Even if the 
motivations for pro-social behavior can be manifold, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) 
identified a variable mix of three components particularly guiding people's behavior: 
altruistic motivation, material self-interest, and social or self-image concerns.37 
 
2.3.1. Motivations for Pro-Social Behavior 
 
Altruistic motivation is driven by the wish to do something good and to help others. 
This help can be monetary or non-monetary. Donations to charities without any 
beneficial return are a good example for altruism-driven pro-social behavior. Material 
self-interest shows when people are more likely to act socially responsibly with 
material benefits on offer. Taking the donation example again; in this case, the 
donation to the charity can be driven by an expected tax-deduction or a present from 
the charity organization. Social or self-image concerns are the cause of individuals' 
pro-social acting if they want to be seen in a positive light by a third party or even by 
themselves.38 People are influenced by their goal to 'shine' as good, responsibly 
acting persons. Furthermore, social image concerns include the aspect of publicity. 
To demonstrate this, Lacetera and Macis (2010) among others (Titmuss 1970; 
Mellström and Johannesson 2008; Ariely et al. 2009) executed a blood donation 
experiment. In the experiment of Lacetera and Macis 'private' and 'public' rewards 
(e.g. medals, certificates) for blood donations in Italy were provided. The authors 
identified a significant positive feedback on the chance of receiving public recognition 
37 In a more recent article (Bénabou and Tirole 2010) the authors rename the different 
motivations: genuine, intrinsic altruism; material incentives; social and self-esteem 
concerns. The meaning is identical. The wording from 2006 is chosen due to the fact that 
the former wording better reflects people's motivation. The latest wording might confuse 
due to the word 'incentive' which is typically related to a form of lever to influence a 
person's action. 
38 The third motivation is based on researches showing the great importance of image 
concerns for the explanation of pro-social behavior. Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson 
(2006: p. 1), for example, identified by their survey that "most respondents considered their 
own concern for status when purchasing a car to be minor in comparison with the status 
concerns of others". The respondents regarded environmental performance as one of the 
most important criteria when buying a car for themselves, and though, when taking their 
neighbors into consideration, they revised their ranking and put status criteria near to the 
top, this result shows that self-image aspects are an important driver for pro-social acting. 
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as reward. Thus social image concerns are a strong motivator39 for acting socially 
responsibly. People motivated by self-image concerns want to be sure that they are 
good people; they want to value themselves positively, free from outside influence 
(Bénabou and Tirole 2010 and 2011). Social image concerns are more than a one-
way case where individuals aim at increasing their own reputation on the basis of 
society's recognition, also do "individuals contribute more to public goods when they 
know that others are also giving" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006: p. 1666). 
The description of the three guiding components can be complemented by listing the 
characteristics and origin of their incentives: intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational. 
Intrinsic incentives are present when individual preferences are determined by the 
will to help others for the sake of the pro-social action itself. Extrinsic incentives exist 
when pro-social behavior is not so much driven by individual preferences, but rather 
by monetary or non-monetary material benefits or rewards. In contrast, reputational 
incentives are not given in the form of material benefits or rewards, but in the form of 
society's or the public's positive opinion about the person's pro-social behavior. 
Altruistic motivation is driven by an intrinsic incentive. Therefore it can be specified by 
the term 'pure': pure altruistic motivation, as defined by Andreoni (1989). Andreoni 
differentiated altruistic motivation into a pure and an impure form. The impure form is 
characterized by the individual's expectation of a potential moral benefit from its own 
action, phrased by Andreoni as 'warm glow' of giving. The impure form is a more 
selfish motivation affected by the wish to feel good about oneself (Andreoni 1989; 
Bénabou and Tirole 2006), but as the side effect of a warm glow, caused by the 
individual's wish to do something good, is not disclosed to another party, the impure 
altruistic motivation is intrinsically driven as well. 
External monetary or non-monetary benefits address an individual's material self-
interest, thus the driving incentive is extrinsic. Extrinsic incentives addressing 
material self-interest carry the risk of changing the perception of pro-social behavior, 
as, in the eyes of an observer, the altruistic intent is inauthentic and e.g. money is 
apparently the primary driver. Providing rewards draws a thin line between improving 
and reducing pro-social behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). 
Reputational incentives drive social or self-image concerns. Society exerts a strong 
influence on an individual's pro-social action; in this way, the individual is rewarded 
by an increase of reputation. This incentive encourages pro-social behavior 
(Bénabou and Tirole 2006). 
39 "The presence of a social signalling motive for giving is also evident in the fact that 
anonymous donations are both extremely rare – typically, less that 1 percent of the total 
number – and widely considered to be the most admirable" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006: p. 
1653; based on Glazer and Konrad 1996). 
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2.3.2. Incentive Interdependency and Related Risks 
 
Changing the level of an incentive can affect the related motivation or even a 
different motivation. Imagine a hospital wants to attract additional blood donors by 
announcing a monetary reward increase. In this way, the extrinsic incentive for a pro-
social behavior is increased. Two effects might result. Firstly, people who did not 
donate before are now willing to donate to receive the monetary reward. These 
people show a motivation characterized by material self-interest, as they want to get 
something in return for their pro-social behavior. Taking into account that these 
individuals were not willing to donate blood when there was no or a smaller monetary 
reward, this attitudinal change can disclose these individuals' financial greediness. As 
the results of a blood donation experiment executed by Titmuss (1970) show, a 
second result can occur: paying for blood donations can reduce willingness to 
donate.40 Some people who were willing to donate blood without receiving any 
reward are now confronted with an extrinsic incentive incompatible with their pure 
altruistic motivation. Titmuss argued that individuals might reduce or even stop their 
donations, as they do not want to be considered greedy or motivated by material self-
interest. In general, humans desire to be seen as pro-social, not greedy, "and indeed 
someone who has a high valuation for money relative to effort and/or public goods is 
not a very attractive partner in friendship, marriage, hiring to a position of 
responsibility, electing to office, or other situations where it is difficult to always 
monitor behavior or write complete contracts" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006: p. 1658). 
Therefore previous contributors driven by altruistic motivation may be prevented from 
further blood donations (Bénabou and Tirole 2003 and 2006). Extrinsic incentives 
can make an altruistic motivation appear questionable, and thus the intrinsically 
motivated individual may be restrained from presenting its altruistic pro-social 
behavior. Furthermore, some intrinsically motivated individuals overwrite their 
intrinsic incentives by extrinsic ones. This phenomenon is called 'overjustification 
effect' (Tang and Hall 1995; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
 
 
 
40 "[…] individuals' desire for money than about their motivation for the specific task at hand, 
even a minimal concern about appearing greedy is sufficient to cause a sharply negative 
response to small incentives and, in the limit, a downward discontinuity in the supply 
response" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006: p. 1663). 
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2.4. MAKING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE DECISIONS FOR SOMEONE ELSE 
 
As introduced previously, private consumers are a very important stakeholder group 
that needs to be addressed by corporations. Private consumers decide whether to 
buy or not to buy a product. In general, private consumers decide for themselves; 
they pay for the product out of their own monetary funds, and they are not 
accountable to anyone. Thus research can focus directly on the decision process of 
private consumers in the context of CSR; it does not need to take into account 
potential biases that can occur when purchasing managers have to make the same 
decisions in an organizational context, i.e. on behalf of the organization and its 
shareholders or owners. Purchasing managers decide if they buy a product or a 
service for the company they work for, and they decide whether they buy it from a 
socially responsibly acting company or not. Unlike private consumers, they are not 
financially affected themselves,41 but as they decide about corporate money, they are 
accountable to the organization. In the following, a brief introduction is given into 
available research about how private consumers and purchasing managers act and 
how they can be positively influenced in the context of CSR to achieve a positive 
business case. 
  
2.4.1. Private Consumers as Decision Makers 
on Behalf of Themselves 
 
Psychological insights are used by researchers to better understand the pro-social 
behavior of private consumers and to find out how CSR can increase the 
consumption of this stakeholder group. Many factors can steer the purchase 
decisions of private consumers, and CSR can influence some of these factors (see 
Appendix 6.1.3 for selected studies). Corporations' social acting and the related 
reputation is more and more appreciated by consumers (Pivato et al. 2008). In 
general, consumers use two principles to choose between two available products: 
vertical and horizontal differentiation (McWilliams et al. 2006). In the context of CSR, 
vertical differentiation is possible when the characteristics of two products are totally 
equal except for additional CSR elements that are characteristic for only one of the 
products. If the consumer appreciates the additional benefit he is willing to prioritize 
the CSR product and even pay a higher price. The additional CSR elements 
contribute to the reputation of the firm. Horizontal differentiation exists when the 
41 Incentive schemes not considered. 
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consumer chooses a product on the basis of taste (e.g. color), when CSR elements 
are missing, and when the consumer is unwilling to pay a higher price. As a result, 
there is no contribution to the firm's reputation. 
It is not easy for consumers to determine if a firm's CSR operations meet their moral 
and political expectations (McWilliams et al. 2006). CSR-related information is 
normally distributed by the corporation itself, for example in annual reports, 
homepages, or advertisement campaigns. But this information can be biased 
because it is mostly not reviewed by an independent third party and potentially 
represent a one-sided view of the corporation (McWilliams et al. 2006). Thus 
consumers have more confidence in the information provided by independent 
institutions (Pomering and Dolnicar 2009). The corporation needs to find a way to 
make CSR transparent42 and, at best, link the pro-social activities to the product. 
Based on interviews, Green and Peloza (2011) identified three43 criteria explaining 
why private consumers buy from socially responsibly acting companies and thus 
increase the revenue of those companies: emotional value, social value, and 
functional value. The first criterion matches the impure form of altruism with its effect 
of a 'warm glow' when a pro-social attribute is directly linked to the purchased 
product. The second criterion is driven by reputational social image concerns, as 
people are judged by others with regard to the CSR activities of the firm 
manufacturing the product (Green and Peloza 2011; based on Yoon et al. 2006). The 
'functional value' can be interpreted as an extrinsic, incentive-driven material self-
interest, as it is defined as a product-specific feature like price or quality. From this 
feature the consumer receives a direct benefit, e.g. a lower price, which is his 
material incentive to buy a CSR product. The analysis by Green and Peloza (2011) 
reveals that the functional value is the main criterion steering a purchasing decision. 
Thus it is important to avoid CSR activities that have a negative effect on the 
product's functional value, possibly leading to a decrease in revenue (Sen and 
Bhattacharya 2001; Green and Peloza 2011). 
The identified positive effects of CSR on the purchasing behavior of private 
consumers can lead to an increase in revenue (e.g. by an increase in loyalty as 
found out by Mohr and Webb 2005 or by Lee et al. 2012, or by a positive effect on 
the purchasing intent as identified by Mohr and Webb 2005), but in most research 
articles the benefits of CSR for consumers are linked to securing a company's current 
42 Russell and Russell (2010) identified that a CSR activity is more effective in steering 
purchasing decisions when the CSR activity is domestic and executed in the home state of 
the consumers. 
43 The findings match three out of five criteria identified by Sheth (1991): functional value, 
conditional value, social value, emotional value, epistemic value. 
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revenue as proven by Mohr et al. (2001). In their opinion, CSR is basic to the 
prevention of a decrease in revenue, as "consumers are more likely to boycott 
irresponsible companies than to support responsible companies" (Mohr et al. 2001: 
p. 69). Other authors conveyed similar findings. Mattila et al. (2010), for example, 
illustrated that CSR can protect a company against a loss of reputation if headlines 
show the corporation in a negative light. Brown and Dacin (1997) revealed a positive 
effect of CSR on the evaluation of a consumer product. 
Summarizing, evidence was found that CSR can influence private consumers and 
has a positive effect on the business top line. Although revenue cannot be increased 
in every case, it can at least be protected from decreasing. Thus the interaction of 
CSR and private consumers leads to a positive business case. 
 
2.4.2. Purchasers as Decision Makers 
on Behalf of Their Organizations 
 
Friedman (1970) stated that society consists of individuals; this statement also 
applies to organizations and the identified psychological insights are also applicable 
to professional purchasers, as "similar to consumer behavior, the [professional44] 
buyers often decide on factors other than rational or realistic criteria" (Sheth 1973: p. 
56). But professional purchasers are employees of an organization and they act on 
behalf and for the benefit of this organization. On the other hand, purchasing 
managers are individuals who might not be able to divest themselves of their own 
social preferences, and these preferences might bias the buying-decisions to be 
made on behalf of the company. An understanding of their behavior is particularly of 
interest, as professional purchasers have more 'CSR power' than private consumers. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.2, purchasers handle incoming goods with a value of 
more than 956 billion Euro45 (Hennchen 2009), whereas private consumption 
amounts to 1,347 billion Euro (Räth and Braakmann 2007). This considerable market 
power makes professional purchasers a highly interesting group for, e.g., suppliers, 
and it makes them an important group for society as well: they can use their influence 
to promote suppliers' pro-social acting (DesJardins 2007). Private consumption of an 
individual is less powerful to change suppliers' way of acting. 
In the context of purchasing and CSR, two phrases are used: 'purchasing social 
responsibility' (PSR) (Carter 2004 and 2005) and 'socially responsible buying' (SRB) 
44 Seth uses the term 'industrial' with the same meaning. 
45 Processing industry 
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(Maignan et al. 2002; Park and Steol 2005). Based on Carroll (1979) and in line with 
Carter (2004 and 2005), Salam (Salam 2009) defined PSR as "purchasing activities 
that meet the ethical and discretionary responsibilities expected by the society"46. In 
particular, two research streams using these phrases exist. One of these streams 
strives to understand if PSR/SRB affects stakeholders and how PSR/SRB is 
embedded in the whole organization to improve the activities and the perception of 
CSR (e.g. Drumwright 1994; Crane 2001; Maignan et al. 2002; Carter 2004 and 
2005; Maloni and Brown 2006; Salam 2009). The second stream examines the 
purchasing manager as a decision maker within the buying company (e.g. Sheth 
1973; Browning and Zabriskie 1983; Joyner et al. 2002; Park and Steol 2005). 
Both streams do not transfer their insights concerning the purchasing organization to 
the supplier, but several findings indicate that purchasing managers can increase the 
revenue of their companies by choosing a supplier executing CSR activities. Salam 
(2009), for example, discovered that consumers value an organization with a socially 
responsible supply chain, logistics and suppliers included. According to Salam, one 
task of professional purchasing managers is to ensure that suppliers act in line with 
the purchase organization's definition of socially responsible acting. That is only 
possible if this definition is transparent to the professional purchaser. Joyner et al. 
(2002) found that, in the context of CSR, ethical decisions of purchasing managers 
need to be guided by clear statements or actions of the owners. From this 
perspective, the purchasing manager just executes the task entrusted to him by the 
buying corporation; as a result, the manager might choose an organization executing 
CSR activities as supplier. This can lead to an increase in the chosen supplier's top 
line (provided that the supplier would not have been selected without CSR). 
Browning and Zabriskie (1983) reveal that professional purchasers, even without 
guidance, have a high level of ethical belief and ethical behavior. Therefore it can be 
inferred that CSR activities of the supplier can positively affect professional 
purchasers and their purchasing decisions, as "attitudes towards ethics and social 
responsibility directly influence SRB" (Park and Steol 2005: p. 240). 
Concluding, there is evidence that CSR can influence decisions made by 
professional purchasers and has a positive effect on the business top line. Thus CSR 
and professional purchasing show a positive business case. 
46 Similar definition for SRB: "[…] SRB can be deﬁned as the inclusion in purchasing 
decisions of the social issues advocated by organizational stakeholders" (Maignan et al. 
2002: p. 642). 
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2.4.3. The Conflict between Managers' and 
Organizations' Preferences 
 
Purchasing managers can apparently be influenced by CSR activities, but it is 
questionable if they are driven by their own social preferences or by the social 
preferences of the shareholders. This vagueness applies not only to purchasing 
managers, but can be transferred to a higher, more general level: corporate 
managers. Like purchasing managers, general managers are hired to make 
decisions as corporate representatives. 
General analyses of CSR's effect on financial performance do not imply a wrong or a 
non-execution of CSR. But as "employee commitment to CSR is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon that will be influenced both by corporate contextual factors 
and by employee perceptions" (Collier and Esteban 2007: p. 20), it cannot be 
ensured that employees execute CSR as desired and eventually defined. The 
execution of CSR is up to the managers, and hopefully they match their 
shareholders' social preferences, thus acting in line with the corporate owners. But 
managers who are expected to act socially responsible (conviction CSR) in their 
organization's name are in an uncertain situation because they cannot achieve full 
transparency about their shareholders' social preferences. Managers can only act in 
accordance with the organization's conviction CSR preferences if they receive some 
kind of information about the social topic to be handled and the amount to be spent 
for it. Organizations can design and publish rules like a code of conduct (COC)47 to 
guide managers and describe, for example, the field of social actions. But codes of 
conduct cannot govern behavior entirely because they cannot take into account all 
conceivable business decision scenarios. Thus the field of CSR actions has to be 
described on a higher level, which is difficult with regard to financial investments. In 
contrast, a strategic CSR program can be more detailed, as it is designed to achieve 
a specific goal. Finally, the manager is at least uncertain about the amount of money 
to be spent for the social purpose. With conviction CSR in place and a full strategic 
CSR program not in place, the shareholders can only rely on the manager's 
appropriate financial evaluation. The significance attributed to the social topic and, 
consequently, the financial evaluation of this topic is influenced by the manager's 
social preferences. The decision process of managers who determine about 
company money in the context of CSR on the basis of their own pro-social 
preferences has not been analyzed by scholars, even though the topic is old. Already 
47 Chapter 4 gives further explanations and analyzes if managers abide by codes of conduct. 
Science is divided on the effectiveness of a COC, and thus further research is desirable. 
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in 1970, Friedman concerned himself with this question and feared that managers 
might promote their own social agenda at the expense of the corporation. This fear is 
based on Friedman's (1975) personal conviction that "very few people spend other 
people's money as carefully as they spend their own". Managers can act in 
accordance with their own social motivations (intrinsic, extrinsic, reputational) without 
having to consider personal financial consequences. Do managers handle corporate 
money differently than their own? If this is not the case, then shareholders can trust 
the managers' 'social compass' enabling them to execute conviction CSR on a 
suitable financial level. And these managers will not be likely to waste company 
money for a personal benefit. It is in the interest of science to understand how 
managers handle corporate money if they, though not financially affected, can have a 
personal benefit, e.g. a warm glow of giving achieved by a donation out of company 
money or by buying from a socially responsible supplier. A real donation experiment, 
designed to deal with this topic, will show if people handle other people's money less 
carefully than their own, as Friedman predicted. 
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3. DECISION MAKING WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S 
MONEY – INSIGHTS FROM A REAL DONATION 
EXPERIMENT 
 
"Very few people spend other people's money as carefully as they spend their own." 
Milton Friedman (1975) 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter puts Friedman's above-mentioned statement to the test and gives 
insights into people's behavior when deciding on spending other people's money. 
The findings may be interesting and helpful for future scientific research as well as for 
business management. 
Decisions on the use of one's own monetary income occur on a day-to-day basis to 
satisfy own preferences, e.g. by purchasing everyday products in stores or, in a 
social context, by donating money to a charity organization. Today's behavioral 
economics provide many insights into the decision-making process of individuals 
deciding on their own money; these insights – in addition to neoclassical economics 
– strongly suggest the existence of individual preferences like fairness (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000), trust (Berg et al. 1995), altruism (Andreoni 1989; Levine 1998), or reciprocity 
(Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Especially these additional preferences influence the 
underlying decision processes when it comes to possibly donating money for a good 
cause. In a private setting, social decisions aiming to satisfy one's own preferences 
are generally characterized by the consciousness of these preferences and the 
possibility of deciding on utilizing one's own monetary resources. The setting for 
social business decisions, especially those to be taken by managers, is different: 
corporate preferences are not fully disclosed; managers' own preferences might 
interfere with corporate preferences; and managers decide on the company's 
monetary funds, not on their own. Especially the responsible handling of corporate 
money by a company's managers is regarded as critical, as Adam Smith, as early as 
1776, expressed in his work 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations'. With regard to joint-stock companies he stated: "The directors [...] being the 
managers rather of other people's money than their own, it cannot well be expected 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery watch over their own" (based on Smith 1827: p. 311). 
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This relationship of interdependence between a person with the authority to hand 
over a decision and the decision maker can be attributed to agency theory. Within 
this principal-agent relationship, the 'principal' delegates the decision-making 
authority or work to someone else – the 'agent' (Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Eisenhardt 1989). It cannot be guaranteed that the preferences of the principal 
and the agent are identical, and in the absence of a comprehensive contract48 
between the parties other people's money might be handled differently, as Adam 
Smith predicts. Milton Friedman takes a similar view contending that "very few people 
spend other people's money as carefully as they spend their own" (Friedman 1975). 
Friedman particularly has his reservations about managers' handling of corporate 
money when they have to make socially responsible decisions in organizations. For 
socially responsible decisions in the field of conviction CSR there is no strategic 
alignment that can serve managers as a precise guidance – e.g. a social purpose or 
the level of monetary investment – to execute their assigned job. A possibility of 
predetermining the general purpose of the social action could be a contract like a 
code of conduct49. Due to the missing strategic alignment the level of expenditure on 
the social purpose depends on the manager's evaluation. Friedman (1970) predicts 
that, especially in such an uncertain situation, managers spending the company's 
money will promote their own social agenda as they need not spend their own funds. 
In this case, managers will handle other people's money less carefully and can enjoy 
a potential benefit, e.g. an increase in reputation or a 'warm glow of giving', by 
satisfying solely their individual preferences. Achieving a personal benefit by 
spending company money for a purpose possibly not reflecting the shareholders' 
interests or preferences could be described as embezzlement. 
Not all companies publish rules and regulations or have a comprehensive COC to 
provide the managers with full CSR guidance. Under such circumstances, managers 
can only estimate the level of monetary investment which is necessary to realize, for 
example, the altruistic preferences of their company's shareholders, and the 
corporation can do nothing but rely on the matching 'altruistic compasses' guiding the 
corporation's and managers'  preferences. In that case it would be desirable to have 
managers disregarding their own preferences or, at least, using them as a reference 
point to determine the company's preferences instead of merely guessing what those 
preferences might be. For the corporation it is helpful to know about the manager's 
preferences when handling his own money and whether the manager disregards his 
48 Chapter 4 implements a code of conduct as a version of a contract between the principal 
and the agent. 
49 Chapter 4 gives further explanations of codes of conduct. 
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preferences (according to Adam Smith and Milton Friedman) when dealing with other 
people's (company owners', shareholders') money. The results of the research on 
hand can help to evaluate an individual's personality traits in respect of dealing with 
other people's money, and they can help to infer if that person will handle someone 
else's money as carefully as his own. The findings can give business organizations 
first hints how to deal with managers involved in decisions in a CSR context. With 
additional information in hand, the organization can judge a decision maker and, if 
necessary, loosen or tighten the control over this manager. 
For an understanding of the pro-social behavior of a manager who deals with other 
people's money in a CSR scenario with unknown shareholders' preferences it is 
essential that, at first, the manager's own preferences and the related decision-
making processes are disclosed. Subsequently, the investigation has to focus on the 
influences determining possible changes of the disclosed behavior when the source 
of money changes. Section 2.2 described the CSR environment corporate managers 
are supposed to act in and the limitations of available information. The driving factors 
for pro-social behavior were outlined in Section 2.3. Section 3.2 presents literature 
treating the handling of other people's money as an issue subordinate to the research 
focus. In Section 3.3 the experimental approach itself will be explained as well as the 
reasons for selecting an economic experiment as the most suitable method. An 
introduction to the questionnaire and the experimental procedure will also be 
presented. Section 3.4 presents the derived hypotheses in the context of the 
introduced experiment. The experimental results and their impact on the hypotheses 
are outlined in Section 3.5. Chapter 3 is rounded off with Section 3.6 including a 
summary of the major findings, an outlook concerning the feasibility of implementing 
CSR and the need of further research. 
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3.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Several authors (Hibbingand Alford 2005; Eriksen and Kvaløy 2010; Hamman et al. 
2010; Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; Carlsson et al. 2011; Chakravarty et al. 2011; 
Makowsky et al. 2014) from various disciplines (e.g. psychology, economics) studied 
differences in the behavior of individuals in situations when they took decisions 
having an effect on their own assets compared to situations when they made 
decisions having an effect on the assets of others. A small but growing number of 
authors in the realm of behavioral economics deal with that topic, which covers, 
among other aspects, various degrees of a decision maker's responsibility. The 
thesis on hand identifies three strands in literature: 
 
Deciding on behalf of someone else 
 in a high-responsibility relationship, 
 in a medium-responsibility relationship, 
 in a low-responsibility relationship. 
 
These clusters have been chosen because the level of responsibility characterizing 
the relationship between individuals might influence their behavior, i.e. by the feeling 
of being obliged to decide in favor of an authority. This might be mainly true in a 
business environment or when incentives are granted for delegation (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997; Hibbing and Alford 2005; Makowsky et al. 2014). Table 2 gives an 
overview of the analyzed publications and their assignment50 to one of the defined 
clusters. In the following sections, all mentioned publications are described in detail. 
The three clusters are founded on the experimental instruction given to the 
participants. A high-responsibility relationship exists when the instructions make it 
transparent that a decision is to be made on behalf of someone else and a specific 
frame or wording is used to support a delegated authority. A relationship is 
characterized by a low-responsibility level when the instructions merely describe the 
task to be executed, without creating an additional link between the involved parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
50 The criteria for defining the clusters and assigning a single publication to one of the clusters 
are exclusively based on, and confined to, the viewed literature.   
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   High-responsibility 
relationship 
 Medium-responsibility 
relationship 
 Low-responsibility 
relationship 
 
                   Description  The experimental 
instruction states:  
a) decision on behalf 
of, or delegated to, 
someone else 
b) additional frame / 
wording supporting 
the given authority 
e.g.: 
"The investor is your 
client, and your task is 
to manage his/her 
money."51 
 The experimental 
instruction states:  
a) decision on behalf 
of, or delegated to, 
someone else 
b) no additional frame / 
wording supporting 
the given authority 
e.g.: 
"Your task is to make a 
decision on behalf of 
the other people in this 
group."52 
 The experimental 
instruction states:  
a) decision for 
someone else 
b)  no additional frame / 
wording supporting 
the given authority 
e.g.: 
"You decide how much 
every person in your 
group (including 
yourself) has to donate 
to [...]."53 
 
                   Authors   Hibbing and Alford 
(2005) 
 Eriksen and Kvaløy 
(2010) 
 Hamman et al. 
(2010) 
 Makowsky et al. 
(2014) 
  Daruvala (2007) 
 Bartling and 
Fischbacher (2012) 
 Kvaløy and 
Luzuriaga (2014) 
 
  Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2008) 
 Carlsson et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
         
Table 2: Differentiation between levels of responsibility 
 
3.2.1. Deciding for Someone Else in a 
High-Responsibility Relationship 
 
The first cluster comprises authors trying to understand how behavior adapts when 
decisions are executed by an individual in place of someone else in a relationship 
characterized by a high responsibility of one party (in most studies referred to as the 
agent in an agent-principal relationship). Owing to his authority, the principal has the 
decision power, he can execute the decision by himself or he can delegate the right 
to make a decision to his agent. In the latter case, the agent can act on behalf of the 
principal. In business organizations, e.g., a manager can delegate his decision power 
to an employee of his choice. 
Hibbing and Alford (2005: pp. 8 & 12) defined a relationship between the parties 
(agent and principal) by telling the participants in the experiment that they acted as 
"representative of another person". The leading idea for the authors was to create an 
experimental environment in which the "representatives have an attachment to a 
51 Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010): p. 539 
52 Daruvala (2007): p. 271 
53 Carlsson et al. (2011): p. 20 
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particular principal or group of principals". The authors conducted a standard dictator 
game54 and compared a participant's transfers of own money (as dictator) with the 
transfers made by the same participant as representative of another person. A spin-
off result55 is that 53.8% of the dictators tended to divide their money equally 
between themselves and their assigned recipient. The proportion increased to 
73.3%56 when a representative unknown to the dictator decided on behalf of this 
dictator. It should be noticed that this increase is statistically significant on an 
approximately 13-percent level, which is far from overwhelming. As these 
percentages are spin-off results they are not further explained by the authors. The 
findings might indicate that people acting as representatives tend to transfer more 
money to a recipient, but it is unclear if this result must be traced to a specific aspect 
of the experiment's design: the representative received a fixed fee, unlike the 
dictator's endowment, and he might be led to adapt his transfer to his own fee. 
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) investigated the risk-taking behavior of investment 
managers handling clients' (=other people's) money. The result of an investment 
game experiment (lottery) showed investment managers to take higher risks staking 
their own money and to take lower risks staking other people's money. The authors 
had informed the participants about the roles to be taken (investment manager and 
client), and they had defined a relationship characterized by high responsibility57 
between the investment manager and the client. In the frame of this design, the 
investment manager might be obliged to act in favor of the client which fits Eriksen 
and Kvaløy's research context but might lead to confounding effects creating 
behavior distortion undesirable for the research targets of the thesis on hand. 
Hamman et al. (2010) analyzed whether decisions on transfers to a third party taken 
by an agent were characterized by more self-interest and a less pro-social behavior 
than decisions taken by the principal (dictator) himself. The laboratory experiment of 
the authors showed that agents shared less of the principal's money with a third 
participant than the principal did himself. The high responsibility relationship was 
created in the following manner: the agent was only paid if the principal selected him 
on the basis of his transfer decisions in previous rounds. The agent was expected to 
keep the money-transfer level low, as he most probably wished to be selected for 
54 Appendix 6.5 gives an introduction to the dictator game. 
55 With no updated investigation in hand, the results should be considered preliminary. Due to 
their research focus on political decision making, the authors aimed at understanding 
political representatives deciding on behalf of constituents known to them. 
56 While in the text a proportion of 73.3% in total is mentioned several times, the table 
presented in the appendix discriminates between a 5$-5$ apportionment (70% in total) and 
a 2$-8$ apportionment (3.3% in total).  
57 "The investor is your client, and your task is to manage his/her money" (Eriksen and Kvaløy 
2010: p. 539). 
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another round with the opportunity to earn money for himself. The results of the study 
do not indicate that the agent handles the principal's money more carefully. 
In a laboratory economic experiment, Makowsky et al. (2014) examined changes in 
contributions when these contributions were made on behalf of a group. A first round 
of a standard public goods game (based on Fischbacher et al. 2001) served as a 
baseline. In a second round, randomly chosen 'leaders' with a fixed payoff had to 
"make decisions on behalf of their group – acting as a trustee for the group and its 
resources – while playing with other trustees" (Makowsky et al. 2014: p. 45). The 
leader's fixed payoff differed from the other group members' endowment. Makowsky 
et al. found out that trustees' (leaders') contributions to the public goods game out of 
their group members' endowment were frequently higher than those out of their own 
endowment (in the first round). The authors explicitly linked their study to leadership 
literature and concluded from their findings that "agents acting in leadership roles 
behave differently from the rest of the group" (Makowsky et al. 2014: p. 45). In their 
experiment, a high-responsibility relationship is created which possibly exerts an 
influence on the results. According to Makowsky et al. (2014: p. 51), an officially 
appointed leader might only be considered to act effectively if he "maximizes overall 
resources accruing in the game". Additionally, the chosen leader was made known at 
the end of the experiment, this might lead the respective subjects to strategic 
decision making. 
 
3.2.2. Deciding for Someone Else in a 
Medium-Responsibility Relationship 
 
Authors included in the second cluster – medium-responsibility relationship – 
explicitly transfer authority, but compared to the first cluster, do not frame the 
instructions to further raise the level of responsibility. An experiment designed by 
Daruvala (2007) investigated, among other things, how individuals take risk-decisions 
on behalf of others; especially the decision-making parameters were of interest to 
him. Two rounds were run. In the first round the participants were asked to choose 
between two alternatives (risky vs. non-risky). In the second round the same 
procedure was followed, but the decision had to be taken by an individual for a 
group. A specific role description to increase the level of responsibility within the 
relationship was not presented in the experimental instruction58. Receiving a fixed 
58 "Your task is to make a decision on behalf of the other people in this group" (Daruvala 
2007: p. 271). 
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payment, the person executing the decision for the group was not affected by the 
chosen alternative. The experiment revealed that in the second round the decision 
taker's criterion for determining the alternative to be selected was a combination of 
his own risk preferences and the averaged assumed risk preferences of the group. 
The article does not specifically investigate changes in the chosen risk alternative. 
Chakravarty et al. (2011) might fill this gap. The authors designed two risk 
experiments (lottery and bid auctions) to get an answer to a question comparable to 
that of Daruvala. In their experiment Chakravarty et al. delegated a risky decision to 
an individual and investigated changes in risk taking. The results indicate that 
delegates are less averse to risks when they decide on other people's money instead 
of their own. 
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) dealt with the question whether a dictator's 
delegation of unpopular decisions to a delegee implies a shift of blame to the delegee 
as a decision maker as well. Their research focused on the punishment behavior of 
the persons affected by the decisions. The authors designed an experiment based on 
a dictator game, inclusive of the possibility to delegate decisions and to punish other 
participants in the experiment by reducing their payoff. It was made transparent to all 
participants that a decision was delegated59, but no further wordings were used to 
increase responsibility level. The dictator could choose freely whether he wanted to 
take the decision (fair or unfair allocation60) himself or delegate it to a third party. 
Subsequently, the receiver had the option of punishing the principal or the delegee 
by withdrawing experimental points from the dictator's or delegee's account. As the 
study focused on the punishment activities, the amount of fair or unfair allocations is 
not of main interest for the authors. An interpretation of the numeric results that is 
more suitable for the special focus of the thesis on hand does not evidence a 
significant difference between unfair and fair allocations by the dictator or the 
delegee. The treatment with no punishment option shows that 79% of the dictators 
and 83% of the delegated third parties allocated unfairly. With a punishment option 
available, 38% of the dictators and 40% of the delegees chose an unfair split. This 
result is not surprising because the payoff function is identical for the dictator and the 
potentially chosen delegee, consequently the delegee makes a decision in 
awareness of the consequences to his own endowment. Therefore the experimental 
59 Medium-responsibility relationship: "Participant A can either choose between allocations 1 
and 2 or he/she can delegate this decision to participant B. [...] participant B makes the 
decision" (Bartling and Fischbacher 2011: p. Appendix II). 
60 Fair = equal split between all parties; unfair = principal and agent receive 90% of the 
endowment. 
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results cannot be indicative of how an agent decides for someone else without being 
affected himself. 
Focusing on trust in a delegation setting, Kvaløy and Luzuriaga (2014) carried out an 
economic experiment. In a baseline treatment, a standard trust game (based on Berg 
et al. 1995) was executed; a second treatment incorporated the management of 
other people's money. In this treatment, the standard roles of a trust game (sender, 
receiver) were supplemented by a third player (client). Each of these three parties 
was fitted out with an endowment of 100 NOK61. The sender decided, in a medium-
responsibility relationship62, on behalf of the client without any effect on his own 
endowment. The experimental results show that "[s]enders who manage other 
people's money do not behave significantly different from senders who manage their 
own money" (Kvaløy and Luzuriaga 2014: p. 623). In the baseline treatment, the 
senders transferred 65.04 NOK of their own endowment to the receiver; in the 
second treatment, the transfer amounted to 59.18 NOK, thus being nearly unaltered. 
There is no significant difference between the treatments (Mann-Whitney test: z=0.80 
/ p=0.42). As the authors' focus was on trust, i.e. the behavior of the sender and the 
receiver, they did not conduct further investigations by, e.g., analyzing data on an 
individual level. 
 
3.2.3. Deciding for Someone Else in a 
Low-Responsibility Relationship 
 
Unlike the other clusters, this cluster comprises authors whose research designs 
were exclusive of additional descriptions of a relationship. Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2008) published63 a dictator game-like experiment. The participants were asked to 
take a binary decision (safe vs. risky option64). Bolton and Ockenfels aimed to 
understand how risk preferences adapt when a new recipient is introduced who is 
affected by the risk taken by the decision maker65 ('chooser'), but is not allowed to 
make any decision himself. In total, fourteen binary-choice problems (safe or risky) 
were developed to identify adapting risk preferences when problems due to the social 
61 Norwegian krone: at the time of the experiment 6 NOK ≈ 1 USD. 
62 "[...] trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver) does this on behalf of a 
third party [...]" (Kvaløy and Luzuriaga 2014: p. 616). 
63 Based on insights from Bohnet et al. (2008). 
64 Safe = guaranteed payoff for the chooser; risky = 50% chance of getting a higher payback 
or zero. 
65 Low-responsibility relationship: "You are randomly assigned to another person in this room. 
One of the two persons is Participant A and the other one is Participant B. [...] Participant A 
has to choose [...]" (Bolton and Ockenfels 2008: p. 8). 
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context were introduced. One result of Bolton and Ockenfels' experiment is that the 
decision taker is more averse to risks if another person is affected by the decision; 
the chooser restrains his own preferences and tends to choose a lower risk level 
when an additional party is introduced. 
Several interesting characteristics of the experimental design and the achieved 
results make the study of Carlsson et al. (2011) worth including in this cluster. 
Carlsson et al. designed a laboratory experiment, based on a standard dictator 
game, with a dictator (one member of a group totaling four) and a charity as the 
recipient of a donation. A relationship66 was not further defined in the experimental 
instruction and assigned to the participants in this experiment. The authors aimed to 
find out how a participant's individual donation adapts when he has to dictate67 a 
fixed minimum donation binding on all members of the group. At first each participant 
was asked to decide on the amount of his individual donation to the charity. The 
outcomes were compared with the decisions taken by the same participant for the 
other group members. When the dictator prescribed an amount for the group he was 
also bound to this amount. 64% of the decision makers did not change their 
individual donation when prescribing an amount for the group, but the mean donation 
of the whole group dropped significantly from 112 SEK68 to 99 SEK. In another 
treatment, the dictator fixing a minimum amount for the other group members was 
not bound to this amount himself, but was forced to make the predetermined 
individual donation. The results showed an even greater decrease in donation (52 
SEK). The participants were informed about the role assigned to them (dictator or 
group member) at the time of the payment, i.e. after their donation decision. Due to 
the experiment's design, the results are not transferable to the thesis on hand, 
focusing on individual decision making, and neither is the experimental design itself, 
as confounding effects might occur resulting from the timing of the information about 
the role assignment. 
 
 
 
 
66 Low-responsibility relationship: "Your second choice is to decide how much of your 
endowment of 150 kronor you want to donate to the orangutan project when everyone in 
your group must donate the same amount as you" (Carlsson et al. 2011: p. 22). 
67 As in the role of a dictator in a dictator game (compare Appendix 6.5). 
68 Swedish krona: at the time of the experiment 7 SEK ≈ 1 USD. 
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3.2.4. Overview of Publications and 
Derivation of Research Suggestions 
 
Especially risk literature has lately put a lot of effort into trying to understand risk 
preferences when it comes to making decisions on behalf of another person. The 
results identify risk restraints when other people's money is dealt with; literature 
investigating monetary-transfer decisions, in contrast, present discordant findings. 
Results differ across clusters as well as within clusters, mainly due to the fact that the 
authors' research foci partly vary and the experimental designs fail to concentrate on 
the basic question how people deal with other people's money. Current experimental 
designs seem to lead to distorted results. A high-responsibility relationship, for 
example, might make an agent feel obliged to act as a good agent (who does what is 
expected), and a participant in an experiment who is not informed of his role prior to 
his decision might more than habitually restrain himself. At present, no literature 
appears to be available solely focusing on the management of other people's money 
in consideration of different responsibility levels concerning the relationship between 
the involved parties. Up to now, a question almost inevitably arising from Adam Smith 
and Milton Friedman's concern about possible mishandlings of others' funds remains 
unanswered: how do people deal with other people's money? Chapter 3 is intended 
to close this information gap and give first answers to Smith's and Friedman's 
statements by taking the following guidelines into account: 
 
 Apply an environment that allows control over the mainly 
influencing parameters and elimination of parameters distracting 
from the research goal. 
 Ensure that the decision made when dealing with other people's 
money has no fictive, but real effects on the involved parties. 
 Address the question 'How do people handle other people's 
money?' by taking the potential effect of responsibility levels into 
consideration. 
 Create a research design built on a frequently used design with 
proven results. 
 
On the basis of the viewed literature, an economic laboratory experiment is the most 
recommendable research method to address the framed guidelines and to derive the 
necessary data for an analysis. 
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3.3. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
 
Latest economic science makes use of laboratory experiments to investigate human 
behavior in general and behavioral interactions in particular. The results provide a 
solid foundation for this chapter to build on. The presented authors carried out 
experiments because "they can offer clean tests of economic theories by constructing 
experiments that meet the assumptions of the theories, and observing the outcomes" 
(Croson 2002: p. 945). To test Friedman's prediction and to analyze how managers 
act in their companies in the field of conviction CSR, a two-step approach is applied. 
As a first step, a person's handling of other people's money needs to be extracted. 
To obtain the necessary empirical data without unwanted external factors biasing the 
behavior of interest, an environment is needed in which a high level of internal 
validity is achievable. A controlled human economic experiment69 in a laboratory 
environment without any contextual element can ensure internal validity, and if an 
individual's decision leads to a real disbursement the respective choices of interest 
can be extracted (Smith 1976; Croson 2002 and 2005). The non-fictive monetary 
outcome of the individual's decision on other people's money eliminates hypothetical 
behavior and ensures real effects on the involved parties as requested by the framed 
guidelines for the thesis on hand. 
The exclusion of contextual elements might be risky as regards the laboratory 
experiment's external validity, as "all forms of thinking and problem solving are 
context-dependent" (Loewenstein 1999: p. F30). Thus, as a second step, an 
additional economic experiment is necessary with an amount of context increased to 
a level where external validity is secured as well (Bachke et al. 2013). 
In accordance with the presented literature, an economic laboratory experiment is 
designed, consisting of two treatments, each of which uses a setting with 
independent parties to address this chapter's research aim. Based on the studies 
published within the delegation and risk literature, the dictator game (see Appendix 
6.5), a method with robust results of investigations into the management of other 
people's money, is chosen as the basic design across all treatments of the 
experiment. Aside from different contextual frames, both treatments use the same 
experimental structure to allow for a ceteris paribus comparison. The first treatment is 
neutrally framed (Treatment 1 / T1) with a relationship characterized by a low-
responsibility level between the involved parties to reveal undistorted decisions with 
regard to the handling of other people's money. The second treatment (Treatment 2 / 
T2) integrates a business scenario – leading inevitably to a high-responsibility 
69 See Croson (2002 and 2005) for insights into the methodology of economic experiments. 
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relationship – into the design of Treatment 1 to improve external validity. In the 
following, both treatments will be explained. As they are designed identically the 
explanation of the business scenario will be limited to the major adaptions. 
 
3.3.1. Treatment 1: Neutral 
 
The experiment must be designed to answer the question how people handle other 
people's money. More precisely, the experiment should disclose how people adapt 
their behavior deciding on others' funds in contrast to deciding on their own funds. 
The dictator game can be considered as a proven foundation to start with. Even if the 
dictator game has been a point of discussion for many critics (see Engel 2011), it is 
the first choice for the experimental framework. Using the developed experimental 
design (which will later be explained in detail) allows critical aspects to be bypassed, 
because the experiment is designed to identify 'changes' in the individual behavior of 
subjects. The critical view of dictator game aspects mentioned above results from a 
faulty interpretation of the reasons for the transfer to a receiver. If dictators are 
influenced, for example, by their own aversion to inequity, then they are driven by the 
motivation to achieve equitable outcomes (Forsythe et al. 1994; Fehr and Schmidt 
1999). Thus critics argue that a participant in an experiment is driven rather by 
fairness preferences than by the hypothesized altruism preference. In the economic 
experiment presented in this chapter the subject's preference is discussed as a 
ceteris paribus condition, thus the type of preference is unimportant to the 
subsequent analysis. 
The dictator role of the standard dictator game is transferred to the developed 
experiment, in which, within the neutral treatment, the dictator is named PLAYER A 
(PA). PLAYER A is endowed with money, and, in Round 1, he is the decision maker. 
But in today's corporations there are more decision makers and more money owners, 
so, to increase external validity, the experimental setting might be more appropriately 
characterized by speaking of a pool of PLAYER As (more than one). With the 
existence of more money owners, the disposable capital of a PLAYER A group is 
nearly unlimited, resulting in an increase in external validity. But the benefit of 
unlimited 'shareholder'-money is counteracted by three factors. Firstly, the 
experiment is intended to investigate the change in behavior in a ceteris paribus 
condition, thus it admits only slight changes in the decisions. Due to 'group effects', 
decisions taken in a group can differ from those taken by a single person, as 
published by several authors (Bornstein and Yaniv 1998; Kocher and Sutter 2005; 
38 
 
Bosman et al. 2006; Charness and Jackson 2007; Luhan et al. 2009; Feri et al. 
2010). Secondly, the experiment should enable the research to be carried out with 
the simplest design possible. The use of a group of PLAYER As could make it difficult 
for the subjects to understand the experimental setting and lead to biased results by 
distracting from the basic question if people can disregard their own preferences. 
And, thirdly, the use of a single PLAYER A as a dictator, like in the present study, 
includes the possibility of a comparison with comprehensive literature providing 
insights into results to be expected (see Appendix 6.5). 
The standard dictator game is modified by choosing a charity organization as 
'recipient'. Such a substitution of the recipient was made by other authors too, e.g. 
Eckel and Grossman (1996); Carpenter et al. (2008); Fong and Luttmer (2009). For 
the thesis on hand the German charity organization 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit' 
(SOS)70 was selected. Three advantages arise out of the choice of a charity as 
receiver. Firstly, a charity fits best the context of CSR and pro-social human 
behavior. The transfer of money from the dictator to the charity equals a real altruistic 
donation which can be made in a private context as well as in a business context; 
keeping the design simple leads to an increase in external validity. Secondly, as the 
research focuses on investigating differences in donations dependent on whether the 
donator decides for himself alone or decides for another person, it makes sense to 
increase the chance of higher donations. Unlike lower transfers, potentially higher 
transfers are more appropriate for detecting behavioral adjustments by promising 
more room for maneuver. The standard dictator game ends up with a mean 
allocation of 28.35%71. Research results show that, due to a strengthening of the 
dictator's altruistic motivation, a charity can expect higher monetary transfers 
(donations) than an anonymous recipient (see Eckel and Grossman 1996; Engel 
2011). Bachke et al. (2013) found out that donations in favor of African children are 
the highest ones. Individuals are especially inclined to donate to health care and 
education campaigns expected to help children in poor regions like Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Furthermore, the authors emphasize the preference for 'SOS Kinderdörfer 
weltweit' receiving 90% of the private donations. Thirdly, a charity as receiver 
counteracts a possible inequity aversion of the dictator because it is no human being 
and thus disables the dictator from drawing comparisons with his own payoff. 
Additionally, a third-party dictator game as presented by Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004) is implemented. The third party takes the role of the 'decider' (deciding on 
70 SOS Children's Villages International 
71 Engel (2011) conducted a meta study and calculated a grand mean of 28.35% from 616 
treatments (including different types of recipients). 
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other people's money) and is called PLAYER B (PB) within the present experiment. 
The addition of a decider provides the opportunity to have two players at one's 
disposal: one player deciding on his own money (PLAYER A) and another player 
deciding on other people's money (PLAYER B). 
In each round of participation, PLAYER A and PLAYER B receive an unearned 
endowment of 155 Taler72 without being set any additional specific task. In contrast 
to an earned endowment, unearned money increases the possibility of higher 
donations to the charity (see Cherry et al. 2002; Carlsson et al. 2010). Other than a 
very low fixed endowment, e.g. 10 Taler, the selected amount of 155 Taler should 
give the decision maker more room for maneuver, which is of special importance for 
the decision taking in Round 2 described below. Authors like Forsythe et al. (1994) 
and Carpenter et al. (2005) showed that the endowment level has no significant 
effect on behavior. Additionally, fixing an odd amount of 155 Taler prevents the 
possibility of a fifty-fifty split; the dictator is compelled to decide on donating more or 
less than 50% of his endowment (see Bolton et al. 1998 for offering equal and non-
equal splits). At the end of the experiment, the Taler amount is converted into Euro 
by factor 0.087 (1.30 Euro per 15 Taler, totaling around 13.50 Euro for the fixed 
amount of 155 Taler), and the participant is paid a show-up compensation of 2.50 
Euro, irrespective of the decisions taken in the experiment. Each participant can earn 
16.00 Euro at most. 
The experiment consists of three rounds. Round 1 provides the control scenario, 
based on the standard dictator game, and serves as a benchmark for the individual 
preferences. Within this control scenario, PLAYER A decides on his own endowment. 
Round 1 shows how much of his own funds PLAYER A is willing to donate to the 
charity, thus revealing his own preferences. In Round 2, PLAYER B (decider) is 
introduced into the dictator game. In Round 1 all participants act as PLAYER As, while 
in Round 2 half of the participants are randomly chosen to take the part of PLAYER B 
(50% of former PLAYER As in Round 1). Each PLAYER A is randomly paired with a 
PLAYER B. PLAYER B also decides on an amount to be donated to the charity, but, in 
contrast to Round 1, the money is withdrawn from the funds of PLAYER A. PLAYER B's 
own endowment is not affected by his decision as it has been fixed at 155 Taler, 
regardless of the amount donated out of PLAYER A's funds; so there is no incentive 
for PLAYER B to optimize his personal finances by choosing a particular donation 
amount (for a decider's fixed payoff see: Hibbing and Alford 2005; Kvaløy and 
Luzuriaga 2014; Makowsky et al. 2014). Thus the genuine effect of the handling of 
72 Fictitious currency 
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PLAYER A's money in the absence of distorting influences can be analyzed (see 
Eriksen and Kvaløy 2010 for a similar reasoning). The set-up of Round 3 is 
comparable to Round 2, inclusive of the roles of PLAYER A, PLAYER B, and 'SOS 
Kinderdörfer weltweit'; the amount of 155 Taler allocated to PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
as a starting-point and the pairing of PLAYER As and PLAYER Bs from Round 2 is not 
changed either. The roles are not randomly assigned and paired again for two 
reasons. Firstly, a former PLAYER A of Round 2 might suspect PLAYER B of 
misspending his endowment and therefore, becoming PLAYER B in Round 3, might 
want to take revenge. Secondly, a PLAYER A of Round 2 is not paired with a new 
PLAYER B in Round 3 to prevent inappropriate considerations possibly biasing the 
results, e.g. 'How much did the former PLAYER B donate?' Again, PLAYER B has to 
decide how many Taler of PLAYER A's money he wants to donate to the charity, and 
again, the donation is of no consequence for his own endowment. As a modification 
of Round 2 PLAYER B is given an additional information prior to his decision: an 
insight into the amount donated by PLAYER A in Round 1, intended to uncover 
PLAYER A's preferences as regards donations to a charity. It is interesting to see how 
the additional information affects PLAYER B's decision on his donation out of PLAYER 
A's endowment. To receive more feedback with regard to PLAYER B's decision 
process the strategy method is implemented: PLAYER B is not told a specific amount 
donated by PLAYER A in Round 1, but is asked to base his own donation on the 
assumption that PLAYER A donated 0, 5, 10, 15 ... 145, 150, 155 Taler respectively. 
For each of PLAYER A's 32 possible donations, PLAYER B is requested to commit 
himself (anonymously and without any consequences to his own endowment) to an 
amount he would be willing to donate out of PLAYER A's endowment, this additional 
information taken into consideration. Findings of other experiments (Brandts and 
Charness 2000; Oxoby and McLeish 2004) show no significant behavioral difference 
between the applied strategy method and executing a one-shot decision. The 
instruction presented to the participants is to be found in Appendix 6.2.1. 
A crucial difference to other published experiments consists in the chosen design 
type. Those experiments mainly used a between-subject design. As the researchers 
did not focus on 'changes' in behavior but rather on a specific behavior due to a 
specific role, their design was correctly chosen. For an answer to the question how 
people handle other people's money, an experiment should be designed that 
addresses individual changes and reveals individual preferences to enable an 
interpretation of the changes. 
Consequently, the present experiment requires different decisions of the same 
subject. In other words, the participants deciding on their own endowment in Round 1 
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and the participants deciding on another person's endowment in Round 2 are the 
same (within-subject design). A huge advantage of this design is the concentration 
on individual behavior by investigating whether people prioritize their personal 
preferences in their decision making, or whether they tend to disregard their 
preferences for other people's sake. Taking different subjects for the decisions on 
donations in Round 1 and Round 2 and comparing the respective average transfers 
may reveal changes in the average transfers as such, but information, if different 
roles lead to a change in behavior, e.g. a restraint of own preferences, can only be 
obtained on an individual level by comparing decisions made in both rounds by one 
and the same subject. 
A risk of this design is that a change in decision might not be due to a restraint or 
realization of the participants' preferences, but rather to the sequence of the 
decisions to be taken (referred to as 'carry-over effects' or 'order effects'): experience 
and practice gained from Round 1 may influence the decisions in Round 2. In spite of 
that, the chosen order of the experiment (1. own money; 2. other people's money) 
has been considered very carefully and potential carry-over or order effects are even 
on purpose. The participants are meant to understand the basic decision-making 
process in Round 1 and to be enabled to empathize with the role of PLAYER A. Later, 
in Round 2 and Round 3, it should be easier for a subject then acting as PLAYER B to 
think himself into the position of PLAYER A, and he will be aware that his decision is 
not inconsequential to PLAYER A's funds.  
Another negative effect that might result from having the same participant take a 
decision in each of the three rounds is strategic decision making: participants might 
not decide independently in Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3, but, knowing about 
future rounds, they might rather try to optimize their payment. The way of endowing 
the subjects was meant to counteract such strategic decision making. Firstly, the 
fixed amount of 155 Taler was chosen to render conversion into real money (EUR) 
more difficult for the participants, thus they had to deal with 155 Taler and could not 
project their final payoff at the beginning of the experiment. Secondly, the subjects 
were informed that only one round was decisive for their payment and that this round 
would be determined during the payment process by throwing a dice.  
Using this design, the experiment can identify and measure each participant's 
change in his donations individually and the results are not based on averaged 
information about different groups of subjects. 
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3.3.2. Treatment 2: Business 
 
In Treatment 2, the neutral Treatment 1 is transferred to a business scenario, a more 
real-world situation including a relationship characterized by a high responsibility. In 
the following, only the differences to Treatment 1 will be explained. In Treatment 2, 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B are denoted business 'OWNER' (OW) and 'MANAGER' (MA) 
respectively. The receiving charity organization remains the same. The participants, 
having been informed about the business scenario by the experimental instructions, 
are asked to identify with the assigned role. In Round 1, the scenario description 
outlines that the business OWNER (PLAYER A) owns and controls a company called 
'Ziegel-STEIN'. The company produces and sells bricks73, and the OWNER is the 
leader of his company. As a tax-free income all corporate profits belong to the 
business OWNER. In Round 1, the total corporate profit of 155 Taler has been 
transferred to his private account. The story continues with the business OWNER 
receiving a letter from the charity 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit' in which he is asked for 
a donation out of his private account. Just as in Treatment 1, this decision reveals the 
individual preferences of the decision maker. 
In Round 2 and Round 3, the company 'Ziegel-BAU' is introduced. The set-up and 
the purpose of the companies 'Ziegel-STEIN' and 'Ziegel-BAU' are identical. The 
different company names underline that the decisions and payments of Round 1, 
Round 2, and Round 3 are separated from each other. The business OWNER does 
not work in his company 'Ziegel-BAU' anymore and has delegated all decision rights 
concerning all company affairs to a MANAGER. The MANAGER is not required to seek 
approval for his decisions, nor is he accountable to anybody. The MANAGER's salary 
of 155 Taler is not affected by his decisions. The MANAGER receives a letter sent to 
his office by 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit' requesting a donation out of company 
money. The MANAGER (PLAYER B) is aware that a donation out of corporate money 
will reduce corporate profits and, as all profits belong to the OWNER (PLAYER A), will 
reduce the OWNER's income as well. The full instruction for the business-context 
treatment is to be found in Appendix 6.2.2. 
The story developed for each round of Treatment 2 corresponds to the neutrally 
framed design of Treatment 1. Across both treatments, three rounds with two roles at 
the maximum are carried out to achieve comparable results of Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2. To reduce complexity for the participants the story is as simple as 
possible, thus reducing the risk of receiving biased results. From now on the thesis 
73 See Chapter 4 for an explanation why the company is producing and selling bricks. 
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on hand will only use the term PLAYER A (designation from T1) instead of T2: OWNER 
to reduce complexity for the sake of intelligibility, as the terms are interchangeable. 
The same applies to PLAYER B (designation from T1) and T2: MANAGER. 
 
3.3.3. Subject Pool 
 
The sample totals 166 students of the University of Paderborn. 110 students (female: 
57 / male: 53) participated in Treatment 1 and 56 students (female: 28 / male: 28) 
participated in Treatment 2. Out of a pool of students having shown interest in 
attending an economic experiment, 1,697 persons74, randomly chosen by use of the 
software 'ORSEE' (Greiner 2004), were invited by e-mail. Based on the first-come-
first-served principle, 166 students were selected. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
participants' field of study. 
 
        
    Field of study # Students Percentage  
                 
Treatment 1 
  Business science75 57 52%  
   Educational science 30 27%  
   Others 23 21%  
   Total 110 100%  
                 
Treatment 2 
  Business science75 35 63%  
   Educational science 16 29%  
   Others 5 9%  
   Total 56 100%  
        
Table 3: Fields of study (T1, T2) 
 
3.3.4. Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment took place in the 'BaER Lab (Business and Economic Research 
Laboratory)' at the University of Paderborn. The participants were randomly assigned 
to an experimental session.76 The subjects were paid a show-up compensation of 
74 Inclusive of the invitations to the investigation presented in Chapter 4. 
75 Comprising business science, international business studies, industrial engineering with 
business studies, business informatics, economic pedagogy. 
76 T1: two sessions February 8, 2012; two sessions April 25, 2012; T2: two sessions June 21, 
2012 - starting at around 9 a.m., 11 a.m., 2 p.m. or 4.30 p.m. 
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2.50 EUR and an amount depending on their performance in the experiment. On 
their arrival, the students proved their identity (Figure 3: step 1) and were asked to 
draw their seat number. Each participant sat in front of a computer with the software 
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) installed. Each place was furnished with visual-protection 
fences. 
 
 
Figure 3: Experimental procedure's process steps (T1, T2) 
 
After all participants took their allocated places, each received the printed instructions 
(Figure 3: step 2). The original German versions of both instructions are accessible in 
the appendix (see Appendix 6.2.1 and Appendix 6.2.2). All subjects were given 
identical instructions, and sufficient time for reading and understanding the 
instructions was afforded. The instructions provide full information about the 
experimental procedure (i.e. about Round 1, Round 2, a basic overview of Round 3) 
and they explain the main experimental rules and the payment modalities. As 
donations to a charity are an important part of the experiment, the participants need 
to trust the experimenter to pass any donation on to the charity. Therefore, the 
instructions made it absolutely clear that all donations made during the experiment 
would be transferred to the charity's bank account after the experiment had finished. 
In addition, an official bank statement was published on the 'BaER Lab' homepage 
within one week after the end of the experiment. Prior to the real experiment the 
participants had to answer some questions testing their comprehension of the 
instructions by means of z-Tree (Figure 3: step 3). Only if all questions were 
answered correctly the participant could start on the experiment. 
In Round 1 (Figure 3: step 4 / Figure 4) all participants acted as PLAYER A, each of 
them endowed with 155 Taler and having to make one personal decision on how 
many Taler (0 min, 155 max; in steps of five) of his endowment he wanted to donate 
to the charity 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit'. The chosen amount had to be entered in 
z-Tree and was deducted from PLAYER A's endowment. 
Check identity of 
participants Execute Round 1
Execute 
understanding 
questions
Hand out 
instructions
Execute Round 3 See donation results
Answer 
questionnaire
Participants' tasks (using z-Tree)Experimenter's tasks
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
Execute Round 2
Separately call up
each participant
Pay participants 
based on the 
determined round
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Figure 4: Description of Round 1 (T1, T2) 
 
Round 2 (Figure 3: step 5 / Figure 5) restored everything to the starting-point. 
Decisions in Round 1 had no effect on the second round. The subject group was 
halved into PLAYER As and PLAYER Bs, which means that half of the participants in 
the role of PLAYER A in Round 1 now took the part of PLAYER B, while the other half 
continued as PLAYER As. The assignment of the respective role was anonymously 
randomized by z-Tree. Each PLAYER B was paired with one PLAYER A. Z-Tree notified 
all participants of their assigned role and each PLAYER B was informed that he was 
linked up with a present PLAYER A. PLAYER A and PLAYER B started with a new 
endowment of 155 Taler (identical to Round 1). 
 
 
Figure 5: Description of Round 2 (T1, T2) 
 
In Round 2 PLAYER B alone was asked to make a decision by determining 
anonymously how many Taler of PLAYER A's endowment he wanted to donate. His 
own endowment was not affected by his decision and PLAYER A had no right to 
intervene. PLAYER B was in full control of PLAYER A's money and could decide without 
any restriction or consequential punishment. The chosen donation had to be entered 
PLAYER A
Receives donation amount
Endowment: 0 Taler
Payoff: 0 Taler + donation amount
Decides on donation amount
Endowment: 155 Taler
Payoff: 155 Taler - donation amount
Donation amount
0, 5, 10, …, 145, 150, 155
a) Logo is property of SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit (http://www.sos-kinderdoerfer.de)
a)
Decider
Decider
PLAYER A
Receives donation amount
Endowment: 0 Taler
Payoff: 0 Taler + donation amount
Transfers donation amount
Endowment: 155 Taler
Payoff: 155 Taler - donation amount
Donation amount
0, 5, 10, …, 145, 150, 155
PLAYER B
Decides on PLAYER A's donation amount
Endowment: 155 Taler 
Payoff: 155 Taler (fixed)
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into z-Tree and PLAYER A's endowment was reduced by this amount. Without being 
granted any decision authority, PLAYER A was merely asked about the amount he 
estimated PLAYER B was going to donate (input into z-Tree again). 
Round 3 (Figure 3: step 6) restored everything to the starting-point again. Prior to the 
experiment, only basic information about Round 3 had been given. On the one hand 
this information was due to the necessity of being frank with the participants; on the 
other hand it was not intended to be circumstantial to prevent any influences on the 
subjects' decisions in the previous rounds. At the beginning of Round 3 the 
instructions for this round were presented in detail on each participant's screen. All 
players kept their assigned roles of Round 2 and the pairing of PLAYER As and 
PLAYER Bs made in Round 2 was not changed either.  
As Figure 6 demonstrates, PLAYER B had to decide thirty-two times on a donation in 
Round 3 on the assumption that PLAYER A donated 0, 5, 10, ... 145, 150, 155 Taler in 
Round 1. For each assumed amount PLAYER B had to determine a donation to be 
transferred to the charity out of PLAYER A's endowment. Again, it had been made 
clear that PLAYER B was free to type in any amount from 0 to 155 Taler (in steps of 5 
Taler). 
 
 
Figure 6: Description of Round 3 (T1, T2) 
 
All inputs were collected by z-Tree. Comparable to Round 2, PLAYER A was asked 
about his estimate of each of the 32 donation decisions made by PLAYER B. The 
participants were informed that the payment out of Round 3 was determined in the 
following way. The real donation amount of PLAYER A in Round 1 was ascertained 
(e.g. 10 Taler). On the assumption of exactly this donation (one out of 32 
possibilities) PLAYER B had decided in Round 3 on his donation out of PLAYER A's 
funds (e.g. 25 Taler). Then PLAYER A's endowment was deducted by the amount 
chosen by PLAYER B (in that case: 25 Taler). After Round 3 the experiment was 
completed. 
Subsequently, the subjects were asked to answer a personality questionnaire (Figure 
3: step 7). In the experiment, PLAYER B's decisions affected the endowment of 
PLAYER A, and as some PLAYER As might be frustrated by the way other people dealt 
Taler
Possible donations in 
Round 1 by PLAYER A 0 5 10 15 … 140 145 150 155
32 independent 
donation decisions in 
Round 3 by PLAYER B
Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 … Decision 29 Decision 30 Decision 31 Decision 32
Real donation by 
PLAYER A
Transfer to charity 
in Round 3
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with their money, the participants were not informed about their earning prior to the 
questionnaire in order to prevent answers biased by emotions due to the knowledge 
of PLAYER B's decisions. The questionnaire consists of items concerning personality, 
experimental decisions, and statistics. A comprehensive explanation of the 
questionnaire is to be found in Section 3.3.5. 
Having responded to the questionnaire the subjects were informed on screen about 
their earnings for all three rounds (Figure 3: step 8), after which the payment process 
started. Each participant was individually called up by his specific place number 
(Figure 3: step 9) and, separated from the other participants, used a dice to 
determine the round relevant to his own payment (Figure 3: step 10). To counteract 
strategic decision making during the experiment, only one of three rounds was laid 
down to be relevant to the payment. Instead of having one subject throw the dice as 
the representative for everybody else, each participant was asked to throw his own 
dice, thus indicating that he was the one determining the relevant round, not a person 
unknown to him. In addition to the payment for the round chosen by the dice, each 
participant received an attendance fee of 2.50 EUR. 
 
3.3.5. Personality Questionnaire 
 
As interindividual differences between the participants can be held sure, a 
questionnaire was designed to reveal the different personality patterns, in 
accordance with Brandstätter (1993: p. 482), who claims that "[e]xperimental 
economics ... may also profit from including short versions of basic personality scales 
in their design, in order to find out why people often do not behave as the rational 
(economic) model would suggest". The questionnaire aims to be helpful to better 
understand the underlying decision processes and to provide general statistics of the 
participants. It is structured as follows: personality, experimental decisions, and 
statistics. 
The questionnaire was designed to cover the experiments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4. The items are identical for both experiments thus increasing the total of answers 
and, therefore, the validity of the results across both experiments (see Section 5.1). 
In the present chapter the complete questionnaire is represented, although some 
selected items are not used in Chapter 3. For the personality measurement, three 
psychological inventories77 were employed to achieve a comprehensive overview 
and get an opportunity to focus on specific aspects: SOEP (Sozio-oekonomisches 
77 A complete list of the used items is to be found in Appendix 6.6.1. 
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Panel)78, HEXACO79 Personality Inventory-Revised, and IBES (Inventar 
berufsbezogener Einstellungen und Selbsteinschätzungen)80. 
For a comprehensive overview the Big-Five approach, first suggested by McCrae 
and Costa (1987), was applied. This concept defines personality as a composition of 
the very broad dimensions Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Conscientiousness, 
and Agreeableness. Owing to limitations of time and space, an excerpt of the Big-
Five Short Inventory tested by the SOEP was applied in the present study. The 
SOEP is a representative panel survey of German households (for further information 
see Wagner et al. 1993). In addition to usual statistical questions, the SOEP consists 
of general personality items to disclose a person's characteristics. The last-
mentioned part presents the respondents with 16 statements beginning 'I am a 
person who ...'. The respondents decide on their degree of approval on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1='do not agree at all' to 7='agree completely'.  
For a better assessment of the participants' personality traits specific inventories 
were chosen. The more recent HEXACO Personality Inventory by Lee and Ashton 
(2006; Ashton and Lee 2007 and 2009) assesses scores for six domain-level scales: 
Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness (versus Anger), 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. Each of these domains consists of 
four facet-level scales plus Altruism as an interstitial scale with up to 200 items. 
An advantage of the HEXACO Personality Inventory is that each facet-level scale 
can be used as a stand-alone scale and thus serve for a focus study. The three 
scales most promising for the aims of this research are Fairness, Greed Avoidance, 
and Altruism. 
The questionnaire designed for this study was enlarged by integrating the IBES test. 
The IBES, created by Marcus (2006; Marcus et al. 2007), is a German integrity test 
to predict behavior in job situations. It consists of two parts – overt and personality-
based – with different subscales, one of which was selected for the study on hand: 
Trouble Avoidance. This self-report inventory measures the integrity of applicants 
with the aim of predicting counter-productive behavior and is the German answer to 
approaches in the United States where commercial integrity tests are already 
common human-resource management practice. The IBES consists of 155 items (60 
overt and 55 personality-based) evaluated for nine subscales. The overt items are 
relevant to the scales General Trust, Rationalization of Deviant Behavior, Perceived 
78 Socio-Economic Panel 
79 'HEXACO' is derived from the personality traits: Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, 
eXtraversion, Agreeableness (versus Anger), Conscientiousness and Openness to 
Experience. 
80 Job Related Attitudes and Self-Evaluations Inventory 
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Counterproductivity Norms, and Behavioral Intentions or Fantasies; the personality-
based items are relevant to the scales Manipulativeness, Stimulus Seeking, Trouble 
Avoidance, Reliability, and Self-Esteem.  
The subjects have to respond to the items of the HEXACO and the IBES on a five-
point Likert-type scale expressing 1='strong disagreement', 2='disagreement', 
3='neutral (neither agreement nor disagreement)', 4='agreement', and 5='strong 
agreement'. Table 4 describes the personality scales selected from the HEXACO and 
IBES. 
 
    
 HEXACO Scale Description (according to Lee and Ashton 2004; http://www.hexaco.org81)  
     Altruism "The Altruism (versus Antagonism) scale assesses a tendency to be sympathetic and 
soft-hearted toward others. High scorers avoid causing harm and react with 
generosity toward those who are weak or in need of help, whereas low scorers are 
not upset by the prospect of hurting others and may be seen as hard-hearted." 
 
         Fairness "The Fairness scale assesses a tendency to avoid fraud and corruption. Low scorers 
are willing to gain by cheating or stealing, whereas high scorers are unwilling to take 
advantage of other individuals or of society at large." 
 
         Greed 
Avoidance 
"The Greed Avoidance scale assesses a tendency to be uninterested in possessing 
lavish wealth, luxury goods, and signs of high social status. Low scorers want to 
enjoy and to display wealth and privilege, whereas high scorers are not especially 
motivated by monetary or social-status considerations." 
 
         Sentimentality "The Sentimentality scale assesses a tendency to feel strong emotional bonds with 
others. Low scorers feel little emotion when saying good-bye or in reaction to the 
concerns of others, whereas high scorers feel strong emotional attachments and an 
empathic sensitivity to the feelings of others." 
 
    
 IBES Scale Description (according to Marcus 2006)  
     Trouble 
Avoidance 
In this context, high scores indicate that the person rather avoids conflicts and strives 
to find a harmonious solution to problems. Such people do not give offence, nor do 
they rarely make themselves unpopular, and they avoid behaving in a way which 
could be set out negatively to them. On the other hand, superiors sometimes feel that 
the person is missing a specific edge or sufficient assertiveness.82 
 
    
Table 4: Applied personality scales (T1, T2) 
 
81 Checked on 2/11/2014 
82 Original German wording: "Hier bedeuten hohe Ausprägungen, dass die Person Konflikten 
eher aus dem Weg geht bzw. eine harmonische Lösung von Problemen anstrebt. Solche 
Menschen ecken nicht an, machen sich selten unbeliebt und meiden Verhalten, das ihnen 
negativ ausgelegt werden könnte. Auf der anderen Seite vermissen Vorgesetzte an ihnen 
manchmal einen gewissen "Biss" oder genügende Durchsetzungsfähigkeit". 
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The second part of the questionnaire designed for this study consists of specific 
(partly open) questions about the experimental design. The subjects were asked, for 
example, if they were able to identify with the assigned roles and which factors 
motivated their decisions during each round. In the questionnaire's final part83 the 
participants were requested to provide some personal information such as their 
private donation behavior, gender, age, or field of study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 See Appendix 6.6.2 for responses of the subjects. 
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3.4. HYPOTHESES 
 
The experiment is designed in such a way that one and the same person makes 
decisions on one and the same matter – an amount donated to a charity – but with 
changes to the effect on his own payoff. The individual preferences regarding the 
charity are revealed in Round 1; they are expected to stay the same for the duration 
of the whole experiment as the same person still decides; only the owner of the 
financial resources affected by the monetary transfer is exchanged. Adam Smith's 
and Milton Friedman's above-mentioned statements (see Section 3.1) in connection 
with the experimental design lead to the first hypothesis. Friedman's presumption is 
very simple, but it needs to be put to the test. Thus, based on Friedman's (1975) 
surmise: "Very few people spend other people's money as carefully as they spend 
their own", or put it the other way round, it is expected that most of the subjects 
handle other people's money differently than their own. Accordingly, the first 
hypothesis reads: 
 
H3.1: Subjects handle other people's Taler endowment in Round 2 
differently than they handle their own Taler endowment in 
Round 1. 
 
Regardless of whether the donations in Round 2 are identical, higher, or lower 
compared to Round 1, it is necessary to understand how participants determine the 
donation amount in Round 2. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced the 
conception that people in uncertain situations tend to use their surroundings for 
setting themselves anchors influencing their decision-making process. As Round 2 
does not disclose the preferences of the related PLAYER A, PLAYER B has to decide in 
an unknown situation as to those preferences. With regard to the experimental 
design PLAYER B can be expected to use his own donation in Round 1 as an anchor, 
which leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
H3.2: When PLAYER B has no knowledge of PLAYER A's donation 
preferences in Round 2, PLAYER B's donation in Round 2 
(out of PLAYER A's funds) is correlated with his own donation 
in Round 1.  
 
Contrariwise, Round 3 discloses PLAYER A's preferences and PLAYER B need not 
decide in an uncertain situation. According to Kahneman and Tversky PLAYER B is 
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expected to use PLAYER A's preferences from Round 1 as an anchor to avoid 
misspending PLAYER A's money in Round 3. PLAYER B is free to accommodate to 
PLAYER A's preferences and donate a comparable amount in Round 3. With a notified 
donation in hand PLAYER B is able to contrast PLAYER A's donation amount in Round 
1 with his own donation preferences. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), among others 
(Kahneman et al. 1986; Turillo et al. 2002), found out that if the monetary transfer 
decided on by one participant did not meet the distribution norm of another judging 
subject or was not seen as fair by that subject, the deciding participant was punished 
with sanctions or the loss of money. The results of Fehr and Fischbacher are quite 
convincing. Each transfer by the dictator falling short of 50% of his available 
endowment was punished by roughly 60% of a judging third party. The following 
hypothesis combines the conception of Kahneman and Tversky, predicting the 
participants to adjust their donation, and the findings of Fehr and Fischbacher, 
evidencing punishing responses if one's norm is not matched. 
 
H3.3a: Round 3 reveals different personality types of PLAYER Bs: 
PLAYER B tending to disregard his own preferences in favor 
of PLAYER A's donation preferences, and PLAYER B punishing 
low donations by PLAYER A in Round 1 by donating a high 
amount in Round 3. 
 
If PLAYER B disregards his own preferences and adjusts to PLAYER A's preferences, 
the anchor conception of Kahneman and Tversky applies predicting that the subject 
will search for an anchor to determine the donation amount. The anchor concept 
strongly suggests an equal behavior of PLAYER B in Round 3 and Round 2. If PLAYER 
B uses an anchor in Round 3, he is likely to do the same in the uncertain situation of 
Round 2. The only anchor available to PLAYER B in Round 2 is his own donation in 
Round 1. 
 
H3.3b: PLAYER B tending to disregard his own preferences in favor 
of PLAYER A's donation preferences in Round 3 shows a high 
correlation between the donations in Round 1 and Round 2. 
 
The results of Fehr and Fischbacher show that punishment occurs when a social 
norm is not met. A social norm characterized by a high donation level is most likely to 
be found among people who are themselves willing to transfer high amounts to 
charities. 
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H3.3c: PLAYER B tending to punish the paired PLAYER A donates 
higher amounts in Round 1 and Round 2 compared to the 
other subjects. 
 
In the literature dealing with the standard dictator game the money transfer is 
regularly traced back to people's preferences, e.g. fairness and altruism. Some 
researchers, however, take a different view; they point out the participant's 
awareness that the experiment is not fully anonymous and that their decisions are 
known to the experimenter. Therefore subjects might adapt their decisions as they do 
not want to be considered greedy (Hoffman et al. 1994). Making allowance for this 
point of view, the experiment's questionnaire has been supplemented with the three 
HEXACO scales Fairness, Altruism, and Greed Avoidance, and the following 
hypotheses are formulated: 
 
H3.4a: The personality factors Fairness, Altruism, and Greed 
Avoidance are positively correlated with the donations of 
PLAYER B in Round 1 and Round 2. 
 
H3.4b: The personality factors Fairness, Altruism, and Greed 
Avoidance are negatively correlated with the deviation of 
PLAYER B's donation in Round 1 from his donation in 
Round 2. 
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3.5. RESULTS 
 
The experiment was designed to investigate PLAYER B's donation changes and his 
willingness to disregard his own preferences. For this reason, z-Tree was 
programmed to divide the subjects into PLAYER As and PLAYER Bs from the 
beginning, and, prior to the experiment, z-Tree had randomly and anonymously 
assigned the roles to the subjects and paired PLAYER As with PLAYER Bs, thus 
making sure that each PLAYER B's donation in Round 1, 2 and 3 could be compared 
and analyzed on an individual level. The participants were informed of their assigned 
role (PLAYER A or PLAYER B) at the beginning of Round 2. In the following, these 
participants will be continually designated as PLAYER B regardless of whether they 
act in Round 1 or Round 2. The following section will present the results of Treatment 
1 and Treatment 2. The underlying z-Tree raw-data files were mainly analyzed and 
displayed graphically by the statistical software Stata (StataCorp. 2007). 
 
3.5.1. Basic Findings 
 
The mean amount donated by all participants (PLAYER As plus PLAYER Bs) in Round 
1 of Treatment 1 is 34.55 Taler (22.29% of their total endowment of 155 Taler) with a 
standard deviation of 38.77 Taler, the mean amount in Round 1 of Treatment 2 is 
31.43 Taler (20.28%) with a standard deviation of 37.14 Taler (see Table 5). There is 
no significant difference between these two amounts (Mann-Whitney test84: z=0.215 / 
p=0.8299). Table 5 additionally lists the mean donations separately for PLAYER As 
and PLAYER Bs. As the participants were not informed of their assigned roles until 
Round 2, a considerable difference between the mean donations of PLAYER As and 
PLAYER Bs cannot well be expected in Round 1. Consistently, their average 
donations in Round 1 do not differ significantly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: T1 
z=0.415 / p=0.6781; T2 z=1.1015 / p=0.3102). Figure 7 shows the distribution for 
both treatments in Round 1. 
 
 
Table 5: PLAYER As' plus PLAYER Bs' donations in Round 1 (T1, T2) 
84 All tests of significance are run as two-sided tests. 
Treatment (N)
PLAYER As + PLAYER Bs
(mean)
PLAYER As
(mean)
PLAYER Bs
(mean)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
between PLAYER As & Bs
Treatment 1 (110) 34.55 Taler 32.00 Taler 37.09 Taler  z=0.415 / p=0.6781
Treatment 2 (56) 31.43 Taler 24.82 Taler 38.04 Taler z=1.015 / p=0.3102
Mann-Whitney test
between T1 & T2
z=0.215 /
p=0.8299
z=0.349 / 
p=0.7267
z=-0.111 / 
p=0.9113
-
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Figure 7: PLAYER AS' plus PLAYER BS' donation distributions in Round 1 (T1, T2) 
 
The hypotheses formulated above focus on PLAYER B, especially on changes in his 
donations and on the question if, in Round 2 and Round 3, he restrains his own 
preferences indicated in Round 1. 
 
3.5.2. Hypothesis 3.1: Testing Friedman's Assumption 
 
H3.1 refers to Friedman's statement reflecting his assessment of people's dealing 
with other people's money. H3.1 was tested by comparing PLAYER B's donation 
entirely out of his own endowment in Round 1 with the same PLAYER B's donation 
entirely out of someone else's endowment in Round 2. 
 
 
Table 6: PLAYER Bs' donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1, T2) 
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Table 6 illustrates that PLAYER B's mean donation in Treatment 1 rose by 60.56% 
from 37.09 Taler in Round 1 to 59.55 Taler (SD: 47.02 Taler) in Round 2 (59.55 Taler 
= 38.42% of the endowment of 155 Taler). In Treatment 2, the increase amounted to 
32.86% from 38.04 Taler in Round 1 to 50.54 Taler (SD: 45.26 Taler) in Round 2 
(50.54 Taler = 32.61% of the endowment). Figure 8, giving an overview of PLAYER 
B's donations in Round 1 and Round 2, illustrates the increase in Round 2: the bars 
shift slightly from left (Round 1: top of Figure 8) to the middle (Round 2: bottom of 
Figure 8). In both treatments, the difference between Round 1 and Round 2 is highly 
significant, as Table 6 demonstrates. 
 
 
Figure 8: PLAYER Bs' donation distributions in Round 1 & 2 (T1, T2) 
 
PLAYER B's higher donations in Round 2 accord with PLAYER A's expectations. In 
Round 2, PLAYER A was asked to estimate the amount PLAYER B was willing to 
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For Round 2, PLAYER As expected a mean donation of 68.55 Taler (SD: 45.93 Taler) 
in Treatment 1 and of 60.00 Taler (SD: 48.17 Taler) in Treatment 2, which seems to 
further support H3.1 and consequently Friedman's hypothesis. But these expected 
amounts exceed PLAYER B's real mean donation by 15.11% in Treatment 1 and 
18.72% in Treatment 2. Figure 9 accumulatively presents the donations by PLAYER B 
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
R
ou
nd
 1
Treatment 1 (N=55)
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
Treatment 2 (N=28)
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
R
ou
nd
 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
57 
 
in Round 1 and Round 2. In Treatment 1, they totaled 2,040 Taler in Round 1 and 
3,275 Taler in Round 2; in Treatment 2, the overall donation amounted to 1,065 Taler 
in Round 1 and 1,415 Taler in Round 2. PLAYER As expected a cumulative donation 
amount of 3,770 Taler in Treatment 1 and of 1,680 Taler in Treatment 2. 
 
 
Figure 9: Mean and accumulated donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1, T2) 
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58.18% against 64.29% (10 Taler deviation) of the participants do not depart from 
their donation preferences, H3.1 and Friedman's statement are not evidenced by this 
experiment's results. As a considerable number of people handle other people's 
money in the same way they handle their own money H3.1 has to be rejected. 
This outcome matches findings of Carlsson et al. (2011). In their laboratory 
experiment, the participants were required to make two decisions on a donation. First 
they had to fix an amount binding only themselves, afterwards they had to fix an 
amount obligatory for themselves as well as for all other participants. 64% of the 
subjects donated the same amount to a charity organization in both experimental 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 10: PLAYER B's donation deviations in Round 2 from Round 1 (T1, T2) 
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make up for the extreme differences caused by subjects entirely reversing their 
donation amount. 
 
 
Figure 11: Donation deviations of Round 2 from Round 1 (T1, T2) 
 
Summarizing the discussion of H3.1, it can be stated that many people believe that 
people do not handle other people's money as carefully as their own, but in reality a 
significant percentage of people deal with other people's money just as they deal with 
their own. 
 
3.5.3. Hypothesis 3.2: Understanding Anchor Function of Round 1 
 
H3.2 is based on the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Although, as the 
discussion of H3.1 pointed out, a considerable number of participants do not 
remarkably change their donation of Round 1 in Round 2, both rounds are 
significantly different, illustrated by correlation coefficients of 0.3653 for Treatment 1 
and 0.9264 for Treatment 2. Regression applying Round 2 as the dependent and 
Round 1 as the independent variable shows support by a regression coefficient of 
0.428 (Robust Std. Err.=0.150 / p=0.006) for Treatment 1 and 0.928 (Robust Std. 
Err.=0.045 / p<0.001) for Treatment 2. The results of both treatments provide a highly 
0
5
10
15
20
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
-155 -125 -100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Deviation options (Taler): Round 2 - Round 1
Treatment 1 (N=55)
0
5
10
15
20
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
-155 -125 -100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Deviation options (Taler): Round 2 - Round 1
Treatment 2 (N=28)
60 
 
significant support of H3.2. Donations of PLAYER BS in Round 1 and Round 2 are 
correlated, thus the preferences shown in Round 1 can help to predict the donations 
in Round 2. 
 
3.5.4. Hypothesis 3.3a: Revealing Personality Types 
 
The design of Round 3 includes a revelation of PLAYER A's preferences to PLAYER B, 
thus removing the uncertain situation. While the participants were asked in Round 1 
and Round 2 to decide once, they had to make 32 independent decisions in Round 3. 
PLAYER Bs were presented with 32 possible donations in Round 1 by their paired 
PLAYER A and the additional information that only one of these was true. Round 3 is 
highly informative regarding the handling of other people's money by persons who 
have knowledge of the others' donation preferences. 
Figure 12 (T1) and Figure 13 (T2) show the results of Round 3. Each small graph 
presents the donation decisions by a single PLAYER B (y-axis) for each assumed 
donation by PLAYER A in Round 1 (x-axis: 0, 5, 10, 15, ..., 145, 150, 155 Taler). An 
interpretation of the different graphs' characteristics yields three noticeable elements. 
The first obvious pattern is the flat trend, indicating that subjects did not adjust their 
donation to that of their counterpart. This group is called 'persisters' as they are 
uninfluenced by PLAYER A's preferences. Subjects belonging to this group have one 
donation preference which continually predominates other influencing factors of 
Round 3. In general, the decision to donate a constant amount has already been 
reached in Round 2 or even Round 1. One representative participant answered the 
related questionnaire's item: "As I did not donate so much [in Round 1] the other 
party can do that [in Round 2 and Round 3]."85 Other participants acted across all 
rounds in the same way: "I determined an amount for myself in Round 1 and 
consequently specified this amount for the paired participants."86 Another repeating 
graphic pattern is the increasing trend, indicating that PLAYER B matches his 
donations to those of the paired PLAYER A. To reach this matching, PLAYER B 
disregards his own preferences and uses PLAYER A's donation as a guide for his own 
decision. Subjects showing an increasing trend are called 'adapters' by the author. A 
descending trend in the left-hand part of a graph is characteristic of the third 
observable graphic element. PLAYER B seems to punish PLAYER A for donating a too 
85 Original German wording: "Da ich selber nicht so viel gespendet habe, kann das dafür der 
andere machen." 
86 Original German wording: "Ich habe für mich im Durchlauf 1 einen Betrag festgelegt und 
auch konsequent diesen bei den zugeordneten Teilnehmern angegeben." 
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small amount or not complying with a social norm. In spite of being aware that only 
one experimental round decides on their payment, some subjects use their chance of 
punishment, as statements in the questionnaire illustrate: "If participant A was 
reluctant to donate an adequate amount of Taler I 'punished' him by proportionally 
donating his Taler quota."87; "Hard-heartedness should be punished."88; "Punishment 
for a low donation, reward for a high donation."89 Subjects whose graphs show a 
descending element in the left-hand part are designated as 'punishers'. 
As different personality types are revealed in Round 3, H3.3a is supported, 
concerning both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. Using the insights gained in Round 3, 
a 'personality model for the handling of other people's money' was developed. All 
kinds of graphs, like those shown by Figure 12 and Figure 13, can be assigned to a 
category of this three-group model (Figure 14). The effects on Round 1 and Round 2 
will be addressed by the review of the following hypotheses. 
 
 
Figure 12: PLAYER Bs' donations in Round 3 (T1) 
 
 
87 Original German wording: "Wenn der Teilnehmer A nicht bereit war, seinen Talerbetrag zu 
spenden, habe ich ihn 'bestraft' und anteilsmäßig die Taler gespendet." 
88 Original German wording: "Hartherzigkeit sollte bestraft werden." 
89 Original German wording: "Strafe für geringe Spende, Belohnung für hohe Spende." 
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Figure 13: MANAGERs' donations in Round 3 (T2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Personality model for the handling of other people's money 
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3.5.5. Hypothesis 3.3b: Analyzing Adapters 
 
Within the framework of the developed personality model, the different graphs 
illustrating the donations in Round 3 are assigned to their specific category (see 
Appendix 6.2.1.3 [T1] and 6.2.2.3 [T2] for a detailed overview). The assignment is 
based on the visual evaluation of the graphs by the author. Group 1, the 'persisters' 
group, totals 14 participants (T1: N=8 / T2: N=6). If Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are 
combined, Group 2, the 'adapters' group, totals 32 subjects (T1: N=23 / T2: N=9). 
Group 3, the 'punishers' group, is the largest one consisting of 44 participants (T1: 
N=30 / T2: N=14). For a review of H3.3b, both treatments were jointly analyzed 
because of the critically small size of the selected groups. A small number of 
observations increases the risk of faulty interpretations, and, moreover, the above 
review of the previous hypothesis has shown that the results of both treatments are 
identical. 
With respect to H3.2, the most interesting value is the mean absolute deviation of the 
donations in Round 2 from those in Round 1. This value is a measure of how Round 
2 adjusts to Round 1 and consequently of the potential of Round 1 to serve as an 
anchor. A low value will show Round 1 to be a stronger anchor, as the subject did not 
distinctly vary his donation in Round 2, whereas a higher value shows both rounds to 
be only weakly connected, or that there is no connection at all. It seems reasonable 
to assume that adapters have a higher motivation to look for an anchor when they 
have to determine an amount of their donation. Figure 15 presents the donations' 
mean deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 for adapters and non-adapters, i.e. all 
subjects not assigned to the adapters group. The mean deviation of the adapters is 
5.43 Taler short of that of the non-adapters. Non-adapters' donations in Round 2 
averaged 25% higher than in Round 1, which indicates that non-adapters do not use 
their own donation of Round 1 as an anchor, whereas the smaller deviation of 
adapters might be interpreted as a first sign that in an unknown situation adapters do. 
For a closer examination of the dependency of Round 2 on Round 1 regression was 
applied. The review of H3.2 by means of regression already showed Round 1 to 
function as an anchor for the decision process in Round 2. The coefficient is 
expected to be higher for adapters than for non-adapters. Regression yields a 
coefficient of 0.675 (Robust Std. Err.=0.164 / p<0.001) for adapters and a coefficient 
of 0.600 (Robust Std. Err.=0.117 / p<0.001) for non-adapters. The coefficient is only 
very slightly higher for adapters, and the Mann-Whitney test reveals no significant 
difference between the two groups (z=-0.245 / p=0.8065). The supposition that 
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adapters are more bound to their donation in Round 1 than non-adapters is not 
supported by the results of Round 3. Consequently, H3.3b has to be rejected. 
 
 
Figure 15: Non-/adapters' donation deviations in Round 2 from Round 1 (T1 + T2) 
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Across all rounds, they have a generally stronger preference for donating money to a 
charity, regardless of the source of investment. Punishers donated nearly 60% more 
20.94
26.37
0
10
20
30
Ta
le
r (
m
ea
n)
Treatment 1 + Treatment 2 (N=83)
Adapters Non-adapters
65 
 
Taler in Round 1 than non-punishers did and with nearly 40% more Taler only slightly 
less in Round 2. Consequently, H3.3c can be retained. 
 
 
Figure 16: Non-/punishers' donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1 + T2) 
 
 
3.5.7. Hypothesis 3.4a: Understanding Personality 
 
The inclusion of the HEXACO personality inventory in the questionnaire presented to 
the subjects after the experiment creates the opportunity to link well-elaborated 
personality traits with donation behavior. The constructed questionnaire 
HEXACO-T1+T290 used for the experiment is presented in this section; it is 
composed of the items relevant to the scales Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and 
Altruism of the HEXACO-200. All items are to be found in Appendix 6.6.1.2. The 
complete HEXACO-200 questionnaire with all its items was administered to 887 
college students. HEXACO-T1+T2 was responded to by 110 participants in 
Treatment 1 and 56 participants in Treatment 2. For an increase of validity Treatment 
1 and Treatment 2 were afresh analyzed jointly in order to come to 166 respondents 
inclusive of 83 PLAYER Bs. A comparison of the results of HEXACO-T1+T2 with the 
90 HEXACO-T1+T2 uses the HEXACO scales Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and Altruism. 
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results of HEXACO-200, shown in Table 7, reveals minor differences possibly still 
explainable by the small size of the group compared to the usually great number of 
respondents in empirical psychological research. 
 
 
Table 7: Comparison between results of HEXACO-200 and HEXACO-T1+T2 
 
H3.4a was tested by several statistical tests. For an examination of a possible 
relationship between the donations in Round 1 and the participants' personality 
scores the Jonckheere Terpstra test and the non-parametric correlation of Spearman 
and of Kendall were used. As the sample is relatively small, compared to other 
personality-assessment research, the results should be interpreted carefully, and for 
further research a greater sample is recommended. Table 8 shows for PLAYER As 
and PLAYER Bs combined across all statistical methods a significant positive 
correlation between the personality-assessment scores and the donations in Round 
1. The same applies to PLAYER Bs in Round 1 (see left-hand side of Table 9). Higher 
scores on the scales Fairness, Greed Avoidance, or Altruism correlate significantly 
with higher donations to 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit'. These positive correlations in 
Round 1 correspond to previous research results (Bolton et al. 1998; Hilbig and 
Zettler 2009). Consequently, H3.4a is supported for Round 1. 
 
 
Table 8: Personality scales and donations in Round 1 (T1 + T2) 
 
 
HEXACO-200
Personality scale
Total (N=887)
M (SD)
Total (N=166)
M (SD)
PLAYER Bs (N=83)
M (SD)
HEXACO: Fairness 3.56 (.77) 3.59 (.75) 3.58 (.73)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 2.91 (.76) 3.34 (.65) 3.42 (.70)
HEXACO: Altruism 3.97 (.56) 3.74 (.53) 3.71 (.61)
HEXACO-T1+T2
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness 3.389 (<0.001) 0.2664 (<0.001) 0.1882 (<0.001)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 3.985 (<0.001) 0.3033 (<0.001) 0.2216 (<0.001)
HEXACO: Altruism 4.216 (<0.001) 0.3221 (<0.001) 0.2362 (<0.001)
PLAYER As + PLAYER Bs (N=166)
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Table 9: Personality scales and donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1 + T2) 
 
In contrast, Table 9 shows no significant results for Round 2, which can be explained 
by the findings related to H3.2. As Round 1 highly significantly correlates with Round 
2, it seems reasonable to perceive Round 1 as the dominating element determining 
the donations in Round 2 by overruling the personality scales. If Round 1 is added as 
an independent variable (Table 10), the regression coefficients and p-values for the 
personality scales change distinctly, even the sign does. The results of the added 
Round 1 stay significant with a robust coefficient. For Round 2 the personality scales 
are of little explanatory value and have no measurable significant effects. 
Consequently, H3.4a has to be rejected for Round 2. 
 
 
Table 10: Personality scales and regression based on Round 1 & 2 (T1 + T2) 
 
 
3.5.8. Hypothesis 3.4b: Understanding Personality 
 
Similarly to the review of H3.4a, Jonckheere Terpstra test and the non-parametric 
correlations were carried out to review H3.4b. In Table 11, three scales are shown to 
have a negative coefficient signifying that with increasing values on the personality 
scales the deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 becomes smaller. The Altruism scale 
arrives at no significance values. This might be due to the relatively small number of 
observations. By accepting results for the Fairness and Greed Avoidance scales as a 
tendency H3.4b can be considered supported. 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness 3.377 (<0.001) 0.3959 (<0.001) 0.2670 (<0.001) 0.612 (0.5403) 0.1764 (0.1106) 0.1153 (0.1406)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 2.992 (0.0028) 0.3189 (0.0033) 0.2364 (0.0028) 1.478 (0.1395) 0.0685 (0.5385) 0.0478 (0.5429)
HEXACO: Altruism 3.762 (<0.001) 0.4115 (<0.001) 0.2987 (<0.001) 0.724 (0.4693) 0.0773 (0.4873) 0.0567 (0.4717)
Round 1 Round 2
PLAYER Bs (N=83)
Independent
variable(s):
Coefficient Robust standard error p-value Coefficient
Robust 
standard error p-value
HEXACO: Fairness 5.427 5.959 0.365 -4.861 5.844 0.408
and Round 1 - - - 0.644 0.093 <0.001
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 2.725 8.354 0.745 -8.880 8.170 0.280
and Round 1 - - - 0.664 0.093 <0.001
HEXACO: Altruism -0.291 8.482 0.973 -12.820 8.333 0.128
and Round 1 - - - 0.672 0.091 <0.001
Individual consideration Joint consideration
Dependent variable: donations in Round 2
PLAYER Bs (N=83)
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Table 11: Personality scales and donation deviations 
of Round 2 from Round 1 (T1 + T2) 
 
 
3.5.9. Results of the Hypotheses' Review 
 
    
 Hypotheses Results  
         
 H3.1 
Subjects handle other people's Taler endowment in Round 2 
differently than they handle their own Taler endowment in 
Round 1. 
not 
supported  
          
 H3.2 
When PLAYER B has no knowledge of PLAYER A's donation 
preferences in Round 2, PLAYER B's donation in Round 2 (out 
of PLAYER A's funds) is correlated with his own donation in 
Round 1. 
supported  
          
 H3.3a 
Round 3 reveals different personality types of PLAYER Bs: 
PLAYER B tending to disregard his own preferences in favor of 
PLAYER A's donation preferences, and PLAYER B punishing 
low donations by PLAYER A in Round 1 by donating a high 
amount in Round 3. 
supported  
          
 H3.3b 
PLAYER B tending to disregard his own preferences in favor of 
PLAYER A's donation preferences in Round 3 shows a high 
correlation between the donations in Round 1 and Round 2. 
not 
supported  
          
 H3.3c 
PLAYER B tending to punish the paired PLAYER A donates 
higher amounts in Round 1 and Round 2 compared to the 
other subjects. 
supported  
          
 H3.4a 
The personality factors Fairness, Altruism, and Greed 
Avoidance are positively correlated with the donations of 
PLAYER B in Round 1 and Round 2. 
supported 
for Round 1  
          
 H3.4b 
The personality factors Fairness, Altruism, and Greed 
Avoidance are negatively correlated with the deviation of 
PLAYER B's donation in Round 1 from his donation in 
Round 2. 
supported  
     
Table 12: Results of hypotheses review (H3.1 to H3.4b) 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness -1.793 (0.0729) -0.1978 (0.0731) -0.1453 (0.0736)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance -1.777 (0.0755) -0.1868 (0.0909) -0.1438 (0.0762)
HEXACO: Altruism -1.236 (0.2165) -0.1442 (0.1934) -0.1005 (0.2180)
_____
Note: Deviation = Round 2- Round 1
PLAYER Bs (N=83) 
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3.5.10. Findings on Further Personality Traits 
The questionnaire was designed to cover the hypotheses formulated in Chapters 3 
and 4. This purpose apart, it turned out to be a rich source for insights not entirely 
addressed by the hypotheses. Additional findings from Chapter 3 are presented by 
Table 13 and Table 14. 
 
 
Table 13: Further personality scales and donations in Round 1 (T1 + T2) 
 
As expected when the hypotheses were formed, Table 13 and the left-hand side of 
Table 14 (PLAYER B in Round 1) show, across all tests, no personality trait to 
correlate significantly with all participants' donations in Round 1. The right-hand side 
of Table 14, presenting correlations of PLAYER B's responses to the questionnaire 
items and his donation in Round 2, reveals a significant relationship to the 
Extraversion dimension. 
 
 
Table 14: Further personality scales and donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1 + T2) 
 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Sentimentality 0.752 (0.4518) 0.0587 (0.4522) 0.0419 (0.4527)
SOEP: Agreeableness 1.840 (0.0657) 0.1428 (0.0664) 0.1045 (0.0659)
SOEP: Conscientiousness 1.219 (0.2230) 0.0921 (0.2381) 0.0690 (0.2235)
SOEP: Openness 0.451 (0.6517) 0.0308 (0.6939) 0.0253 (0.6527)
SOEP: Neuroticism 0.921 (0.3570) 0.0692 (0.3757) 0.0517 (0.3577)
SOEP: Extraversion 0.713 (0.4761) 0.0536 (0.4929) 0.0401 (0.4769)
IBES: Trouble Avoidance 0.240 (0.8105) 0.0210 (0.7885) 0.0134 (0.8116)
PLAYER As + PLAYER Bs (N=166)
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Sentimentality 1.970 (0.0488) 0.2194 (0.0463) 0.1563 (0.0493) 0.514 (0.6072) 0.0561 (0.6141) 0.0403 (0.6100)
SOEP: Agreeableness 0.872 (0.3833) 0.1003 (0.3671) 0.0700 (0.3855) 0.444 (0.6571) 0.0490 (0.6598) 0.0352 (0.6600)
SOEP: Conscientiousness 1.689 (0.0913) 0.1862 (0.0918) 0.1357 (0.0920) 0.825 (0.4095) 0.1043 (0.3479) 0.0655 (0.4117)
SOEP: Openness 0.985 (0.3245) 0.1073 (0.3342) 0.0785 (0.3264) -0.451 (0.6520) -0.0414 (0.7102) -0.0354 (0.6549)
SOEP: Neuroticism 1.851 (0.0641) 0.1926 (0.0810) 0.1471 (0.0647) 0.653 (0.5140) 0.0647 (0.5612) 0.0512 (0.5166)
SOEP: Extraversion 0.286 (0.7747) 0.0309 (0.7817) 0.0229 (0.7777) -2.241 (0.0251) -0.2423 (0.0273) -0.1766 (0.0253)
IBES: Trouble Avoidance 0.370 (0.7117) 0.0323 (0.7716) 0.0294 (0.7147) -0.491 (0.6237) -0.0594 (0.5939) -0.0385 (0.6265)
PLAYER Bs (N=83)
Round 1 Round 2
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Individuals with high scores on the Extraversion scale describe themselves 
egocentric and energetic. Respondents with a low score characterize themselves 
lacking social dominance or superiority (Costa and McCrae 1992a and 1992b). 
Consequently, PLAYER Bs scoring high dislike coming off worse and like adhering to 
their own way of thinking and acting. The coefficients arrived at back up this 
interpretation by a negative correlation. In Round 2, higher scores on the 
Extraversion scale lead to lower donations that rather approximate the amounts of 
Round 1. Regression performed for the review of H3.4a showed the Extraversion 
scale to be robust enough to withstand the powerful influence of Round 1 (Coef. 
[Robust Std. Err. / p] donation in Round 1 = 0.601 [0.094 / <0.001]; Extraversion = 
-9.662 [3.671 / 0.010]; N=83). This distinct effect of Extraversion was somewhat not 
expected, as all other personality scales do not exert an influence. Overall the 
interpretation of the additional personality scales support H3.4a. 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Studies exclusively investigating, on an individual level, the behavior of people 
dealing with other people's money are rare. Behavioral aspects are mostly 
considered as side-issues and the related results are often biased by various factors. 
But it is indispensable for correctly investigating and understanding people's behavior 
to eliminate all factors possibly biasing the participants and thereby distorting the 
results. To close the gap in research, an economic laboratory experiment was 
designed to exclusively focus on reliably significant variables influencing the handling 
of other people's money. 
Within a variation of the dictator game experiment, a first treatment, in the frame of a 
neutral environment for decision taking, is intended to grasp the crucial processes of 
dealing with other people's money in the field of non-strategic CSR (money 
donations). In a second treatment, the decision-making process is transferred to a 
simplified real-life setting in an employee-organization environment. An analysis of 
the results of both treatments reveals if individuals restrain their own (CSR) 
preferences and adapt their transfers when donating money out of others' or 
corporate funds, without having to affect their own endowment. In addition, the study 
pays regard to personality traits influential on individuals' decision taking by making 
the participants respond to a questionnaire with personality-based items at the end of 
each experimental session. 
The study's results show that Adam Smith's and Milton Friedman's concerns are not 
entirely spun out of thin air, as, in the aggregate, the donations increase by around 
50% when personal preferences can be lived out without any effect on the own 
endowment (T1 + T2: mean donations in Round 1: 37.41 Taler and in Round 2: 56.51 
Taler). But an experimental design enabling an analysis on an individual level allows 
rejecting Friedman's hypothesis, as 30 out of 83 subjects (almost 40%) donated the 
same amount in both rounds, regardless of whether they decided on their own or 
someone else's money; for these participants their former donation served as an 
anchor for their further decisions. The experiment's outcome disclosed the existence 
of 'punishers'. In comparison to 'non-punishers', these participants have higher CSR 
donation preferences and punish others for donating amounts falling short of their 
expectations. All these findings are enriched by combining them with the HEXACO 
personality scales Fairness, Altruism, and Greed Avoidance, providing information 
about an individual's donation preferences and the degree of deviation of handling 
his own money from handling someone else's money. 
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The results of the thesis on hand can help to better understand people's dealing with 
other people's money in a setting with a relationship between the involved parties 
characterized by a low- and high-responsibility level, which might be of some interest 
to scientists. Furthermore, they can help to better understand the behavior of 
managers having to decide on corporate money for CSR activities, which might be of 
some interest to business owners and top-level managers who want to set up CSR in 
the realm of their responsibility. One aspect of a CSR framework to decide on can be 
the question to what extent managers may take and execute decisions on their own 
responsibility. The thesis on hand demonstrates that, in an absence of clear rules 
concerning the amount of a CSR investment, a considerable number of managers 
use the anchor of their own social preferences to determine a corporation's donation. 
Besides, there are outliers 'wasting' corporate money to live out their own CSR 
preferences of achieving a 'warm glow of giving'.  
The investigation's results imply that, to a certain degree, organizations can trust their 
employees' decisions on corporate money. There is no urgency to regulate all 
possibly uncertain conditions relevant to decision making. With an anchor in the form 
of their own preferences available, many employees will follow their own guidelines 
preventing them from wasting corporate money. However, the individual's 
preferences might not match the corporation's, or owner's, or top-level manager's 
preferences, so corporate owners have to balance an absolute freedom of action 
against a freedom of action limited by rules to reduce the possibility of uncertainty. 
This thesis' insights can be helpful for a successful implementation of CSR. Whether 
CSR rules introduced to diminish uncertainty can be made effective by 
communicating them to managers will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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4. PLEASE COMPLY WITH OUR RULES: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE 
EFFECTIVNESS OF CODES OF CONDUCT TO 
GOVERN A PERSON'S PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Business managers often have to act in situations without clear guidance by their 
organization or its shareholders. Especially in the realm of CSR, managers mostly 
have no detailed information about their stakeholders' requirements as regards 
decisions on the scope of investment in CSR-related business practices. On the one 
hand, as pointed out in Section 2.4.3, it is often difficult for shareholders to phrase 
their own pro-social preferences and to communicate them to the managers. On the 
other hand, providing managers with a clear CSR guidance regarding money 
transfers for social purposes might be of great importance for shareholders, if they 
want to avoid a waste of their money and a reduction of their monetary and non-
monetary profits. A company processing woods, for example, may have shareholders 
with monetary as well as social preferences. The monetary preferences can be easily 
met by a high dividend. The social preferences can be manifold, either with a direct 
link to the business, like e.g. the support of the rainforest protection, or without a 
direct link to the business, like e.g. the support of the local kindergarten. If 
shareholders want to make certain of achieving a maximal benefit from their 
investment, they must ensure a maximization of their 'monetary' and 'non-monetary' 
profits. The obvious striving for a monetary maximization is somehow traditional, and 
the striving for a non-monetary maximization is not new either, as the increasing 
amounts of 'socially responsible investments'91 demonstrate. In their study, published 
in 2010, J. P. Morgan Global Research and the Rockefeller Foundation expect 
socially responsible investments to increase at least tenfold to $400 billion in 2020, 
yielding a profit of $183 billion or more (J.P. Morgan Global Research and 
Rockefeller Foundation 2010; Bradley 2011). These figures indicate an obvious 
demand for such investments relating either to non-specific or specific social 
purposes. If shareholders want specific pro-social preferences primarily considered 
(e.g. a specific social purpose), they have to see about properly communicating 
91 Socially responsible investments: Investments that can "proactively create positive social or 
environmental benefit" (J.P. Morgan Global Research and Rockefeller Foundation 2010: 
p. 5). 
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these preferences to the organization's managers and having the managers pay 
regard to them. 
In the previous chapter the MANAGER had to deal with a single pro-social organization 
with the result of a limited scope for decision making and a reduced chance of 
misconduct. But if more pro-social commitments are possible, the shareholders have 
to guide the manager to favor the desired variant. In the context of CSR, such 
guidance can take the form of a 'code of conduct' (COC). To date, the effectiveness 
of COCs is still called into question by academics and practitioners. Scholars carried 
out a number of theoretical as well as empirical studies, but, in the end, they did not 
arrive at homogeneous results (e.g. Treviño and Victor 1992; Cleek and Leonard 
1998; Ethics Research Center 1999; Adams et al. 2001; McKendall et al. 2002). 
Even though there are studies which suggest a positive effect of corporate codes on 
the behavior of their addressees (e.g. Hegarty and Sims 1979; Ferrell and Skinner 
1988; Treviño and Victor 1992; Adams et al. 2001; Lauer et al. 2008), many 
researchers link the effectiveness to further supportive measures, such as the 
successful implementation, communication, and establishment of the codes (e.g. 
McCabe et al. 1996; Treviño et al. 1998; Stevens 1999; Somers 2001; Stevens 
2008). While some scholars found only a limited or no correlation between COCs and 
employees' behavior (e.g. Laczniak and Inderrieden 1987; Mathews 1987; Cleek and 
Leonard 1998; Schwartz 2001; McKendall et al. 2002), one study even postulates a 
negative or harmful effect of codes, as they might provoke unethical behavior (Ethics 
Research Center 1999). The applied methodologies, COC contents, and results 
differ; however, there remains evidence that a written corporation statement may at 
least have the potential to influence people's behavior in a desired way. 
Nevertheless, none of the available studies used an unbiased laboratory setting and 
executed an economic experiment with a clear incentive scheme in this surrounding 
to challenge if a COC with typical CSR-related guidelines can govern the behavior of 
managers in line with the shareholders' preferences. 
A laboratory economic experiment was carried out by Lauer et al. (2008), but it was 
designed to find out if the probability of cooperative behavior can be increased by a 
COC. Thus their COC does not focus on CSR or a manager-shareholder 
relationship. The experiment rather creates a setting of employees who act together, 
and the COC contains "the explicit expectation to cooperate" (Lauer et al. 2008: 
p. 187). 
Further enlightenment on the effectiveness of a CSR code of conduct in a manager-
shareholder relationship is required. Shareholders need to know if a COC is a 
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reliable and suitable instrument to govern their managers' behavior. Thus, the thesis 
on hand addresses the following research questions: 
 
Is a code of conduct an effective organizational instrument to guide a 
manager's or employee's behavior in order to prohibit a deviation 
from the company's desires? Can individuals be induced to comply 
with a code of conduct and can they, in particular, be induced to act in 
accordance with communicated shareholders' CSR preferences, 
even though this will lead them to restrain their personal preferences? 
 
The thesis on hand is intended to answer these questions by the empirical results of 
a laboratory experiment. A version of the dictator game92 with a simplified real-life 
setting is to cover the substantial roles and institutions of an employee-organization 
environment. In order to create a design which best reflects the behavioral responses 
in business reality, the game's setting incorporates a COC typical of a business 
corporation. The experiment presented in Chapter 3 is extended by two additional 
treatments: firstly, a baseline treatment to disclose the participants' preferences for a 
socially responsible organization (Treatment 3), and, secondly, a treatment inclusive 
of a COC focusing on a specific charity (Treatment 4). The results of these two 
treatments are meant to reveal if individuals do (or do not) comply with the code and 
act in accordance with the shareholders' preferences, even if they have to disregard 
their own preferences. Moreover, the study focuses on individual determinants 
encouraging a manager's compliance with, or violation of, a COC; hence the 
participants are requested to respond to a personality-based questionnaire at the end 
of each experimental session. 
For a basic understanding of a COC the following Section 4.2 will give a brief 
introduction to codes of conduct, inclusive of the historical development. Section 4.3 
concentrates on available literature dealing with COCs' effectiveness as a means of 
preventing undesired behavior and on research's recommendations for designing 
COCs. In Section 4.4 theory will be put into practice by presenting the treatments' 
experimental design, the experimental procedure, and the structure of the 
questionnaire. In Section 4.5 the hypotheses are derived from theory-based 
suppositions about the subjects' behavior. In Section 4.6 the results of the data 
analysis are presented and the hypotheses are reviewed. Finally, Section 4.7 
contains a discussion of the major findings and some practice-oriented suggestions. 
92 See Appendix 6.5. 
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4.2. CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
Although CSR is an important and omnipresent topic in today's business 
organizations, CSR implementation often turns out to be a challenge, as managers 
have own individual preferences possibly contrary to those of their organization's 
shareholders. Putting CSR measures into execution is simple when organizational 
decisions makers' preferences match their shareholders' or company owners' 
preferences. Difficulties can arise when these preferences differ and managers are 
expected to disregard their own preferences for the sake of the organization's 
conceptions. 
To guide a manager and prevent him from making detrimental decisions or decisions 
counteracting an organization's CSR efforts, companies can introduce a COC as an 
integral part of their CSR framework. These written formal "statements of how 
employees are required to behave by the company/senior management" (Fisher and 
Lovell 2006: p. 389) comprise: 
 
"Principles, values, standards, or rules of behavior that guide the 
decisions, procedures and systems of an organization in a way that 
(a) contributes to the welfare of its key stakeholders, and (b) respect 
the rights of all constituents affected by its operations" (International 
Federation of Accountants 2007: p. 6). 
 
Though the contents of a COC are not legally binding, they undoubtedly show 
characteristics of an indirect obligation. COCs are especially suited for those CSR 
elements that are beyond the standard economic and legal obligations, e.g. ethical 
and philanthropic dimensions, as introduced by Carroll (1979) (for further 
explanations see Section 2.1.2). 
Nowadays, COCs are ubiquitous: 86% of the 200 biggest global public companies 
have already introduced corporate codes with a strong focus on ethical behavior 
(KPMG and RSM Erasmus University 2008). In 82% of all US companies and even 
96% of the Fortune-500 companies written standards for ethical conduct obtain 
(Ethics Research Center 2012). Moreover, 63% of the 100 highest-selling German 
companies deploy a COC (KPMG 2011). After all, COCs are not a novelty. The 
oldest code dates to the 19th century, when founders of small and rural companies 
also began to see the potential of a COC. Ever since the growth of their firms and the 
relocation to urban areas rendered internal communication more difficult, COCs have 
been considered an instrument for disseminating a company's values (Knouse et al. 
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2007). Due to public revelations of companies' unethical practices, COCs 
encountered a wave of popularity in the 1970s and 1990s (Farrell et al. 2002). The 
term 'codes of conduct', applied to a corporate environment, should not be conceived 
as totally differing from terms like codes of ethics, business codes, business 
principles, corporate credos, corporate philosophies, corporate ethic statements, 
codes of practice, or mission statements (Byrne 1988; McCabe et al. 1996; Adams et 
al. 2001; Schwartz 2001; Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). A COC, as the thesis on hand 
understands it, does not only incorporate general virtues, usually found in ethical 
codes, like honesty or loyalty, but, moreover, is characterized by specific prescriptive 
or prohibitive instructions how to decide and act as an employee in concrete 
business situations. This definition of a COC will be used as one parameter in a 
design of a laboratory experiment investigating the efficacy of a COC that is intended 
to ensure managers' behavioral compliance with revealed shareholders' preferences. 
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4.3. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
4.3.1. The Effectiveness of Codes of Conduct 
 
The initiation of a COC as an external influence can possibly guide employees and 
managers in uncertain situations to restrain their personal preferences for the sake of 
the company's preferences. However, the mere existence and internal notification of 
a COC cannot guarantee that the employees will follow the given guidelines. That 
even Enron, the paramount example of corporate scandals93, had a COC admits of 
doubts about its effectiveness. Consequently, the study on hand aims to answer the 
question if such written, not legally binding rules are at all suitable to govern the 
managers' and employees' conduct. 
A plethora of investigations examined the effect of COCs on the behavior of 
employees in an organization without coming to explicit conclusions. The spectrum 
covers studies identifying a positive correlation between corporate codes and the 
desired behavior of their addressees (e.g. Hegarty and Sims 1979; Ferrell and 
Skinner 1988; Treviño and Victor 1992; Adams et al. 2001; Lauer et al. 2008), 
studies with a limited or no correlation (e.g. Laczniak and Inderrieden 1987; Mathews 
1987; Cleek and Leonard 1998; Schwartz 2001; McKendall et al. 2002), and one 
study that even identified a negative effect (Ethics Research Center 1999). A more 
detailed overview is given by Kaptein and Schwartz (2008). The authors reviewed 78 
empirical studies of the impact of business codes, 35% of which showing a positive 
effect, 16% a weak relation, 33% no relation, and one proving a negative effect. The 
differing results might be traced back to different research methods, different 
research foci, and bias effects. Besides results supporting a positive, neutral, or 
negative effect of COCs, many researchers identified that the efficacy of a COC is 
strongly influenced by supporting factors like the successful implementation, 
communication, and embedment in the 'core of the organization' (e.g. McCabe et al. 
1996; Treviño et al. 1998; Stevens 1999; Somers 2001; Stevens 2008). Laboratory 
experiments solely focusing on the code's effectiveness and trying to design an 
unbiased environment are rare. This applies especially to incentive-controlled 
economic experiments. 
An early laboratory experiment setting of Hegarty and Sims (1979) evidenced the 
positive effect of a special company letter. The participants took the role of a sales 
93 "At the heart of the Enron mess is market manipulation, governmental influence peddling, 
and suspect performance by auditors and analysts" (Sterling 2002: p. vii). 
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manager and had to decide whether they wanted to pay a kickback bribe to a fictive 
purchasing agent. In this context, ethical behavior is tied to not paying any kickback, 
whereas making all kickback payments signifies undesired behavior. A non-payment 
of the kickback led to a randomly determined reduction of the revenue and to a loss 
of profit for the sales manager. The participants' loss of profit was only fictive as they 
did not receive any incentive or payment, neither for their participation nor based on 
their decision making. All subjects received a letter from the corporate president, but 
only some of these letters tried to make the manager act in accordance with the 
corporation's desires. The experimental results show that a code associated with 
ethical issues can induce the participants to adjust their behavior to the corporate 
letter's content by making less kickback payments. 
Ferrell and Skinner (1988) investigated by means of questionnaires whether the 
internal bureaucratic structure of a company influences company-internal behavior. 
The authors related bureaucracy directly to codes that centered on ethical standards. 
By evaluating self-administered questionnaires, responded to by marketing 
researchers, they found out that undesired behavior can be prevented by laying 
down policies like a COC in the respective corporations. 
Treviño and Victor (1992) used an experimental classroom scenario to examine a 
COC which represented role responsibilities by mandating whistleblowing. Their 
results suggest that COCs are indeed a suitable means to foster a desired conduct, 
in this case peer reporting on undesired behavior. 
The positive effect of a COC was also corroborated by an experiment of Lauer et al. 
(2008). Exceptionally, the authors conducted an economic laboratory experiment and 
examined the effectiveness of normative COCs in a business-team context. The 
subjects, in the role of employees, had to work together as a team made up of four 
members. Within this public-goods-game setup, each team member received an 
endowment of 20 tokens that could be invested in the team project to achieve a 
higher team outcome (1 token lead to 1.6 tokens for the team members jointly) or 
could be kept for one's own benefit (1 token as benefit). The amount of tokens 
contributed to the team project are a measure of the team efficiency. At the end of 
the experiment, each participant's tokens were exchanged for Euro. After the authors 
had carried out a baseline treatment, they presented a normative COC to the 
participants: "Our employees are our most important resource. The cooperation and 
the commitment of our employees are of vital importance in maintaining our leading 
market position. Only fair and committed teamwork will secure our operating 
efficiency in the long run" (Lauer et al. 2008: p. 189). 
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The presentation of the COC increased the mean contribution to the team project 
(and thereby the team efficiency) significantly. The authors found evidence that the 
introduction of the COC reduced unbridled behavior and added to behavior in line 
with the corporate preferences. The experimental design of Lauer et al. is the 
exception rather than the rule by using an economic laboratory setting with a clear 
incentive scheme. 
Studies doubting the suitability of COCs, and thus attributing only a limited or no 
impact on employees' behavior, mostly use non-laboratory or non-incentive-
controlled methodologies. Laczniak and Interrieden (1987) carried out an in-basket 
experiment. The subjects took the role of a corporate executive and were faced with 
nine scenarios to react to. The authors cannot confirm a strong effect of a COC on 
behavior unless it is coupled with sanctions. In a field study, Mathews (1987) 
investigated the influence of COCs on corporate criminality in major US companies 
over an 8-year period. He cannot evidence any link between corporate legal behavior 
and the existence of codes. 
Schwartz (2001), who conducted in-person interviews in companies, found that 
employees' behavior is only seldomly affected by codes, as they are often considered 
common sense and therefore regarded as an integral part of one's own behavior. In 
case of being faced with an ethical dilemma, the respondents would rather act in 
accordance with their own convictions, even if they were contrary to a code. 
Cleek and Leonard (1998) had business students respond to a questionnaire, with 
the result that codes are not a variable significantly determining behavior. This 
outcome coincides with the evaluation of a questionnaire which another group of 
researchers (McKendall et al. 2002) sent to employees of 315 large US-based 
companies. The authors can neither support nor reject the assumption that a COC is 
an effective preventive measure against activities detrimental to the working-
environment, so they suggest that such compliance programs are rather part of a 
window-dressing strategy. 
All of the above-mentioned studies use different research methods, which also 
applies to the one yielding an alerting result. According to the National Business 
Ethics Survey (4,544 responses) of the Ethics Research Center (1999), the mere 
existence of a COC has a harmful impact if supplementary explanations are lacking. 
The reason is that the COC acquaints employees with possible misbehavior, but 
does not simultaneously give helpful information about efficient measures to cope 
with this predicament. 
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4.3.2. Main Influencing Factors of a Code's Effectiveness 
 
By investigation of codes' usefulness, authors identified factors influential on the 
suitability of COCs to govern employees' or managers' behavior. Overall, literature 
(e.g. Ladd 1985; Stevens 1999; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011) suggests three 
main influential factors: internalization, rewards and punishment, and informal 
systems. 
Firstly, as for the degree of 'internalization': if the written behavioral guidelines 
correspond exactly, or at least closely, to a person's own perceptions, values, and 
preferences, then a code is redundant, as the person will act as desired just by acting 
intuitively (Stevens 1999). On the contrary, persons whose own values do not 
correspond to the code's content are less likely to act in accordance with a COC, 
because they will usually be unwilling to deviate from what they believe to be right 
(Ladd 1985; Schwartz 2001). In reality, corporate values will not always match 
individual or societal preferences. 
Secondly, 'rewards and punishment' are suggested having an important influence on 
a code's efficacy. In contrast to Laczniak and Interrieden (1987), who found out that 
sanctions promoted behavior in line with the content of an endorsement letter 
presented by the CEO, other researchers argue that such organizational attempts 
may actually provoke a reaction contrary to their intended effects (Fisher and Lovell 
2006; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). Offering rewards for reaching certain aims 
does not properly consider individual reactions to goal setting. Individuals exclusively 
striving to achieve an externally set objective are likely to ignore everything else and, 
in order to reach this goal, will even resort to risk taking and non-compliance 
(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). The National Business Ethics Survey revealed 
that almost one third of the interviewees felt being pressured into misconduct to 
reach a business goal (Ethics Research Center 1999). Moreover, employees often 
are exposed to a multitude of goals. As a consequence, they tend to overemphasize 
those promising the highest rewards (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). Likewise, the 
imposition of sanctions or punishments can lead to undesired reactions. If employees 
were uncertain about a decision to be made in their private life, they would try to find 
a basis for decision making by putting their personal moral values and beliefs into a 
balanced state. In a business environment under threat of sanctions by their 
employer, however, this weighing approach may be replaced by psychological 
reactance. Employees who feel being restricted may try to regain their freedom of 
choice and thus may be attracted to forbidden fruit, that is to say non-compliance. 
82 
 
The personal 'COC decision' turns into a normal 'business decision', based on the 
probability of getting caught and punished (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). 
Thirdly, 'informal systems' in an organization seem to "teach employees what 
behavior is really expected of them" (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011: p. 103). This 
informal company culture is communicated by well-established signals in the form of 
the actual conduct of organizational members such as peers or leading managers. 
Since the company's true attitude towards ethics underlies these signals, formalities, 
like theoretical codes, rather appear to be a whitewash on the assumption that the 
actual behavior of the corporate agents is not in line with the code's content. Enron 
can serve as a textbook example in a negative sense. The company insisted on the 
distribution of a written code of ethics, but as its content was obviously not 
compatible with the informal ethical culture, it did not save the company from the 
misconduct of its employees (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). 
 
4.3.3. Overview of Publications and 
Derivation of Research Suggestions 
 
The presented literature apparently shows contradictory results, indicating the 
complexity bound up with investigations of a code's effectiveness and the involved 
individual decision-making processes. There is more than one answer to the question 
why the findings vary widely. On the one hand, there is the non-uniformity of the 
samples; on the other hand, the topic COC is dealt with in different situations and 
environments. Some researchers evaluated questionnaires administered to students, 
others evaluated face-to-face interviews with employees. Some studies base on 
information given by real employees, others base on information given by students in 
an artificial employment situation to test if a COC can influence whistleblowing, team 
efficiency, corporate executives' decision making, or sales managers' decisions on 
kickbacks. 
The available analyses provide but first indications of the factors influential on a 
COC's efficacy. Further research, which is obviously necessary, should build on 
these analyses, it should integrate current findings as well as the findings concerning 
the psychological processes affected by internalization, rewards and punishment, 
and informal systems. The thesis on hand argues that important insights are revealed 
by the available literature without being combined and taken into account in one 
study; consequently, it recommends to incorporate four essentials in a research of a 
COC's effectiveness: 
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 Use a setting that allows control over the mainly influencing 
parameters and elimination of parameters distracting from the 
research goal. 
 Ensure that the decision to comply or not to comply with the COC 
has no fictive, but real effects on a study's participants, preventing 
them from giving social / COC desirable responses without having 
to face own consequences. 
 Address nothing but the question whether an explicit, though non-
compulsory COC can govern employees' behavior. 
 Design a COC which considers the main influencing factors 
formerly identified by different authors. 
 
Again, a laboratory experiment is the most promising way to meet these demands 
and to identify the influence of a COC. The experimental design should, on the one 
hand, correspond to a real-life situation, but should, on the other hand, reduce real-
life complexity by focusing on variables relevant to the efficacy of written guidelines 
on the actual addressees' behavior. Thus the experiment becomes an effective 
means of ensuring reliability and the right balance between internal and external 
validity, as described in Section 3.3. The experiment for the study on hand is 
designed to test a COC's 'governing'-capability by taking the main influencing factors 
into account and introducing them into the design of the COC. It has to be assumed 
that the presented influencing factors, correctly considered, influence the behavior of 
people in general and the behavior of participants in a developed laboratory 
experiment in particular. The next section comprehensively presents the laboratory 
experiment as a conceptual approach to investigate the effectiveness of a COC. 
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4.4. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
 
The experimental design is derived from the design introduced in Chapter 3, which 
included two treatments (T1, T2) and applied a modified version of the 'dictator game' 
to find out how people deal with other people's money. The dictator game (see 
Appendix 6.5) research started with Kahneman et al. (1986) and aims at identifying 
individual preferences. In the particular context of the present chapter, the design of 
the game is modified in such a way that it focuses on the question whether a COC is 
a suitable means of influencing individual preferences.  
The modified version uses a real-life setting that covers the substantial roles and 
institutions of a manager-owner-organization environment. The manager of a 
company is required to decide on company money for a social purpose. As the 
company belongs to a single owner, the manager indirectly decides on the owner's 
money. 
As the investigation concentrates on the efficacy of a COC, the 'business scenario' 
treatment of Chapter 3 (T2) needs some specific adjustments. A baseline treatment 
(Treatment 3 / T3) is to disclose preferences with respect to a socially responsible 
organization, and a treatment incorporating a COC (Treatment 4 / T4) is to reveal 
whether individuals respond to a code by withholding their personal preferences for 
the sake of the corporation's CSR efforts, or whether they deviate from the 
employer's guideline. An additional focus is on the intraindividual determinants 
influencing a manager's compliance with, or refusal of, a COC. Therefore, a 
personality-based questionnaire is conducted at the end of each experimental 
session. 
 
4.4.1. Adjustment of the Experimental Design of Chapter 3 
 
To increase the external validity of this study, the experimental design provides 
realistic conditions by adapting the plot of Treatment 2 to two new independent 
treatments: T3, the 'charity-preference treatment', and T4, the 'COC treatment'. 
Treatment 4 differs from Treatment 3 in just one aspect, the existence of a COC, 
otherwise the structures are identical. Treatment 3 is designed to serve as a 
reference point indicating how individuals act in the absence of a COC. With all other 
variables remaining constant, the introduction of the COC in Treatment 4 will allow to 
infer the code's effectiveness, because behavioral differences between both 
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treatments reveal whether the subjects comply with the code or whether they stick to 
their own divergent preferences. 
The insights of the experiment designed in Chapter 3 are transferred to a setting 
beneficial to the objective of the present chapter, and though the differences between 
the handling of one's own (private) money and the handling of other people's 
(corporate) money are no longer the center of interest, the setting of Chapter 3 is 
kept for two reasons. Firstly, the setting is a proven instrument, that can also be used 
to investigate a COC's efficacy, and, secondly, the additional observations can back 
up the previous findings. 
In order to detect possible differences between (a) individuals' decisions and (b) their 
decision-making process in organizations with a COC in contrast to organizations 
with no COC, each treatment is made up of two rounds. In Round 1 the subjects 
have to make a decision on their own behalf, while in Round 2 they have to make the 
same decision on behalf of another person. The design of Round 3 in Chapter 3 is of 
no importance for the present chapter, so only the insights of Round 1 and Round 2 
will be transferred. 
Appendix 6.3.1 provides the original German instructions for Treatment 3 and 
Treatment 4. T4 differs from T3 in only those two paragraphs that introduce the COC. 
Section 4.4.2 and Section 4.4.3 recapitulate essential aspects of the experiment in 
Chapter 3 with the focus on the necessary modifications. 
 
4.4.2. Treatment 3: Charity Preferences 
 
The baseline treatment (Treatment 3) provides the foundation for the experiment and 
is designed to reveal explicitly each participant's preferences, whereas the COC-
scenario treatment, which will be explained later, introduces a code of conduct to test 
its effectiveness as a guideline. The baseline treatment functions as a preparation 
and takes the findings of previous studies into consideration. As explained in Section 
4.3.2, it is crucial for the usability of a COC to integrate elements which are opposed 
to a participant's personal values ('negative internalization'), therefore the baseline 
treatment already includes a contrary element. 
In the first round, each subject takes the role of the 'OWNER' of the brick-
manufacturing company 'Ziegel-STEIN'. This medium-sized company, which gives 
work to 80 employees, constructs new buildings and engages in the restoration of 
monuments. The experimental instructions make it plain that the single OWNER still 
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works in his company and that the company makes a profit of 155 Taler94, which is 
transferred to the OWNER's private account; consequently each subject receives an 
endowment of 155 Taler. The OWNER gets two letters, sent to his home address, with 
different calls for a donation: one from 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit' (SOS), the other 
from 'Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz' (DSD)95. 
SOS is mainly active in developing countries. The experimental instructions 
illustratively inform the subjects about SOS's engagement in Somalia, where a SOS 
Children's Village Medical Clinic was established in the Badbado Refugee Camp. 
The organization concentrates on helping children who generally are undernourished 
and need medical attention. The private foundation DSD sees to the rescue and 
maintenance of village churches, town walls, castles, and other monuments in 
Germany which are critically threatened with decay. For instance, DSD currently 
engages in the renovation of the Glienicke Bridge's colonnades. 
Stimulated by Bachke et al. (2013) and the German 'Bilanz des Helfens' (Deutscher 
Spendenrat e.V. 2012) study, DSD is introduced as the charity organization that 
represents different social preferences than SOS and is generally far from being that 
highly esteemed by most of the participants. This is confirmed by the results of the 
regularly conducted study 'Bilanz des Helfens', which shows that Germans are 
generally more willing to donate for humanitarian aid (74.2%) than for cultural-
heritage conservation (7.5%). That people are less willing to donate money for the 
preservation of cultural heritages can be traced to the attitude that, since they pay 
taxes, the government should look after this affair. On account of these findings it can 
clearly be anticipated that the participants in the present study will show the same 
preferences and donate more money to SOS than to DSD. Furthermore, the 
subjects, being students, are younger than the average donor, and it can be 
assumed that younger people do not care as much about the renovations of 
memorials as older people do. 
In Round 1, the OWNER has to make two sequential decisions. He has to decide if he 
wants to donate a certain amount of his 'private' money to the charities and, if this is 
the case, on the apportionment of this amount between the two charities (SOS and 
DSD). First the subjects can determine a donation amount within the range from 0 
Taler (no donation) to 155 Taler (complete donation) in steps of 5 Taler. The 
experimental instructions emphasize that the donation is non-fictive and has a real 
94 The exchange rate of the fictitious currency 'Taler' is 13.50 EUR for 155 Taler. 
95 Unofficial translation: German Foundation for Monument Protection 
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effect on the subject's endowment as well as on the charity organization.96 
Subsequently, the subjects have to apportion the chosen amount between SOS and 
DSD. Six options are available: 100% as opposed to 0%, 80% as opposed to 20%, 
60% as opposed to 40%, and vice versa. A 50%-50% split is not possible, since the 
participants are intended to reveal their personal preferences by determining their 
preferred charity organization. 
Subjects apportioning 100%, 80%, or 60% of their previously determined donation 
amount to SOS and the remainder to DSD are supposed to attach greater 
importance to humanitarian issues. Participants who choose the option to donate not 
more than 40%, 20%, or 0% to SOS obviously sympathize more with the aims of 
DSD. The design permits these intermediate stages, since an extreme 'all or 
nothing'-option could make the decision takers feel ill at ease. Even subjects with a 
clear preference might like to transfer a 'consolation' Taler to the other organization. 
The intermediate stages take such a way of thinking and acting into consideration. 
 
Round 2 differs from Round 1 in some important aspects. The role of the 'OWNER' is 
supplemented with the role of the 'MANAGER'. The subject group is halved, one half is 
randomly and anonymously assigned the role of the OWNER, the other half the role of 
the MANAGER of another brick-manufacturing company called 'Ziegel-BAU'. Each 
OWNER is randomly paired with a MANAGER, together they form one group. The 
instructions specify that the OWNER of 'Ziegel-BAU' no longer works in his company 
and has delegated all decision rights concerning all company affairs to a MANAGER. 
The OWNER plays a passive role, he will only be asked to make guesses at his paired 
MANAGER's action. In Round 2, the MANAGER receives fund-raising letters of SOS 
and DSD, identical to those in Round 1, and has to decide how much money he is 
willing to donate as the representative of the company OWNER. The MANAGER's own 
salary, fixed at 155 Taler (i.e. the endowment of the assigned participant), is 
unaffected by his decision, but the company's profit of originally 155 Taler, which is 
due to the OWNER, is reduced by the donation amount determined by the MANAGER. 
In consequence, the MANAGER's decision has an actual effect on the disbursement to 
the OWNER and the charity. 
Analogous to Chapter 3, but with two charities in existence, a comparison of the 
donation amounts and the apportionment decisions in Round 1 and Round 2 can 
clarify whether the MANAGER handles the OWNER's money differently than his own. 
96 Therefore, the participants received a separate handout with relevant information on the 
organizations. At the end of the experiment, the subjects also had to sign a donation 
confirmation sheet (see Appendix 6.3.1.3). 
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With regard to the research question, this treatment constitutes a baseline for the 
MANAGER's preferences and way of acting in the absence of a COC. 
 
4.4.3. Treatment 4: Code of Conduct 
 
Round 1 of Treatment 4 is identical to Round 1 of Treatment 3. It is again evident to 
the subjects that SOS and DSD are devoted to entirely different causes; presented 
fund-raising letters give specific insights into the organizations and their field of social 
activities by describing current aid projects. Round 1 again aims at revealing each 
participant's social preferences, which can serve as a basis for the determination of 
this individual's possible later change in behavior. As an alteration of Round 1, a 
COC in the form of a circular letter, presented by the company in the name of its 
OWNER, is introduced in order to find out if it can effectively direct the MANAGER to a 
behavior in favor of the OWNER's preferences. Round 2 of Treatment 3 and Round 2 
of Treatment 4 are identical except for the initiation of the COC in Treatment 4. 
Therefore, a difference between the results of both treatments can obviously be 
traced back to the influence of the COC. 
Prior to his decision on a donation, the MANAGER receives a COC. The COC as a 
systematic set of principles and regulations is meant to communicate the OWNER's 
CSR preferences and to govern the MANAGER's behavior in this direction. 
Specifically, it sets precise rules how to handle donations on behalf of the company, 
and it incorporates the findings of Section 4.3.2. However, the COC presented to the 
MANAGER fixes neither a specific nor a minimum or maximum donation amount. This 
applies to the donation to SOS as well as to the donation to DSD. The design of the 
COC refrains from prescribing certain amounts for two reasons. Firstly, the 
MANAGERs are likely to follow such instructions, as their own fixed salary is not 
affected by their decisions. Secondly, the COC is intended to contrast with the 
participants' social preferences; a specific donation amount that meets this 
requirement is impossible to find. The subjects would not make an economic decision 
anymore and, in consequence, an important target of the experiment would be 
missed. Therefore, the COC aims at a donation allocation to a specific charity 
instead. To ensure an investigation into its real efficacy, the COC needs to contradict 
the MANAGER's, in this case the subject's, preferences. A code corresponding with 
the MANAGER's values is unsuitable to reveal whether the MANAGER's behavior is due 
to the influence of the code or whether it is due to his own convictions. Thus, the 
baseline treatment and Round 1 of Treatment 4 are designed to prove the 
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participants' preference for SOS, and the COC is designed to contrast this preference 
by urging them to prefer DSD. Another recommendation of Section 4.3.2 is an 
experimental design exclusive of rewards and punishments in order to reduce the 
risk of biased results regarding the COC's effectiveness; therefore the content of the 
experiment's code lacks any positive or negative effect on the MANAGER resulting 
from his decision making. Finally, any form of a corporate culture is excluded from 
the experimental design. The focus is purely on the efficacy of a sole written 
statement, thus the study's validity increases and, in consequence, its results show 
the code's real effectiveness. 
The COC was presented to the MANAGERs in the form of a circular letter, distributed 
by the OWNER and directly addressing the MANAGERs in its salutation. To prevent 
participants from feeling influenced by the experimenter, the instructions reveal that 
the OWNERs were involved in the letter's formulation. More precisely, subjects in the 
role of the OWNER were offered different components of sentences they had to join 
together. However, they could not alter the major content of the COC: the preference 
for DSD. To prevent the OWNERs and MANAGERs from calling the content into 
question, the instructions describe the company as a German brick manufacturer, 
constructing and restoring buildings. Particularly, the letter states: 
 
'As a responsible member of our societal environment we are aware of our 
social responsibility and feel obliged to support the preservation of momentous 
historical architecture through donations in kind and in cash to the cultural 
heritage preservation. On these grounds donations are supposed to be 
allocated solely to sponsorships for monuments in need.'97 
 
For a company restoring buildings, a donation to DSD is likely to have positive 
consequences, such as new orders. In Round 2, both players were reminded that an 
OWNER usually has the company's interests in mind. After having read the COC, 
presented on screen for three minutes, the MANAGERs had to attest that they had 
taken notice of the circular letter. The OWNERs had to attest that the letter was 
distributed on their behalf. This is a realistic approach, since employees in 
organizations usually commit themselves to certain behavioral instructions when 
signing employment contracts98. Subsequently, the MANAGERs had to make the 
97 The original German wording can be found in Appendix 6.3.1.4. 
98 In some companies, COCs are explicitly trained. An experimental training, however, may 
provoke experimental demand effects, leading the subjects to concentrate too much on the 
significance of the COC. 
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same decision on a donation amount and the apportionment99 of this amount as in 
Round 1. The subjects' decisions in Round 2 are highly informative on the code's 
effectiveness. If subjects in the role of the MANAGER do not comply with the COC, i.e. 
the OWNER's social preferences, they will consistently stick to their own preferences, 
revealed in Round 1; otherwise, if the MANAGERs alter their apportionment decision 
from Round 1 in favor of the OWNER's preferences, the COC has proved itself an 
effective means to direct the MANAGERs to a behavior in accordance with the 
OWNER's desires. 
 
4.4.4. Subject Pool 
 
The sample totals 168 students of the University of Paderborn. 84 students (female: 
54 / male: 30) participated in Treatment 3, and 84 students (female: 46 / male: 38) 
participated in Treatment 4. The average age of the subjects was 23. Out of a pool of 
students having shown interest in attending an economic experiment, 1,697 
persons100, randomly chosen by the software 'ORSEE' (Greiner 2004), were invited 
by e-mail. Based on a first-come-first-served principle, the participants were selected 
and assigned to the different experimental sessions. Students who had taken part in 
topic-related experiments before were not admitted. Table 15 gives an overview of 
the subjects' field of study. 
 
        
    Field of study # Students Percentage  
                 
Treatment 3 
  Business science101 39 46%  
   Educational science 30 36%  
   Others 15 18%  
   Total 84 100%  
                 
Treatment 4 
  Business science101 39 46%  
   Educational science 35 42%  
   Others 10 12%  
   Total 84 100%  
        
Table 15: Fields of study (T3, T4) 
99 To prevent participants from detecting the investigation target, the code was not displayed 
immediately before the apportionment decision, but prior to the decision on the donation 
amount. 
100 Inclusive of the invitations to the investigation presented in Chapter 3. 
101 Comprising business science, international business studies, industrial engineering with 
business studies, business informatics, economic pedagogy. 
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4.4.5. Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment took place in the laboratory environment of the Business and 
Economic Research Laboratory (BaER Lab) at the University of Paderborn. The 
participants were randomly assigned to a session.102 Prior to the experiment, the 
participants were informed of the BaER-Lab rules and consented to them. The 
subjects were aware that they were paid an attendance compensation of 2.50 EUR 
and had the opportunity of receiving additional money depending on their decision 
making in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 17: Experimental procedure's process steps (T3, T4) 
 
Figure 17 illustrates that the whole experiment is made up of 9 (Treatment 3) or 10 
(Treatment 4) process steps respectively. The fifth step is only executed in Treatment 
4. On their arrival, the participants proved their identity and were asked to draw their 
seat numbers (Figure 17: step 1). Each subject sat in front of a computer with the 
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) installed. Computerization103 does 
not only simplify the execution and evaluation of an experiment, e.g. by automatic 
data gathering, it also ensures a better control and reduces the number of mistakes. 
The procedure of the COC experiment resembles the procedure described in Section 
3.3.4 (Figure 17: steps 2 & 3), but incorporates a few, though important, 
modifications. As the experiment was conducted in a real-life setting, 'PLAYER A' turns 
into 'OWNER' (OW) and correspondingly 'PLAYER B' into 'MANAGER' (MA) (compare 
Treatment 2). The participants first entered the donation amount they had decided on 
and a confirmation of their decision into z-Tree, after which they were asked by a 
102 T3: two sessions June 27, 2012; one session July 4, 2012; T4: one session June 28, 2012: 
one session June 29, 2012; one session July 4, 2012 - starting at around 9 a.m., 11.30 
a.m., or 4.30 p.m. 
103 See Appendix 6.3.1.5 for the screenshots of T3 and T4. The sole difference between T3 
and T4 are the screens concerning the introduction of the COC which are highlighted. 
Generate and 
publish the CoC 
(only in T4)
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participants Execute Round 1
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understanding 
questions
Hand out 
instructions
Execute Round 2 Answer questionnaire
1 2 3 4 5
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Participants' tasks (using z-Tree)Experimenter's tasks
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each participant
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results
Pay participants 
based on the 
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new display to decide on their apportionment by selecting one of the six options 
(Figure 17: step 4 / Figure 18). After this decision the respective round was complete. 
 
 
Figure 18: Description of Round 1 (T3, T4) 
 
Following Round 1, the participants were assigned their roles and, only in Treatment 
4, the COC was introduced (Figure 17: step 5). The MANAGERs were informed on a 
waiting-screen that their assigned OWNER was creating a specific COC, based on 
text blocks, while on the screens of the OWNERs text blocks were shown from which 
the participants selected those they liked best. After the text blocks were joined 
together, the originated COC was transmitted to the MANAGER, and both the OWNER 
and the MANAGER had to confirm the transmission. Then the MANAGERs decided on 
the donation amount and the apportionment between the charities. The OWNER-
MANAGER relationship, after the incorporation of the COC, is presented in Figure 19. 
In Treatment 3, the interaction is identical except that no COC is presented 
beforehand. In contrast to the experimental procedure presented in Chapter 3, there 
is no third round in either of the two treatments. 
Following, a personality questionnaire (see Section 4.4.6) was administered to the 
participants (Figure 17: step 7). The subsequent payment process is identical to that 
in Chapter 3 except that the subjects had to sign their apportionment between SOS 
and DSD (Figure 17: steps 9 &10). 
 
 
Decider
Company
Receives donation amount
Endowment: 0 Taler
Payoff: 0 Taler + donation amount
Receives company profit
Decides on donation amount
Endowment: 0 Taler + 155 Taler profit
Payoff: 155 Taler - donation amount
Apportionment: 100%0%
80%
20%
60%
40%
40%
60%
20%
80%
0%
100%
2. Donation amount
0, 5, 10, …, 145, 150, 155
OWNER
1. Company profit
Transfers company profit
Endowment: 155 Taler
Company profit: 155 Taler (fixed)
a) Logo is property of Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz (http://www.denkmalschutz.de)
a)
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Figure 19: Description of Round 2 (T3, T4) 
 
 
4.4.6. Personality Questionnaire 
 
After the experiment the students were asked to respond to a questionnaire, the 
content of which was almost completely identical to that of the questionnaire 
presented in Section 3.3.5. The first part aims at assessing personality traits 
determining the participants' disposition to restrain their own preferences in favor of a 
compliance with the COC. Most of the items are the same as in the experiment in 
Chapter 3, as the personality inventory proved to be a device for determining 
selected correlations. Furthermore, using the same questionnaire items promises the 
opportunity to analyze an even larger pool of consistent data. Following this first part, 
the participants are questioned about their willingness to donate and their reasons for 
choosing a specific donation amount and a specific apportionment between the 
charities. The questionnaire is concluded by requesting general statistical 
information, e.g. gender and age. 
 
 
Decider
Company
Receives donation amount
Endowment: 0 Taler
Payoff: 0 Taler + donation amount
Receives company profit
Endowment: 0 Taler
Payoff: 0 Taler + company profit
OWNER
2. Company profit
Transfers donation amount
Transfers company profit
Endowment: 155 Taler
Company profit: 155 Taler - donation amount
Apportionment: 100%0%
80%
20%
60%
40%
40%
60%
20%
80%
0%
100%
1. Donation amount
0, 5, 10, …, 145, 150, 155
MANAGER
Takes notice of the COC (only in T4)
Decides on company's donation amount
Endowment: 155 Taler 
Payoff: 155 Taler (fixed)
COC
in T4
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4.5. HYPOTHESES 
 
This section focuses on the experimental hypotheses relative to the behavior of 
subjects in the role of the MANAGER when a COC is presented which contradicts their 
own preferences. Section 4.6 presents the related results and reveals whether the 
hypotheses were supported or had to be rejected. 
In Round 1 of the experiment, each participant is fully informed about the decision to 
make and the effects of this decision. The experimental setting allows 'rational' 
MANAGERs, who always make decisions to their individual advantage, to act 
completely in accordance with their own social preferences, especially in Treatment 1 
with no COC in existence. Corresponding with the donation preferences identified by 
Bachke et al. (2013) and the German study 'Bilanz des Helfens' (Deutscher 
Spendenrat e.V. 2012), it is anticipated that SOS will be the choice recipient of the 
majority of the participating German students. The developed experiment is expected 
to show an outcome similar to the 'Bilanz des Helfens' report (humanitarian aid: 
74.2%), which leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H4.1: In the first round of both treatments (T3, T4), the participants 
preponderantly allocate their donation to SOS as the 
organization representative of humanitarian aid, thereby 
revealing their personal preference of SOS to DSD. 
 
In Round 2 of both treatments, the role of the MANAGER is added, whereby the 
experiment incorporates the standard principal-agent theory, since an agent (the 
MANAGER) is hired to act on behalf of the principal (the company OWNER). This 
theory, mainly originated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is grounded on the premise 
that a contract between both parties is often incomplete due to an asymmetry of the 
agent's and the principal's information level. While the agent typically has knowledge 
of his own behavior, the principal does not have infinite means of ascertaining and 
controlling the agent's preferences and conduct. A conflict of interests might arise 
from the agent's realization of own preferences to the principal's cost. The present 
study's experimental design makes the OWNER reveal his preferences to the 
MANAGER by a COC, but he cannot control the degree of the MANAGER's compliance 
and has no opportunity to punish non-compliance. Hence, standard economic theory 
assumes that the rational MANAGER will not withhold his personal preferences and 
will decide to ignore the COC. 
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Behavioral economics researchers support the view that social or moral preferences 
are material to an individual's decision-making process, which often deviates from the 
purely rational model (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002). Fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), trust 
(Berg et al. 1995), altruism (Andreoni 1989; Levine 1998), or reciprocity (Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006) are typical preferences of this kind, identified by means of 
experimental settings; thus, as regards the present study, the MANAGERs' personal 
social preferences can be expected to be not the sole factor influencing decision 
making. The study's experimental design enables the MANAGER to weigh his own 
social preferences against the compliance with the OWNER's COC. In view of the 
results of previous investigations into COCs' effectiveness and the conceptions of 
behavioral economists, it can be expected that the MANAGERs' social preferences will 
not dominate their decision making in Round 2 of Treatment 4 and that the 
MANAGERs will follow the introduced COC. Likewise, the OWNERs can be expected to 
anticipate this compliant behavior, which leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H4.2a: In Round 2 of Treatment 4, the MANAGER disregards his own 
preferences, revealed in Round 1, in favor of the OWNER's 
preferences for DSD, as communicated by the COC. 
 
H4.2b: In Round 2 of Treatment 4, the OWNER will correctly 
anticipate the MANAGER's compliance with the COC. 
 
It is true that in each round of this experiment a participant's endowment is reduced 
by a donation decision, but the subsequent apportionment of the donation has no 
additional effect on his payoff. Thus, the apportionment decision can considerably be 
traced to the participant's personality. For a substantiation of the results which are 
material to H4.1, it is useful to understand which personality traits are responsible for 
the preference of SOS to DSD. The HEXACO personality inventory (Lee and Ashton 
2004 and 2006), introduced in Section 4.4.6 (compare Section 3.3.5), includes 
personality scales which are suitable in this regard. A closer view at the scales' 
descriptions shows especially the 'Sentimentality' scale to promise a correlation with 
behavior. It "assesses a tendency to feel strong emotional bounds with others" (Lee 
and Ashton 2004: p. 334). People scoring low "feel little emotion when saying good-
bye or in reaction to the concern of others, whereas high scorers feel strong 
emotional attachments and an empathic sensitivity to the feelings of others" (Lee and 
Ashton 2004: p. 334). Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
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H4.3: The personality scale Sentimentality is positively correlated 
with an allocation decision in favor of SOS instead of DSD in 
Round 1. 
 
According to the general Big-Five approach, further personality traits can, by means 
of the SOEP, illuminate – in Round 2 of Treatment 4 – individuals' compliance with a 
COC which contradicts their personal preferences. The descriptions of the traits 
make use of adjectives, provided by McCrae and John (1992) and Gerlitz and 
Schupp (2005), which indicate that subjects in the role of the MANAGER with high 
scores on the scales 'Agreeableness' and 'Conscientiousness' are more likely to 
restrain their own preferences and to comply with the COC. The Big-Five personality 
trait Agreeableness is characterized by facets like trust, straightforwardness, 
altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-mindedness. Individuals scoring high on 
the Agreeableness scale are sensitive, sympathetic, and try to avoid trouble, 
whereas individuals scoring low tend to be demanding, like e.g. show-offs (Costa and 
McCrae 1992a and 1992b). Consequently, it can be expected that MANAGERs scoring 
high are more trusting and show a higher level of compliance, whereas low scoring 
MANAGERs are more stubborn and stick to their own preferences. 
 
H4.4a: The personality scale Agreeableness is positively correlated 
with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the MANAGER 
in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 of 
Treatment 4. 
 
The Conscientiousness dimension comprises, at the high end of the scale, the facets 
competence, order, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-discipline, and 
deliberation. Diametrically opposed to these facets, i.e. at the low end of the scale, is 
the lack of direction. High scoring individuals are attentive, efficient, organized, and 
accomplish entrusted tasks in a diligent and reliable manner (Costa and McCrae 
1992a and 1992b). MANAGERs with high scores tend to be more thorough and can be 
rather expected to comply with a COC, whereas those with low scores may be more 
careless and can rather be expected to stick to their own preferences. 
 
H4.4b: The personality scale Conscientiousness is positively 
correlated with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the 
MANAGER in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 
of Treatment 4. 
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The dimension lastly expected to correlate with an allocation shift is 'Openness'. This 
dimension comprises facets like fantasy, aesthetic, feelings, actions, ideas, and 
values. Individuals scoring high on this scale are curious, well-read, and broadly 
interested, whereas those with low scores are less venturesome, less fanciful, and 
more conventional (Costa and McCrae 1992a and 1992b). In contrast to other 
dimensions, these characteristics are not obviously linked to an individual's 
compliance behavior, but facets like feelings and fantasy might interfere with the 
willingness to comply with a COC. MANAGERs with a high score on the Openness 
scale will probably rather cling to their personal preferences and will not comply with 
the code. 
 
H4.4c: The personality scale Openness is negatively correlated with 
an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the MANAGER in 
Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 of 
Treatment 4. 
 
No hypothesis is framed for the dimension 'Neuroticism', as no specific correlation is 
expected. Neuroticism comprises facets like anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-
consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability. It runs from emotional instability at 
the high end to emotional stability at the low end of the scale. Individuals with low 
scores are more secure, content, and self-confident, whereas individuals with high 
scores suffer from self-doubt and might fear possible negative consequences of a 
non-compliance (Costa and McCrae 1992a and 1992b). But as the COC does not 
incorporate any sanctions, a violation of the rules gives the MANAGERs no reason for 
fear or insecurity. Consequently, no significant correlation of the decision making with 
the Neuroticism scale is expected. 
But even if the subjects do not have to be afraid of consequences, they might 
experience an inner conflict which they would like to avoid. Therefore, the integrity 
test IBES is introduced in order to gain a comprehensive insight into the subjects' 
motivation. The personality-based subscale 'Trouble Avoidance' was integrated into 
the questionnaire the participants responded to at the end of each experimental 
session. Individuals scoring high on this scale shy away from conflicts and aspire to 
harmonious solutions (Marcus 2006). It is expected that, other than Neuroticism, 
these characteristics prevent subjects from non-compliance. 
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H4.4d: The personality scale Trouble Avoidance is negatively 
correlated with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the 
MANAGER in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 
of Treatment 4. 
 
The remaining Big-Five dimension 'Extraversion' comprises the facets warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions. 
Individuals with high scores describe themselves as enthusiastic and energetic, 
especially as regards social interactions, whereas individuals with low scores 
characterize themselves lacking social dominance or superiority (Costa and McCrae 
1992a and 1992b). Similar to the Neuroticism trait, the Extraversion facets do not 
promise to be significantly correlated with the subjects' decision making. Therefore, 
no specific hypothesis is formulated.  
The next section presents general basic findings, a review of all hypotheses, and all 
major results regarding donations, apportionments, and personality traits. 
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4.6. RESULTS 
4.6.1. Basic Findings 
 
The results of Treatment 3 and Treatment 4 are based on 84 subjects respectively. 
The gathered z-Tree raw data were mainly analyzed and displayed graphically by the 
statistical software Stata (StataCorp. 2007). 
The experiment was designed to identify MANAGERs' behavioral changes due to 
restraint of their own preferences after the introduction of a COC. Therefore, z-Tree 
divided the participants into OWNERs and MANAGERs and paired them randomly and 
anonymously already in Round 1. Thus, each single MANAGER's decision on the 
donation amount and its apportionment in Round 1 and Round 2 can be compared 
on an individual level. The subjects were informed about their assigned role at the 
beginning of Round 2. As the data analyses exclusively focus on individual decisions, 
the participants will from now on be continually referred to as MANAGERs, even if they 
acted as OWNERs in Round 1. This denomination is useful when it comes to 
comparing the decisions of one and the same subject in different rounds. 
The following part presents the general results of the donation decisions in Treatment 
3 and Treatment 4, elucidating the participants' donation behavior, which is basic for 
the later review of the hypotheses. Additionally, the results of Treatment 3 and 
Treatment 4 have the potentiality to underpin the findings of Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2 (see Chapter 3), as the basic experimental designs are comparable. 
 
4.6.1.1. MANAGERs' Donations in Round 1 
 
In both treatments of Round 1, all 168 subjects acted as OWNERs of the company 
Ziegel-STEIN. They were given identical instructions and had to make decisions 
within an identical framework. In accordance with typical dictator game results 
contradicting purely selfish decision making and with the findings presented in 
Chapter 3, the participants in fact donated a specific amount in Round 1. The mean 
donation on their own behalf by all participants (OWNERs plus MANAGERs) in T3 and 
T4 of Round 1 was 29.82 Taler (19.24% of their total endowment of 155 Taler) with a 
standard deviation of 29.62 Taler. The mean donations of T3 and T4 do not differ 
significantly (Mann-Whitney test: z=0.582 / p=0.5603), which points to the 
unequivocalness of the instructions and the methodical implementation in the 
laboratory environment. 
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Table 16 breaks down the mean donations and additionally differentiates between 
OWNERs and MANAGERs. As the participants were not informed of their assigned 
roles prior to Round 2, a significant difference of the mean donation by OWNERs and 
MANAGERs cannot well be expected in Round 1, and is, indeed, not found (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test: z=0.639 / p=0.5230), which provides support for the validity of the 
experimental design. Figure 20, illustrating the donation distribution in Round 1, 
shows that 34 (20.24%) of 168 subjects kept their whole endowment of 155 Taler, 
that is to say donated nothing. Only two participants (1.19%) donated their whole 
endowment. 
 
 
Table 16: OWNERs' and MANAGERs' donations in Round 1 (T3, T4) 
 
 
 
Figure 20: OWNERs' plus MANAGERs' donation distributions in Round 1 (T3 + T4) 
 
Treatment (N)
OWNERs + MANAGERs
(mean)
OWNERs
(mean)
MANAGERs
(mean)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
between OWNERs & MANAGERs
Treatment 3 (84) 31.43 Taler 32.38 Taler 30.48 Taler z=0.370 / p=0.7116
Treatment 4 (84) 28.21 Taler 30.00 Taler 26.43 Taler z=0.494 / p=0.6210
Treatment 3 + 4 (168) 29.82 Taler 31.19 Taler 28.45 Taler z=0.639 / p=0.5230
Mann-Whitney test
between T3 & T4
z=0.582 /
p=0.5603
z=0.409 /
p=0.6822
z=0.423 /
p=0.6721
-
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4.6.1.2. MANAGERs' Donations in Round 2 
 
In Round 2, half of the participants became MANAGERs and had to decide on behalf 
of the other half, the OWNERs. Table 17 shows a mean donation by the MANAGER on 
behalf of the OWNER - in both treatments of Round 2 jointly - of 49.70 Taler (32.06% 
of the OWNER's total endowment of 155 Taler) with a standard deviation of 38.44 
Taler. The mean donation in T4 (54.17 Taler) is slightly higher than in T3 (45.24 
Taler), possibly due to the introduction of the COC in T4. Even though the code does 
not specify a donation amount, the responses to the questionnaire show that it 
motivated a few subjects acting as MANAGERs in T4 to donate more money. In spite 
of this, the MANAGERs' donations in Treatment 3 do not differ significantly from those 
in Treatment 4 (Mann-Whitney test: z=-0.627 / p=0.5304), the same applies to Round 
1. As the COC did not include a monetary guideline which the subjects could follow, 
the donation amounts of both treatments in Round 2 can be evaluated jointly. 
 
 
Table 17: MANAGERs' donations in Round 1 & 2 (T3, T4) 
 
Table 17 shows that the MANAGERs (T3 + T4) donated 28.45 Taler in Round 1 and 
49.70 Taler in Round 2 on average; the difference is highly significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test: z=-5.765 / p<0.001). The tendency to higher donations applies to 
both treatments. Eight of 84 MANAGERs (9.52%) donated nothing of the OWNER's 
money, whereas three MANAGERs (3.57%) donated the total endowment of 155 
Taler. More information about the MANAGERs' donation decisions can be drawn from 
Figure 21. In Round 1, in which the subjects decided on their own money, donations 
of 60 Taler or less are preponderant (with a conspicuous quantity of 0-Taler 
donations), whereas in Round 2, in which the subjects decided on someone else's 
money, the donations tend to be more evenly distributed across all options. 
 
Treatment (N)
Round 1
(mean)
Round 2
(mean)
Absolute deviation of
Round 2 from Round 1 (mean)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
between Round 1 & 2
Treatment 3 (42) 30.48 Taler 45.24 Taler 18.57 Taler z=-3.776 / p<0.001
Treatment 4 (42) 26.43 Taler 54.17 Taler 30.60 Taler z=-4.399 / p<0.001
Treatment 3 + 4 (84) 28.45 Taler 49.70 Taler 24.58 Taler z=-5.765 / p<0.001
Mann-Whitney test
between T3 & T4
z=0.423 /
p=0.6721
z=-0.627 /
p=0.5304
z=-1.843 /
p=0.0654
-
_____
Note: Deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 is calculated per subject by Stata
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Figure 21: MANAGERs' donation distributions in Round 1 & 2 (T3 + T4) 
 
The donations' mean absolute deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 is 24.58 Taler 
(standard deviation: 34.21 Taler). Table 17 shows the treatments to differ widely in 
their deviations (T3: 18.57 / T4: 30.60; Mann-Whitney test: z=-1.843 / p=0.0654). 
This difference is due to MANAGERs extremely increasing their donation amount 
in Round 2, that is to say they donated a very small amount or even nothing in 
Round 1, but a very high amount or even all of the endowment in Round 2, which 
leads to differences of 100 to 155 Taler between the rounds. A speculation on the 
cause of this rise could be that subjects donating a certain amount to SOS in 
Treatment 3 wanted to comply with the code in Treatment 4 by allocating the major 
part of their donation to DSD, but as they simultaneously did not want their donation 
to SOS to be short of that in Treatment 3, they kept to the previously chosen amount 
and thus increased the total donation. But the responses to the questionnaire show 
that these subjects donated more because they were not personally affected by the 
donation. 
The higher mean donation amount in Round 2 as well as the mean absolute 
deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 clearly point out the inclination for higher 
donations if the MANAGER does not have to bear the consequences of his decision. 
Anyhow, 30 subjects (35.71%) did not at all change their donation decision of 
0
5
10
15
20
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
Round 1
0
5
10
15
20
D
on
at
io
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
0 25 50 75 100 125 155
Donation options (Taler)
Round 2
Treatment 3 + Treatment 4 (N=84)
103 
 
Round 1 in Round 2. And 52.38% in total of 84 MANAGERs chose a donation amount 
in Round 2 that did not deviate by more than 10 Taler from their donation in Round 1 
(see Figure 22). These results further support the rejection of H3.1. 
 
 
Figure 22: MANAGERs' donation deviations in Round 2 from Round 1 (T3 + T4) 
 
4.6.1.3. OWNERs' Estimations in Round 2 
 
In Round 2, the 84 OWNERs (T3 + T4) were requested to estimate their paired 
MANAGER's donation. The mean estimation amounted to 52.92 Taler in Treatment 4. 
Six of the OWNERs (7.14%) expected the MANAGER to donate nothing at all and 
seven OWNERs (8.33%) expected him to donate the whole endowment. Their mean 
estimation already shows the OWNERs to give a nearly exact appraisal of the 
MANAGER's behavior, and the actual donations by the MANAGER do not differ 
significantly from the OWNER's expectations (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=0.540 / 
p=0.5892). Figure 23 demonstrates the closeness of the estimations to the 
donations. The graph on the right-hand side shows nearly coinciding curves of the 
real donations and the expected donations; the estimates are only slightly above the 
cumulative donations. 
 
35.71%
57.14%
7.14%
Accepted deviation: 0 Taler
Round 1 - Round 2 = 0
Round 1 - Round 2 < 0
Round 1 - Round 2 > 0
52.38%44.05%
3.57%
Accepted deviation: 10 Taler
|Round 1 - Round 2| <= 10
Round 1 - Round 2 < (-10)
Round 1 - Round 2 > 10
Treatment 3 + Treatment 4 (N=84)
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Figure 23: MANAGERs' donations / OWNERs' estimates in Round 1 & 2 (T3 + T4) 
 
This result is all the more remarkable as the OWNER's assessment of the MANAGER's 
donation in Round 2 differs highly significantly from his own donation in Round 1 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=-4.980 / p<0.001). 
 
4.6.2. Hypothesis 4.1: Revealing Charity Preferences 
 
The subjects' responses to the questionnaire show a marked preference for a 
particular donation recipient: 93% (T3: 79 out of 84 / T4: 77 out of 84) prefer 
donations to help children, only 3% (T3: 3 out of 84 / T4: 2 out of 84) prefer donations 
for monument preservation. Furthermore, a clear geographical preference is visible: 
65% (T3: 58 out of 84 / T4: 52 out of 84) would support campaigns in Africa as 
against 17% (T3: 15 out of 84 / T4: 13 out of 84) who would rather donate for 
purposes in Germany. 
For a review of H4.1, however, it is necessary to scrutinize if these obvious 
preferences match up with the actual apportionments between SOS and DSD. Figure 
24, showing the participants' mean percentage apportionments of each treatment in 
Round 1, makes it clear that the subjects undoubtedly favored SOS over DSD. The 
pie diagram demonstrates that more than 70% of the mean donation amount was 
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transferred to SOS, and the bar charts show the majority of the participants to have 
allocated 80% or 100% of their donation to SOS. 
 
 
Figure 24: OWNERs' plus MANAGERs' allocations to SOS in Round 1 (T3, T4) 
 
Table 18 presents the results of binomial tests which evaluate the numbers of 
participants preferring SOS or DSD respectively and, accordingly, the donation 
amounts allocated to the respective charity in Treatment 3 and Treatment 4. Across 
both treatments, 147 participants (87.5% of the sample) chose an allocation of 60%, 
80%, or 100% to SOS, while 21 participants (12.5% of the sample) allocated 60%, 
80%, or 100% of their donation to DSD. 
 
 
Table 18: OWNERs' plus MANAGERs' allocations in Round 1 (T3, T4) 
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The statistical results reveal a clear preference of the participants for SOS. The 
binomial test comparing the observed distribution (SOS: 87.5%, DSD: 12.5%) in the 
sample to an assumed distribution (SOS: 70%, DSD: 30%)104 in the total population 
reveals that a number of participants preferring SOS is significantly higher in the 
sample than in the assumed population. It is evident that the donation amounts 
allocated to SOS by these participants are significantly higher as well. These results, 
which are in line with the responses to the questionnaire and the findings of Bachke 
et al. (2013), demonstrate an overwhelming preference of SOS to DSD. As this is a 
crucial prerequisite to the systematic execution of the experiment, the proper 
selection of both charities is corroborated. Hypothesis 4.1 is supported. 
 
4.6.3. Hypothesis 4.2a: Testing COC Compliance 
 
The COC, introduced in Round 2 of Treatment 4, includes the message105 that 
donations on behalf of the company meet with the OWNER's approval, but should only 
be allocated to DSD. The code's impact on the MANAGER can be found out on an 
individual level by comparing his apportionment between SOS and DSD in Round 1 
of Treatment 4 (exclusive of a COC) with that in Round 2 of Treatment 4 (inclusive of 
a COC); additionally, a comparison of Round 2 of Treatment 3 (exclusive of a COC) 
with Round 2 of Treatment 4 (inclusive of a COC) can be expected to shed light on 
the COC's impact. Figure 25 depicts the MANAGERs' allocation decisions of each 
treatment and round. The bar charts, showing the frequencies of the different 
allocation decisions in favor of SOS, as well as the pie charts, showing the mean 
percentage allocations to SOS and DSD, demonstrate that in the baseline treatment 
(Treatment 3) there are only minimal changes in the MANAGER's behavior in Round 2 
(75.24% to SOS) compared to Round 1 (77.14% to SOS). The lack of a significant 
difference is corroborated by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z=1.171 / p=0.2415; see 
Table 19). Accordingly, the MANAGERs were not led by the idea that the donator, e.g. 
their employing company, might profit from a donation out of company money to an 
organization like DSD. The MANAGERs rather clung to their own preferences and let 
SOS have the far greater portion of their donation. 
 
 
104 The choice of a 70%-30% split is based on the 'Bilanz des Helfens' report (Deutscher 
Spendenrat e.V. 2012): 74.2% of the donations in favor of humanitarian aid. 
105 The complete COC message is presented within Appendix 6.3.1.4. 
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Figure 25: MANAGERs' mean and allocation distributions in Round 1 & 2 (T3, T4) 
 
 
 
Table 19: MANAGERs' apportionments in Round 1 & 2 (T3, T4) 
 
In Treatment 4, the participants behave completely differently in the single rounds. A 
comparison of the allocations to SOS in Round 1 of Treatment 3 and Treatment 4 
shows them to be nearly identical (77.14% and 80.00% respectively; Mann-Whitney 
test: z=-0.526 / p=0.5988). A comparison of Round 1 with Round 2 in Treatment 4 
reveals a reversal of the apportionment among the charities: in Round 1, 80% of the 
donation amount was allocated to SOS (DSD: 20%), whereas in the second round 
75.24% of the donation amount was allocated to DSD (SOS: 24.75%). Round 2 is 
almost a mirror image of Round 1 (compare pie charts in Figure 25). In Round 1, 19 
of 42 subjects donated 0 Taler to DSD, whereas in the second round 21 MANAGERs 
allocated their whole donation to DSD. Only five participants transferred 100% of 
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Round 2 from Round 1 (mean)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
between Round 1 & 2
Treatment 3 (42) 77.14% 22.86% 75.24% 24.76% 3.81pp z=1.171 / p=0.2415
Treatment 4 (42) 80.00% 20.00% 24.76% 75.24% 55.24pp z=5.539 /  p<0.001
Mann-Whitney test
between T3 & T4
- -
_____
Note: Deviation of Round 2 from Round 1 is calculated per subject by Stata; Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Mann-Whitney test applied to the allocation to SOS; pp = percentage point
Round 2Round 1
z=-0.526 /
p=0.5988
z=5.594 /
p<0.001
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their donation to SOS, i.e. 0% to DSD, in Round 2; and only six of 42 MANAGERs 
stuck in Round 2 to their preferences revealed in Round 1. Nine subjects totally 
reversed their allocation to DSD from 0% in Round 1 to 100% in Round 2. On 
average, the allotment to DSD increased by 55.24 percentage points. All in all, there 
is a marked difference between the allocations in both rounds of Treatment 4, which 
is highly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=5.539 / p<0.001). The switch in 
allocations from SOS to DSD proves that, in Round 2, the MANAGERs restrained their 
own preferences and acted as desired by the OWNER. Figure 26 presents the 
cumulative percentage allocations to DSD in Treatment 3 and Treatment 4. The right-
hand side, representing Round 2 respectively, reveals a large gap between both 
treatments showing the accumulation in Treatment 4 to reach a much higher value 
than in Treatment 3. The difference is statistically highly significant and substantiates 
the effectiveness of the COC in Round 2 of Treatment 4. 
 
 
Figure 26: MANAGERs' cumulative allocations to DSD in Round 1 & 2 (T3, T4) 
 
As the results demonstrate, a COC can influence individual decision making and lead 
MANAGERs to disregard their own preferences in favor of the OWNER's preferences. 
Consequently, H4.2a can be retained. 
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4.6.4. Hypothesis 4.2b: Testing COC Compliance 
 
In Round 2 of Treatment 3 and Treatment 4, the OWNER is affected by his MANAGER's 
decisions, but has no possibility to make decisions himself. He is only asked to make 
guesses at the MANAGER's action. The extent of correspondence between the 
MANAGER's decision and the OWNER's estimate can indicate, e.g., to what degree the 
OWNER is able to anticipate the MANAGER's compliance, or non-compliance, with the 
COC. 
The pie charts in Figure 27 show the OWNERs to estimate the MANAGERs' 
apportionments completely differently in Round 2 of Treatment 3 than in Round 2 of 
Treatment 4. In Treatment 3, lacking a COC, they assumed a mean allocation of 
23.81% to DSD, while, being aware of the COC, they estimated a mean allocation of 
70.95% to DSD in Treatment 4. The difference between the estimates in both 
treatments is highly significant (Mann-Whitney test: z=-6.319 / p<0.001). 
 
 
Figure 27: OWNERs' estimates of MANAGERs' apportionments (T3, T4) 
 
The OWNERs' estimates (70.95%) nearly match the MANAGERs' real allocations to 
DSD (75.24%); consequently, the difference between the two values is statistically 
not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=1.199 / p=0.2305). The OWNERs expect 
the MANAGERs to abide by the COC by allocating the donations to DSD, and as the 
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MANAGERs' actual behavior is consistent with this expectation, the OWNERs 
accurately anticipated that the MANAGERs would restrain their personal preferences 
and comply with the COC. Consequently, H4.2b can be retained. 
The review of H4.1 to H4.2b was based on the percentage apportionments. An 
analysis of the actual donation amounts was not necessary, but might be useful for 
gaining a comprehensive insight. Table 20 gives an overview of the MANAGERs' mean 
donations and the OWNERs' mean expectations in Round 2 in Taler. The donations to 
the charities were calculated by multiplying the MANAGER's donation amount and his 
apportionment, the same applies to the OWNER's expectation in Round 2. The 
calculation is based on a separate evaluation of each single participant's input into z-
Tree; Table 20 presents the numerical results of the accumulated values. The figures 
do not contrast with the findings presented above, this applies to the donation 
amounts in Round 1 across all treatments and across all charities. 
 
 
Table 20: MANAGER's donations / OWNERs' estimates and apportionments (T3, T4) 
 
 
4.6.5. Hypothesis 4.3: Understanding Personality 
 
The numeric results presented in the previous section attest to the effectiveness of a 
COC, but they yield no information about the personality traits influencing decision 
making and thus contributing to the participants' compliance, or non-compliance, with 
a code.  
H4.3 postulates that subjects scoring high on the HEXACO Sentimentality scale tend 
to allocate the majority of their donation to SOS instead of DSD. Table 21 gives an 
overview of the relationship between the Sentimentality scale and the allocations to 
SOS. The mean HEXACO-Sentimentality score of all 168 participants was 3.77, 
which approximates the HEXACO-200 score of 3.76 stated by Ashton and Lee (2007 
and 2009; Lee and Ashton 2006). If the subjects are split into two groups, depending 
on the allocation of the donation majority, the Sentimentality mean score of the 
respective group turns out to be higher (participants favoring SOS) or lower 
Treatment (N)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Treatment 3 (42) 30.48 Taler 24.41 Taler 6.07 Taler 45.24 Taler 32.14 Taler 13.10 Taler 46.90 Taler 35.28 Taler 11.62 Taler
Treatment 4 (42) 26.43 Taler 19.64 Taler 6.79 Taler 54.17 Taler 18.24 Taler 35.93 Taler 58.93 Taler 18.02 Taler 40.91 Taler
Mann-Whitney test
between T3 & T4
z=0.423 /
p=0.6721
z=0.611 /
p=0.5410
z=0.731 /
p=0.4646
z=-0.627 /
p=0.5304
z=3.255 /
p=0.0011
z=-3.734 /
p<0.001
z=-1.335 /
p=0.1817
z=3.470 /
p<0.001
z= -4.861 /
p<0.001
Round 2Round 1
OWNERs' estimates
Round 2
MANAGERs' donations
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(participants favoring DSD) than the mean score of the total subject group. According 
to Ashton and Lee, higher scores indicate a stronger emotional attachment to the 
feelings of others, whereas lower scores are linked to less sympathetic reactions to 
the concern of others. As Table 21 shows, the mean score of the participants 
allocating the majority of their donation to SOS is 3.83, which is higher than the total 
subject group's mean score of 3.77. The increase applies to the MANAGERs as well 
as the OWNERs. In contrast, the mean score of the participants allocating the majority 
of their donation to DSD is 3.39, which is short of that of the total subject group. 
 
 
Table 21: Sentimentality scores and apportionments in Round 1 (T3 + T4) 
 
For a close examination, these findings were scrutinized by means of the Jonckheere 
Terpstra test for ordered alternatives (J*=1.926 / p=0.0541) and Spearman's 
(ρ=0.1484 / p=0.0549) and Kendall's (τ-b=0.1150 / p=0.0543) correlation coefficients. 
The results underline the descriptive statistics of Table 21, demonstrating that a 
higher score on the Sentimentality scale is related to an allocation to SOS instead of 
DSD. Consequently, H4.3 is supported by the experimental results. 
 
4.6.6. Hypotheses 4.4a to 4.4d: Understanding Personality 
 
As Hypotheses 4.4a to 4.4d are uniformly based on the assumption that there is a 
relationship between personality traits and the shift in allocations away from SOS to 
DSD in Round 2 of Treatment 4, all four hypotheses will be reviewed in this section. 
In Round 2 of Treatment 4, it is up to the MANAGER to comply with the COC by 
restraining his own preferences revealed in Round 1. As Table 19 shows, the 
MANAGERs indeed act in line with the code. In Round 2, the allocations to DSD 
increase significantly with a mean absolute deviation of 55.24 percentage points (SD: 
34.73) from Round 1. For an investigation of personality traits which are likely to be 
jointly responsible for this phenomenon, the SOEP was applied. The subjects were 
HEXACO-200
Total
M (SD)
OWNERs + MANAGERs
M (SD)
OWNERs
M (SD)
MANAGERs
M (SD)
N=887 N=168 N=84 N=84
3.76 (.64) 3.77 (.67) 3.79 (.67) 3.76 (.67)
- N=147 N=75 N=72
- 3.83 (0.68) 3.85 (0.68) 3.80 (0.68)
- N=21 N=9 N=12
- 3.39 (0.49) 3.28 (0.30) 3.48 (0.59)
Participants allocating
≥ 60% to DSD
Participants allocating
≥ 60% to SOS
HEXACO-Sentimentality in Round 1
General
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requested to respond to 16 items altogether. Each of the scales Neuroticism, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion is covered by three, the scale 
Openness to Experience by four items.106 As to Hypotheses 4.4a to 4.4d, the scales 
Neuroticism and Extraversion were not evaluated because a correlation with the 
MANAGERs' conduct cannot be well expected. Additionally, the IBES subscale 
Trouble Avoidance, a variable possibly influencing the apportionment decision, was 
included in the investigation. The Jonckheere Terpstra test examines the 
experimental data for statistically significant relations between personality scales 
(Hypotheses 4.4a to 4.4d) and differences between the allocations to DSD in Round 
2 and Round 1. Spearman's and Kendall's rank correlation are meant to give further 
insight into a possible relationship between personality traits and compliance 
behavior. Table 22 gives an overview of the statistical results. 
 
 
Table 22: Personality scales and deviation of allocation to DSD 
of Round 2 from Round 1 (T3 + T4) 
 
H4.4a postulates a positive correlation between the Agreeableness scale and an 
allocation shift to DSD. The evaluation shows a positive, though rather low significant 
correlation. Taking into account that only 42 observations were available and only 
three items are assigned to the Agreeableness scale, the found significance level is 
tolerable. Trying to avoid trouble, participants with higher scores on the 
Agreeableness scale comply with the COC. Consequently, H4.4a can be retained. 
With regard to the Conscientiousness scale, no significant relationship with the 
allocation shift was found. H4.4b has to be rejected. 
The evaluation of the Openness scale shows highly significant negative correlation 
coefficients, revealing that high scores on this scale are related to a lower deviation 
of allocations to DSD in Round 2 from allocations to DSD in Round 1. Subjects 
106 See Appendix 6.6.1.1 for the assignment of the single items to the respective scales. 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
H4.4a (SOEP: Agreeableness) 1.804 (0.0713) 0.2954 (0.0575) 0.2166 (0.0730)
H4.4b (SOEP: Conscientiousness) 0.690 (0.4901) 0.1195 (0.4508) 0.0823 (0.4971)
H4.4c (SOEP: Openness) -3.444 (<0.001) -0.5146 (<0.001) -0.4045 (<0.001)
H4.4d (IBES: Trouble Avoidance) 0.953 (0.3404) 0.1582 (0.3169) 0.1124 (0.3461)
_____
Note: Deviation = Round 2- Round 1
MANAGERs (N=42)
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scoring high tend to restrain their own preferences to a lesser degree, they are more 
venturesome and thus risk acting contrary to the COC. As high Openness scores are 
significantly negatively correlated with a lower allocation deviation, H4.4c is 
supported. 
For Hypothesis 4.4d, based on the IBES questionnaire Trouble Avoidance scale, 
Table 22 shows no significant relationship with the MANAGER's allocation decisions. 
With regard to the personality-trait description, a significant negative correlation was 
expected. Perhaps the sample is too small, or the usage of merely one IBES scale is 
not suitable to achieve interpretable results. H4.4d has to be rejected. 
 
4.6.7. Results of the Hypotheses' Review 
 
    
 Hypotheses Results  
         
 H4.1 
In the first round of both treatments (T3, T4), the participants 
preponderantly allocate their donation to SOS as the 
organization representative of humanitarian aid, thereby 
revealing their personal preference of SOS to DSD. 
supported  
          
 H4.2a 
In Round 2 of Treatment 4, the MANAGER disregards his own 
preferences, revealed in Round 1, in favor of the OWNER's 
preferences for DSD, as communicated by the COC. 
supported  
          
 H4.2b In Round 2 of Treatment 4, the OWNER will correctly anticipate the MANAGER's compliance with the COC. supported  
          
 H4.3 
The personality scale Sentimentality is positively correlated 
with an allocation decision in favor of SOS instead of DSD in 
Round 1. 
supported  
          
 H4.4a 
The personality scale Agreeableness is positively correlated 
with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the MANAGER 
in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 of 
Treatment 4. 
supported  
          
 H4.4b 
The personality scale Conscientiousness is positively 
correlated with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the 
MANAGER in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 
of Treatment 4. 
not 
supported  
          
 H4.4c 
The personality scale Openness is negatively correlated with 
an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the MANAGER 
in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 of 
Treatment 4. 
supported  
          
 H4.4d 
The personality scale Trouble Avoidance is negatively 
correlated with an allocation shift from SOS to DSD by the 
MANAGER in Round 2 of Treatment 4, compared to Round 1 
of Treatment 4. 
not 
supported  
     
Table 23: Results of hypotheses review (H4.1 to H4.4d) 
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4.6.8. Findings on Further Personality Traits  
 
The questionnaire used for the personality assessment in Chapter 4 is identical with 
the one used in Chapter 3, even if, due to the different foci, not all of the analyses of 
Chapter 3 were repeated in Chapter 4. To increase validation across chapters, the 
conditions of the decision-making process in Round 1 were designed identically for 
all treatments, thus making it possible to back up findings of previous sections by 
subsequent results. This especially applies to personality assessment, for which the 
size of the sample is often crucial. 
The review of H3.4a in Section 3.5.7 has shown that higher scores on the three 
major HEXACO scales Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and Altruism correlate 
significantly with higher donations to SOS. It is conceivable that this also applies to 
Treatment 3 and Treatment 4. On the supposition that subjects voluntarily donating 
money out of their own endowment to a charity tend to be more altruistic, fairer, and 
try more to avoid greediness than subjects donating nothing, the data of Round 1 
were again analyzed by the Jonckheere Terpstra test and Spearman's and Kendall's 
correlation coefficients. The results, presented in Table 24, are very explicit for each 
personality trait and show a positive correlation between higher scores on the 
respective scale and the donations by OWNERs and MANAGERs in Round 1, which 
means that the higher the subject's score on a scale, the higher his donation amount 
is. All results are highly significant. H3.4a, already supported in Section 3.5.7, 
receives strong support again by the even clearer results presented in Table 24. 
 
 
Table 24: Personality scales and donations in Round 1 (T3 + T4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness 2.793 (0.0052) 0.2183 (0.0045) 0.1544 (0.0052)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 3.699 (<0.001) 0.2739 (<0.001) 0.2044 (<0.001)
HEXACO: Altruism 3.288 (0.0010) 0.2530 (<0.001) 0.1832 (0.0010)
OWNERs + MANAGERs (N=168)
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4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The present chapter sheds light on a COC's capacity to govern individuals' decision 
making within the framework of CSR. The laboratory economic experiment of 
Chapter 3 was supplemented by two business-scenario treatments, designed for a 
comparison of employees' behavior in settings with or without a COC (Treatment 3 
and Treatment 4 respectively). In this context, the formulated code was intended to 
be in support of the company's continuity and thus desired acting in accordance with 
the guidelines. Additionally, the influence of selected personality traits, assessed by a 
questionnaire, was fathomed out. The results of previous research on the usefulness 
of COCs are far from corresponding and leave a gap, which this chapter is intended 
to close. 
That a COC in the form of a formal and written statement can govern an employee's 
behavior is clearly supported by the present experimental results. 93% of the 
participants preferred donations helping children and allocated in Round 1 of both 
treatments (T3, T4), in the absence of a COC, 76.90% on average of their 
endowment to SOS. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that, in Round 2 of 
Treatment 4, they were brought into a loyalty conflict by the introduction of a COC 
requiring them to disregard their own preferences and to comply with the code's 
differing objectives. The consequent allocation reversal, replacing 76.90% to SOS by 
75.24% to DSD, is statistically highly significant. It points up the MANAGERs' 
compliance behavior, and it is consistent with the expectations of the OWNERs who 
formulated and distributed the code. The outcome of the present study is relevant to 
business owners or top-level managers considering a COC-supported 
implementation of CSR in their organizations. On the one hand, it is difficult to 
formulate a comprehensive code with rules applying to all contingencies and all 
concerned parties; on the other hand, if the code shall serve as an anchor for 
employees in uncertain situations, its purpose should be laid down as precisely and 
intelligibly as possible. In practice, the communication of a code becomes 
increasingly vital and complicated, especially in large-scale enterprises. For the sake 
of practicability, a code can only cover the main aspects of CSR and will be 
somewhat incomplete, involving the risk of permitting too much freedom of decision. 
The establishment of a COC, irrespective of its form, as well as the monitoring of 
employees' degree of compliance with the code stays a complex process requiring 
human, monetary, and time resources. The results of the thesis on hand can help to 
simplify the implementation of a code regulating interactions between 'principals' and 
'agents'. A COC providing guidelines and dispensing with possible punishments or 
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rewards, as successfully tested in this study, could be a less costly, less difficult and 
less laborious alternative to intensive monitoring; it could be an effective means for 
the implementation of CSR and a useful supplement to employment contracts. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the present study's outcome imply that 
organizations should consider the implementation of a COC, even if it is incomplete, 
to ensure a sufficiently compliant behavior even without thorough supervision. The 
results point out that a few deviationists can be tolerated, as the vast majority of the 
participants acted in accordance with the COC by disregarding their own 
preferences, even without any prospect of punishments or rewards. Thus, 
organizations can save on expenses and resources by trusting their employees, as 
compliance with the given rules is to be expected. 
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5. SUMMARY 
 
5.1. COMBINED RESULTS FOR ALL FOUR TREATMENTS 
 
In total, four treatments were designed for the review of the hypotheses. The 
treatments build on each other, thus giving the opportunity to achieve results relevant 
to each single hypothesis and, moreover, to achieve further validity by comparing 
results across the treatments. All four treatments are designed with a similar basic 
structure: in Round 1, a participant as a member of a group made up of two subjects 
decides on a donation out of his own endowment, while in Round 2, the same 
participant decides on a donation out of the other group member's endowment. The 
extent and/or the frame of each single treatment were/was designed to serve its 
respective purpose (see Table 25). 
 
 
Table 25: General description of all treatments (T1 to T4) 
 
Because of their identical experimental core, Round 1 as well as Round 2 can be 
considered collectively across all treatments. Table 26 shows that the Jonckheere 
Terpstra test detects significant differences between PLAYER B's / the MANAGER's 
donations in the four treatments neither in Round 1 (J*=-0.813 / p=0.4161) nor in 
Round 2 (J*=-0.668 / p=0.5040). H3.1 and H3.2 were evidenced in Sections 3.5 and 
4.6, evaluating all treatments combined gives further support to these hypotheses. 
 
 
Table 26: MANAGER's donations / OWNER's estimates in Round 1 & 2 (T1 to T4) 
Chapter Focus Scenario Rounds Recipient Participants
Treatment 1 3 Other people's money None 3 SOS 110
Treatment 2 3 Other people's money Business 3 SOS 56
Treatment 3 4 Charity preferences Business 2 SOS / DSD 84
Treatment 4 4 CoC effectiveness Business 2 SOS / DSD 84
Total - - - - - 334
Treatment (N)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Total
(mean)
SOS
(mean)
DSD
(mean)
Treatment 1-4 (167) 32.90 Taler - - 53.08 Taler - - 59.25 Taler - -
Treatment 1 (55) 37.09 Taler - - 59.55 Taler - - 68.55 Taler - -
Treatment 2 (28) 38.04 Taler - - 50.54 Taler - - 60.00 Taler - -
Treatment 3 (42) 30.48 Taler 24.41 Taler 6.07 Taler 45.24 Taler 32.14 Taler 13.10 Taler 46.90 Taler 35.28 Taler 11.62 Taler
Treatment 4 (42) 26.43 Taler 19.64 Taler 6.79 Taler 54.17 Taler 18.24 Taler 35.93 Taler 58.93 Taler 18.02 Taler 40.91 Taler
Jonckheere-Terpstra
test for T1 to T4
J*=-0.813 /
p=0.4161
- - J*=-0.668 /
p=0.5040
- - J*=-1.568
p=0.1169
- -
OWNERs' estimates
Round 1 Round 2 Round 2
MANAGERs' donations
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Another way of inspecting H3.1 is offered by Figure 28, showing, separately for 
Round 1 and Round 2, the donation decisions of PLAYER Bs / the MANAGERs in all 
four treatments. The histograms illustrate the shift from low amounts in Round 1 to 
medium amounts in Round 2, with a mean donation across all treatments of 32.90 
Taler in Round 1 and 53.08 Taler in Round 2. The donations of all four treatments 
together seem to show again that PLAYER Bs / the MANAGERs handled other people's 
money differently than their own; strictly speaking, they tended towards higher 
donations when the spent money was not their own. Estimating a donation of 59.25 
Taler on average (see Table 26), the paired PLAYER A / the OWNER expected these 
higher donations in Round 2. 
 
 
Figure 28: PLAYER Bs' / MANAGERs' donation distributions in Round 1 & 2 (T1 to T4) 
 
On the other hand, nearly 36% of PLAYER Bs / the MANAGERs, across all treatments, 
chose no different donation amounts, regardless whether they transferred money 
from their own or from their paired PLAYER A's / the OWNER's endowment. This 
portion of 36% rises to more than 56%, when the amount difference between the 
donations in Round 1 and Round 2 is 10 Taler at most (see Figure 29). 
Consequently, it can be stated that the results of the four treatments as a whole give 
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support for H3.1 by pointing up that a considerable percentage of individuals do not 
handle other people's money differently than their own. 
 
 
Figure 29: PLAYER Bs' / MANAGERs' donation deviations 
in Round 2 from Round 1 (T1 to T4) 
 
Furthermore, the fact that 36% of the participants did not change their donation of 
Round 1 in Round 2 and, additionally, a correlation of 0.5157 between Round 1 and 
Round 2 across all treatments back up H3.2. 
H3.4a and H3.4b were also reviewed across all four treatments. An advantage in 
combining the treatments is the increase in validity by augmenting the number of 
observations, which is especially useful for the examination of effects caused by 
personality traits. Table 27 presents the relationship between three HEXACO 
personality scales and PLAYER B's / the MANAGER's donation in Round 1. The 
correlation coefficients without exception are positive and the statistical significance 
is even higher than that of the findings in Chapter 3, thus H3.4a is even more 
strongly supported. Appendix 6.4 provides an insight into the relationship between 
ten personality traits and the donation decisions; as expected, the HEXACO scales 
Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and Altruism, presented in Table 27, turn out the most 
influential ones due to the highest statistical significance. 
 
35.93%
56.29%
7.78%
Accepted deviation: 0 Taler
Round 1 - Round 2 = 0
Round 1 - Round 2 < 0
Round 1 - Round 2 > 0
56.29%
39.52%
4.19%
Accepted deviation: 10 Taler
|Round 1 - Round 2| <= 10
Round 1 - Round 2 < (-10)
Round 1 - Round 2 > 10
Treatment 1 to Treatment 4 (N=167)
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Table 27: Personality scales and donations in Round 1 (T1 to T4) 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 3.4b is to be reviewed once again. Table 28 presents, across all 
treatments, the correlation between the personality scales Fairness, Greed 
Avoidance and Altruism with the deviation of the donations in Round 2 from those in 
Round 1. Like in Section 3.5.8, the coefficients show negative signs. The significance 
level is comparable with previous results: while Fairness is significantly correlated, 
Greed Avoidance only shows a trend towards significance and Altruism a non-
significant correlation; thus the hypothesis can be seen strongly supported only with 
regard to the trait Fairness. As to the Greed Avoidance scale, the significance level is 
still acceptable to support H3.4b. 
 
 
Table 28: Personality scales and donation deviations 
of Round 2 from Round 1 (T1 to T4)  
 
Reviewing the hypotheses of Chapter 4 across all treatments seems not to be 
reasonable, as Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 include neither the charity DSD nor a 
COC and thus are not comparable with Treatment 3 and Treatment 4. Therefore a 
review of Hypotheses 4.1 to 4.4d across all treatments is left out. 
 
 
 
 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness 3.383 (<0.001) 0.2690 (<0.001) 0.1878 (<0.001)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 3.453 (<0.001) 0.2622 (<0.001) 0.1912 (<0.001)
HEXACO: Altruism 3.805 (<0.001) 0.2929 (<0.001) 0.2123 (<0.001)
PLAYER Bs / MANAGERs (N=167)
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness -2.448 (0.0144) -0.1908 (0.0135) -0.1386 (0.0144)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance -1.864 (0.0623) -0.1409 (0.0693) -0.1053 (0.0625)
HEXACO: Altruism -1.305 (0.1918) -0.1040 (0.1810) -0.0743 (0.1922)
PLAYER Bs / MANAGERs (N=167)
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5.2. SYNOPSIS 
 
Taking the following aspects into account, the thesis on hand can support business 
owners and corporations in a successful implementation of a corporate social 
responsibility program inclusive of a realistic assessment of its effects on the CSR 
business case:  
 
 Definition of CSR, presentation of related theoretical concepts and 
the CSR business case 
 Behavior of corporate managers who are required to realize 
corporate owners' (incl. shareholders') pro-social interests by 
means of corporate money 
 Effectiveness of a COC to induce corporate managers to behave 
in line with the corporate owners' (incl. shareholders') expectations 
 
Based on available research literature, CSR, with the focus on conviction CSR, is 
introduced in Chapter 2 to provide an overall picture and to build the basis for further 
analyses. CSR is differentiated from other comparable concepts, and the utility of 
CSR within organizations is discussed. Taking these topics into consideration can 
help business owners to design their CSR program, assist them in pointing out the 
benefits gained from CSR, and enable them to achieve a positive CSR business 
case by understanding customers' and professional purchasers' behavior. But CSR is 
more than a merely organizational matter. As individuals, e.g. professional 
purchasers, are those who execute CSR-related decisions in a corporation, it is 
necessary to gain an insight into individuals' way of pro-social thinking and acting. 
Thus, Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the individual corporate manager's attitude 
and behavior. Concluding, Chapter 2 sets forth the potential conflict between 
managers' own preferences and organizational preferences to draw attention to 
desired further research. When a manager is uncertain about the organization's 
intended monetary level of CSR investment, he can base his financial decisions 
solely on his own evaluation. Consequently, business owners can only 'hope' that 
their social preferences match with those of the managers and that managers' 
financial decisions do not differ depending on whether they spend corporate money 
or their own. Taking potential conflicts between owners' and managers' preferences 
into consideration can be crucial to a successful CSR implementation with regard to 
the required degree of regulation concerning the managers' behavior.  
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This is also an important aspect in the context of Chapter 3, which analyzes how 
people deal with other people's money. Especially Milton Friedman showed himself 
to have a firm opinion about this topic by stating that "very few people spend other 
people's money as carefully as they spend their own" (Friedman 1975). Not a few 
business owners may agree with Friedman, but as his statement is a surmise, it was 
put to the test by means of a dictator game-based laboratory experiment using a 
neutral treatment as well as a business-scenario treatment. The experiment refers to 
the CSR context of Chapter 2 by examining individuals' decisions on donations to a 
charity. On an aggregated level, the experimental results show the participants to 
decide on higher donations out of other people's endowment compared to donations 
out of their own endowment. But a detailed analysis on an individual level reveals 
that at least one third of the participants did not choose different amounts under 
either of these conditions. Another experimental result discloses that in an uncertain 
situation people use their own preferences or their previous behavior as an anchor 
for their donation decisions on behalf of someone else. Additionally, the data analysis 
disclosed the existence of a 'punisher' personality which is characteristic for 
participants whose pro-social standards are well above average and who punish 
other participants for donations which do not meet these standards. 
The experimental design presented in Chapter 4 incorporates a specific form of 
guideline for the managers' behavior: a code of conduct. Such a code cannot 
guarantee a situation without any uncertainty about the monetary investment, but it 
can easily reduce this uncertainty by clearly describing the organization's CSR 
preferences. Whether managers voluntarily comply with a COC dispensing with 
penalties has not been fully clarified until now. The experimental design presented in 
Chapter 4 is based on the design presented in Chapter 3, but is extended by the 
introduction of a COC trying to induce the participants to behave in a desired way, as 
a counterproductive or, at least, non-supportive conduct may be disadvantageous to 
the company. The COC makes it plain that the company has decided to support the 
charity 'Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz'. The vast majority of people support the 
objectives of this charity to a far lesser degree than the objectives of the charity 'SOS 
Kinderdörfer weltweit'; this applies to the participants in the experiment as well. 
Though dispensing with penalty options, the COC induces the subjects to disregard 
their own preferences for 'SOS Kinderdörfer weltweit' and preponderantly contribute 
to 'Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz'. Consequently, business owners can credit a 
COC as an effective means to govern CSR activities in their organizations. 
Even if employees' personality cannot be easily assessed in corporations, the 
experiment of the thesis on hand was enriched by analyzing the influence of 
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personality traits for the purpose of achieving a comprehensive insight. The used 
personality scales were drawn from three different inventories: SOEP, HEXACO, and 
IBES. Especially the HEXACO scales Fairness, Altruism, and Greed Avoidance are 
significantly positively correlated with donations out of the participants' own 
endowment in Chapter 3, and the SOEP scale Agreeableness correlates positively, 
though only weakly, with the COC-caused donation deviation of Round 2 from  
Round 1, whereas the scale Openness shows a highly significant negative 
correlation. Furthermore in Chapter 4, a positive correlation of the trait Sentimentality 
with the apportionment between SOS and DSD was found. 
The thesis on hand shows that individual decision makers in corporations – with or 
without a COC – can serve to realize the CSR preferences of owners or 
shareholders. 
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5.3. OUTLOOK 
 
The encouraging findings of the thesis on hand should motivate future researchers to 
contribute to the discussion about handling other people's money and the 
effectiveness of a COC. The experimental design leaves room for alterations and 
modifications. It largely concentrates on ensuring an appropriate balance between 
internal and external validity. It would surely be of interest to investigate the effects 
brought about by an extension of external validity. The experimental conditions 
permitting the participants to act entirely anonymously could be superseded by a 
setting in which the subjects are informed about their counterpart. Thus, a model of a 
business scenario could be created which enables the OWNER to directly trace back 
an employee's decision to the responsible decision maker. Another modification 
could consist in an additional party, e.g. a peer worker, who could inform the OWNER 
about a MANAGER's non-compliance with the code. External validity could also be 
increased by augmenting the number of dictators, thus creating a 'many 
shareholders' environment. And finally, the participation of real corporate managers, 
i.e. purchasing managers, in the experiment could incorporate their business 
experience. In the present experiment, no sanctioning-options are open to the 
OWNER. It could be erudite to observe the development of the mean donation's 
difference of Round 2 from Round 1 under conditions which allow the OWNERs to 
sanction their counterparts' actions. 
Up to now, the effectiveness of a COC and the impact of included goal settings, 
sanctions, and rewards have been discussed and investigated without homogeneous 
results. In order to explicitly reveal the effect of a plain written statement without any 
accompanying measures, the COC used in this study refrains from any connotations. 
However, the above-mentioned factors, often associated with real-life COCs, are well 
worth exploring. With regard to the study on hand, for example, a third round with a 
monitoring-opportunity for the OWNER could be carried out. Deviations from the 
present experiment's results could reveal if punishments or rewards really affect an 
employee's compliance, be it positively or negatively. As multinationals operate on 
markets beyond national borders, it is also recommendable to investigate cultural 
peculiarities. Especially in non-western countries, individuals may respond differently 
to organizational ordinances than Europeans. Accordingly, sanctions would be 
redundant in regions where employees are used to obeying organizational 
guidelines. Furthermore, testing a COC as an organizational institution motivating to 
report non-compliant behavior in the context of CSR could contribute materially to the 
recent and current debate on whistleblowing. 
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Concluding, it can be considered approved that people who have to decide on other 
people's money in an uncertain situation take their bearings from their own 
preferences and that, furthermore, a COC actually can impact on an employee's 
decision making, even if it contradicts his personal preferences. However, as there is 
still room for improvement in CSR-related behavior within organizations, further 
research on this topic is indispensable. 
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6. APPENDIX 
 
6.1. APPENDIX: CHAPTER 2 
 
6.1.1. CSR Interpretation in Germany 
  
Interpretation of CSR is not only different among scholars, but also across nations. 
Exemplarily, the interpretation in Germany is presented in the following. 
Based on the CSR definition by the European Commission in 2001107, the National 
CSR Forum (2010) recommended a CSR definition to the German government. The 
'Recommendations Report' states (National CSR Forum 2010: pp. Chapters I & II): 
"When everyone shoulders their responsibility, economic, social and environmental 
goals can be cross-linked to the benefit of all. This is the fundamental idea behind 
corporate social responsibility. The National CSR Forum is committed to this 
objective. […] Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to a company's 
assumption of social responsibility above and beyond what is required by law. CSR is 
a byword for the practice of sustainable corporate governance in a company's 
core business. This practice is embedded in its business strategy. CSR is voluntary 
but not arbitrary" [original text not bold]. In a latest statement federal minister Ursula 
von der Leyen108 said: "Of this I am certain: Economic, social and environmental 
objectives pay off, they go hand in hand with one another and they benefit everyone. 
And precisely this constitutes the strength and appeal of corporate social 
responsibility" (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2011). 
In Germany, CSR understanding is strongly related or even identical to sustainable 
development, as adumbrated by the statement: 'CSR is a byword for the practice of 
sustainable corporate governance [...]'. There is a strong tendency to mix CSR with 
'sustainability'. CSR is seen as an instrument to improve two out three dimensions of 
sustainability: social and environmental (Loew et al. 2004). The English word 'social' 
is often translated into the German word 'sozial' (comparable pronunciation, different 
meaning) (Loew et al. 2004). The meaning of the German word 'sozial' is, 
for example, related to caring for disadvantaged people within society. 
107 Commission of the European Communities (2001: p. 6): "[…] a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. […] Being socially responsible 
means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and 
investing "more" into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders." 
108 In 2012 responsible minister for the German governmental department 'Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs'. 
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Schwalbach (2008) (also Schwenk 2010) sees CSR as a kind of management to 
solve social (with the meaning of 'sozial') and ecological problems. 
 
6.1.2. German Stock Corporation Act 
 
German Stock Corporation Act § 76, Management of the Stock 
Corporation, Para. 1: "The management board shall have direct 
responsibility for the management of the company" 109 [original text 
not italic] (Schneider and Heidenhain 2000: p. 85). 
 
The predominant opinion concerning the management board is described within the 
German Stock Corporation Act (interpretation of § 76 para. 1), stating that the board 
is not committed to orient its actions towards the shareholders' interests. In individual 
cases, the management board is authorized to execute its responsibility to favor the 
interests of non-shareholders even at the expense of shareholders. The board is 
obligated to focus its business administration on achieving a profit that ensures a 
substantial maintenance of the company's earning power. It is at the discretion of the 
management board to burden the shareholders with an appropriate amount for the 
consideration of social needs (Empt 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 Original wording: "Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die Gesellschaft zu 
leiten" Hirte (2014: § 76 Abs. 1 AktG), translation by Schneider and Heidenhain (2000: 
p. 85). 
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6.1.3. Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumers 
 
   
 Authors Findings  
       
 Becker-Olsen et al. 2006 
Consumer attitudes towards the corporation can be 
improved by proactive and high-fit CSR initiatives.  
        
 Brown and Dacin 1997 Positive effect of CSR on product perception.  
        
 Brunk and Blümelhuber 2011 
Negative effect of CSR if organizations do not meet 
consumers' level of CSR expectations; no positive 
effect if expectations are exceeded. 
 
        
 Green and Peloza 2011 
CSR can increase or decrease product attributes and 
thus enhance or diminish the overall value 
proposition for consumers. 
 
        
 Lee et al. 2012 Increase in loyalty through CSR.  
        
 Mattila et al. 2010 
CSR can mitigate negative corporate news and 
create a positive attitude towards the organization.  
        
 Mohr and Webb 2005 
CSR generates a positive evaluation of the company 
and affects buying intention.  
        
 Sen and Bhattacharya 2001: p. 238 
"Consumers' company evaluations are more sensitive 
to negative CSR information than positive CSR 
information". 
 
    
Appendix 1: Selected studies of the effects of CSR on consumer behavior 
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6.2. APPENDIX: CHAPTER 3 
6.2.1. Treatment 1: Neutral 
6.2.1.1. Handout: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
Appendix 2: T1 – Instruction (PA, PB) [1/5] 
130 
 
 
Appendix 3: T1 – Instruction (PA, PB) [2/5] 
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Appendix 4: T1 – Instruction (PA, PB) [3/5] 
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Appendix 5: T1 – Instruction (PA, PB) [4/5] 
 
133 
 
 
Appendix 6: T1 – Instruction (PA, PB) [5/5] 
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6.2.1.2. Z-Tree Screenshots 
 
 
Appendix 7: T1 – Welcome z-Tree screen (PA, PB)  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8: T1 – Comprehension questions z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [1/2] 
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Appendix 9: T1 – Comprehension questions z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [2/2] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10: T1 – Round 1 role assignment z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 11: T1 – Round 1 donation z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 12: T1 – Round 1 finish z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 13: T1 – Round 2 role assignment z-Tree screen (PA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14: T1 – Round 2 role assignment z-Tree screen (PB) 
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Appendix 15: T1 – Round 2 donation z-Tree screen (PA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 16: T1 – Round 2 donation z-Tree screen (PB) 
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Appendix 17: T1 – Round 2 finish z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 18: T1 – Round 3 instruction z-Tree screen (PA) 
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Appendix 19: T1 – Round 3 instruction z-Tree screen (PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 20: T1 – Round 3 donation z-Tree screen (PA) 
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Appendix 21: T1 – Round 3 donation z-Tree screen (PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 22: T1 – Round 3 expectation z-Tree screen (PB) 
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Appendix 23: T1 – Payoffs fixed z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 24: T1 – SOEP introduction z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 25: T1 – SOEP items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [1/2] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 26: T1 – SOEP items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [2/2] 
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Appendix 27: T1 – HEXACO instruction z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 28: T1 – HEXACO items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [1/4] 
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Appendix 29: T1 – HEXACO items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [2/4] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 30: T1 – HEXACO items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [3/4] 
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Appendix 31: T1 – HEXACO items z-Tree screen (PA, PB) [4/4] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 32: T1 – Round 1 questions z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 33: T1 – Round 2 questions z-Tree screen (PA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 34: T1 – Round 2 questions z-Tree screen (PB) 
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Appendix 35: T1 – Round 1 & 2 deviation questions z-Tree screen (PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 36: T1 – Round 3 questions z-Tree screen (PA) 
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Appendix 37: T1 – Round 3 questions z-Tree screen (PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 38: T1 – Donation preferences z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 39: T1 – Experiment experience z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 40: T1 – Demographic questions z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 41: T1 – Questionnaire finish z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 42: T1 – Prior to payoff z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
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Appendix 43: T1 – Payoff results z-Tree screen (PA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 44: T1 – Payoff results z-Tree screen (PB) 
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Appendix 45: T1 – Final z-Tree screen (PA, PB) 
 
 
6.2.1.3. Assignment to the Personality Model 
 
 
Appendix 46: T1 – Subject graphs' assignment to the personality model (PB) 
 
 
Persisters Not assigned
Flat Decreasing &
inreasing
Increasing Decreasing &
inreasing
Decreasing Increasing &
decreasing
58 60 57 60 59 56
73 61 67 61 62
77 64 69 64 63
81 75 70 75 65
86 82 76 82 66
89 97 84 97 68
96 101 85 101 71
107 90 72
94 74
99 78
100 79
103 80
104 83
108 87
109 88
110 91
92
93
95
98
102
105
106
PLAYER Bs by subject number (N=55 / no. 56-110)
Adapters Punishers
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6.2.2. Treatment 2: Business 
6.2.2.1. Handout: Experimental Instructions 
 
Appendix 47: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [1/8] 
 
155 
 
 
Appendix 48: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [2/8] 
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Appendix 49: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [3/8] 
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Appendix 50: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [4/8] 
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Appendix 51: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [5/8] 
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Appendix 52: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [6/8] 
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Appendix 53: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [7/8] 
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Appendix 54: T2 – Instruction (OW, MA) [8/8] 
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6.2.2.2. Z-Tree Screenshots 
 
Screenshots of Treatment 2 are comparable to screenshots of Treatment 1 without 
the business scenario wording (see Appendix 6.2.1.2). The related business scenario 
wording is comparable to Appendix 6.3.1.5. 
 
6.2.2.3. Assignment to the Personality Model 
 
 
Appendix 55: T2 – Subject graphs' assignment to the personality model (MA) 
 
  
Persisters Not assigned
Flat Decreasing &
inreasing
Increasing Decreasing &
inreasing
Decreasing Increasing &
decreasing
36 31 29 31 30 48
42 32 34 32 33
44 41 35
45 49 37
47 50 38
53 52 39
56 40
43
46
51
54
55
MANAGERs by subject number (N=28 / no. 29-56)
Adapters Punishers
163 
 
6.2.3. Treatment 1 & 2: Handouts across Treatments 
6.2.3.1. Handout: Additional Information about the Charity 
 
 
Appendix 56: T1, T2 – Information about BaER Lab and SOS (PA, PB) 
 
 
6.2.3.2. Handout: Donation Confirmation Sheet 
 
 
Appendix 57: T1, T2 – Donation confirmation sheet (PA, PB) 
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6.3. APPENDIX: CHAPTER 4 
6.3.1. Treatment 3 & 4: Charity Preferences and Code of Conduct 
6.3.1.1. Handout: Experimental Instructions 
 
Appendix 58: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [1/8] 
 
165 
 
 
Appendix 59: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [2/8] 
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Appendix 60: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [3/8] 
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Appendix 61: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [4/8] 
 
 
168 
 
 
Appendix 62: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [5/8] 
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Appendix 63: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [6/8] 
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Appendix 64: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [7/8] 
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Appendix 65: T3, T4 – Instruction (OW, MA) [8/8] 
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6.3.1.2. Handout: Additional Information about the Charities 
 
 
Appendix 66: T3, T4 – Information about BaER Lab, SOS and DSD (OW, MA) 
 
 
6.3.1.3. Handout: Donation Confirmation Sheet 
 
 
Appendix 67: T3, T4 – Donation confirmation sheet (OW, MA) 
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6.3.1.4. Presented Code of Conduct 
 
In the following, the original German wording of the code of conduct, introduced in 
Treatment 4 of the experiment by z-Tree (Appendix 77 to Appendix 82), is presented. 
Words highlighted in red are interchangeably selectable by the OWNER. 
 
'Liebe Geschäftsführung, liebe Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter, 
der Erfolg des Unternehmens hängt maßgeblich von einer effizienten 
Zusammenarbeit mit Ihnen, den Mitarbeitern als unsere wichtigste [Ressource / 
Quelle], ab. Wir vertrauen darauf, dass Sie in Entscheidungssituationen stets die 
unternehmerischen Eigentümerinteressen als oberste Priorität berücksichtigen. 
Unsere Grundsätze, die sich in den folgenden Werten manifestieren, sollen Ihnen 
hierbei einen Wegweiser bieten. 
 
• Umgang mit Unternehmensvermögen: Unsere Unternehmensziele setzen die 
Einhaltung [jeglicher Gesetze, organisatorischen Regelungen und Prozesse / 
organisatorischen Regelungen, Prozesse und jeglicher Gesetze] voraus. Die 
Nutzung von [Unternehmensgegenständen und -eigentum / 
Unternehmenseigentum und -gegenständen] ist ausschließlich für 
Unternehmenszwecke vorgesehen. Als [verantwortungsvolles Mitglied / 
verantwortungsvoller Teil] unserer sozialen Umwelt sind wir uns unserer 
gesellschaftlichen Verantwortung bewusst und fühlen uns dazu verpflichtet durch 
[Sach- und Geldspenden / Geld- und Sachspenden] an die Denkmalpflege den 
Erhalt bedeutsamer historischer Architektur zu unterstützen. Aus diesem Grund 
sollen Spenden ausschließlich in Förderprojekte für Denkmäler in Not fließen.' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
6.3.1.5. Z-Tree Screenshots 
 
 
Appendix 68: T3, T4 – Welcome z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 69: T3, T4 – Comprehension questions z-Tree screen (OW, MA) [1/2] 
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Appendix 70: T3, T4 – Comprehension questions z-Tree screen (OW, MA) [2/2] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 71: T3, T4 – Round 1 role assignment z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
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Appendix 72: T3, T4 – Round 1 donation z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 73: T3, T4 – Round 1 apportionment z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
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Appendix 74: T3, T4 – Round 1 finish z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 75: T3, T4 – Round 2 role assignment z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 76: T3, T4 – Round 2 role assignment z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 77: T4 – Round 2 COC creation z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 78: T4 – Round 2 COC waiting-z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 79: T4 – Round 2 COC presentation z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 80: T4 – Round 2 COC presentation z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 81: T4 – Round 2 COC transmission z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 82: T4 – Round 2 COC transmission z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 83: T3, T4 – Round 2 donation z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 84: T3, T4 – Round 2 donation z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 85: T3, T4 – Round 2 apportionment z-Tree screen (OW) 
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Appendix 86: T3, T4 – Round 2 apportionment z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 87: T3, T4 – Round 2 finish screen (OW, MA) 
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Appendix 88: T3, T4 – Payoffs fixed z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
 
 
The z-Tree screenshots of the questionnaire administered in Treatments 1 to 4 are 
identical to those presented in Appendix 24 to Appendix 31 and Appendix 38 to 
Appendix 41, therefore, in the following, only new screenshots of Treatment 3 and 
Treatment 4 are presented. 
 
 
 
Appendix 89: T3, T4 – Round 1 questions z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
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Appendix 90: T3, T4 – Round 2 questions z-Tree screen (OW) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 91: T3, T4 – Round 2 questions z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
186 
 
 
Appendix 92: T4 – COC questions z-Tree screen (OW) [1/2] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 93: T4 – COC questions z-Tree screen (OW) [2/2] 
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Appendix 94: T4 – Round 1 and 2 deviation questions z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 95: T4 – COC questions z-Tree screen (MA) [1/2] 
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Appendix 96: T4 – COC questions z-Tree screen (MA) [2/2] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 97: T3, T4 – Payoff results screen (OW) 
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Appendix 98: T3, T4 – Payoff results z-Tree screen (MA) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 99: T3, T4 – Final z-Tree screen (OW, MA) 
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6.4. APPENDIX: CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Appendix 100: Further personality scales and donations in Round 1 & 2 (T1 to T4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personality scale
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
Jonckheere-
Terpstra J* (p)
Spearman's
ρ (p)
Kendall's
τ-b (p)
HEXACO: Fairness 3.383 (<0.001) 0.2690 (<0.001) 0.1878 (<0.001) 0.493 (0.6219) 0.0383 (0.6230) 0.0269 (0.6228)
HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 3.453 (<0.001) 0.2622 (<0.001) 0.1912 (<0.001) 0.415 (0.6780) 0.0340 (0.6628) 0.0226 (0.6790)
HEXACO: Altruism 3.805 (<0.001) 0.2929 (<0.001) 0.2123 (<0.001) 0.541 (0.5886) 0.0428 (0.5830) 0.0297 (0.5895)
HEXACO: Sentimentality 2.311 (0.0208) 0.1783 (0.0211) 0.1283 (0.0209) -0.246 (0.8058) -0.0207 (0.7902) -0.0134 (0.8068)
SOEP: Agreeableness 1.726 (0.0843) 0.1337 (0.0851) 0.0978 (0.0845) -0.011 (0.9911) -0.0041 (0.9583) -0.0006 (0.9922)
SOEP: Conscientiousness 2.093 (0.0363) 0.1633 (0.0350) 0.1181 (0.0364) -0.329 (0.7422) -0.0179 (0.8188) -0.0182 (0.7433)
SOEP: Openness 1.814 (0.0697) 0.1463 (0.0591) 0.1012 (0.0699) 0.310 (0.7566) 0.0244 (0.7541) 0.0170 (0.7576)
SOEP: Neuroticism 0.711 (0.4770) 0.0550 (0.4802) 0.0397 (0.4779) 0.127 (0.8993) 0.0036 (0.9634) 0.0069 (0.9004)
SOEP: Extraversion 1.205 (0.2284) 0.0958 (0.2179) 0.0674 (0.2289) -0.836 (0.4032) -0.0695 (0.3719) -0.0460 (0.4040)
IBES: Trouble Avoidance 0.574 (0.5659) 0.0391 (0.6156) 0.0320 (0.5668) -0.555 (0.5791) -0.0469 (0.5476) -0.0304 (0.5800)
PLAYER Bs / MANAGERs (N=167)
Round 1 Round 2
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6.5. APPENDIX: DICTATOR GAME 
 
Psychology and psychological research methods like experiments found a way into 
economics in the form of behavioral economics. According to a common opinion, 
economics is a non-experimental science. This view is reflected by a statement of 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985: p. 8): "Economists ... cannot perform the controlled 
experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other 
important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally must be 
content largely to observe". 
But "today's research increasingly relies on new data from laboratory experiments 
rather than on more traditional field data, that is, data obtained from observations of 
real economies" (The Royal Swedish Academy of Science 2002: p. 1). In 2002, the 
Economics Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman (experimental psychologist) and 
Vernon L. Smith (experimental economist) were the main impellents110 for 
economics' transformation from a non-experimental science into a science using 
experiments as a well-accepted methodology. Smith (1976) provided one of the first 
guidelines on the design of an economic laboratory experiment.111  
Economic experiments are very suitable to analyze human behavior (Camerer 2003). 
Led by the conviction that people do not only strive to maximize the monetary 
outcome of their actions (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Rabin 1993), many 
researchers executed experiments and used the results for a review of their 
hypotheses. Besides other standard experimental games (e.g. Ultimatum Game by 
Güth et al. 1982), the dictator game is a simple, but very effective experimental 
design, especially when individual preferences are concerned. The initiation of the 
dictator game research was a publication by Kahneman et al. (1986), followed by 
more than 129 contributions until today (Engel 2011). As detailed by Forsythe et al. 
(1994) and Bolton et al. (1998), the dictator game experiment is used to investigate in 
a two-player scenario how individual preferences influence the handling of one's own 
money by nominating a 'dictator' (money owner and sole decision maker) and a 
'recipient' (money recipient). In the standard dictator game, the dictator is endowed 
with USD 10, the recipient with USD 0. The dictator is requested to propose an 
apportionment of his USD 10 between himself and a recipient unknown to him. The 
recipient has no possibility of influencing the dictator's decision, he can only accept 
110 Independent and simultaneous work by Edward Chamberlin, Ausin Hoggatt, Heinz 
Sauermann and Reinhard Selten, Martin Shubik, Sidney Siegel and Lawrence Fouraker, 
Jeffrey Friedman as identified by Smith (1989). 
111 See also Smith (1994 and 1989); more recent insights into experimental methodology in 
economics are provided by Croson (2002 and 2005). 
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the potential money transfer. Many experiments show the participants in a standard 
dictator game to share their given money with an unknown stranger or a charity. 
Based on 616 treatments, Engel (2011) found that dictators transferred a grand 
mean of 28.35% of their money to the recipient. This result contrasts with 
neoclassical economic theories predicting that the dictator will strive to maximize his 
own monetary outcome and thus deny sharing his money. The attempts to explain 
this phenomenon are multifarious and its cause has been controversially discussed 
in experimental literature. The overall outcome of this debate is that profit 
maximization is not solely based on monetary criteria; humans have further 
preferences (e.g. altruism, fairness) opposed to the propensity for materialism 
(Forsythe et al. 1994; Hoffman et al. 1996; for an overview see Camerer 2003 and 
Engel 2011). More than hundred papers dealing with studies based on the dictator 
game show that this experiment has become a widely used and accepted 
methodology (Engel 2011). 
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6.6. QUESTIONNAIRE 
6.6.1. Applied Personality Inventories 
 
This section presents the original German wording as used within the personality 
questionnaire. 
 
6.6.1.1. SOEP Items 
 
Im Folgenden finden Sie unterschiedliche Eigenschaften, die eine Person haben 
kann. Wahrscheinlich werden einige Eigenschaften auf Sie persönlich voll zutreffen 
und andere überhaupt nicht. Bei wieder anderen sind Sie vielleicht unentschieden. 
Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala. 
Der Wert 1 bedeutet: trifft überhaupt nicht zu. Der Wert 7 bedeutet: trifft voll zu. Mit 
den Werten zwischen 1 und 7 können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen. 
 
Ich bin jemand,… 
1. der gründlich arbeitet. [Conscientiousness]112 
2. der kommunikativ, gesprächig ist. [Extraversion] 
3. der manchmal etwas grob zu anderen ist. [Agreeableness] (-)113 
4. der originell ist, neue Ideen einbringt. [Openness] 
5. der sich oft Sorgen macht. [Neuroticism] 
6. der verzeihen kann. [Agreeableness] 
7. der eher faul ist. [Conscientiousness] (-) 
8. der aus sich herausgehen kann, gesellig ist. [Extraversion] 
9. der künstlerische, ästhetische Erfahrungen schätzt. [Openness] 
10. der leicht nervös wird. [Neuroticism] 
11. der Aufgaben wirksam und effizient erledigt. [Conscientiousness] 
12. der zurückhaltend ist. [Extraversion] (-) 
13. der rücksichtsvoll und freundlich mit anderen umgeht. [Agreeableness] 
14. der eine lebhafte Phantasie, Vorstellung hat. [Openness] 
15. der entspannt ist, mit Stress gut umgehen kann. [Neuroticism] (-) 
16. der wissbegierig ist. [Openness] 
 
112 Matching of SOEP and Big-Five based on Gerlitz and Schupp (2005); not transparent 
within the questionnaire. 
113 (-) indicates reverse-keyed items; not transparent within the questionnaire. 
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6.6.1.2. HEXACO Items 
6.6.1.2.1. HEXACO and IBES Instructions 
Im Folgenden finden Sie eine Reihe von Aussagen, die mehr oder weniger auf Sie 
zutreffen können. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Bitte geben Sie 
an, wie sehr Sie den einzelnen Aussagen zustimmen oder sie ablehnen. Dafür 
stehen Ihnen die folgenden Antwortmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung: 
 
Starke Ablehnung - Ablehnung - Neutral - Zustimmung - Starke Zustimmung 
 
Bitte antworten Sie auf jede Aussage, auch wenn Sie sich Ihrer Antwort nicht ganz 
sicher sind. 
 
6.6.1.2.2. HEXACO: Altruism 
 
1. Ich bin ein weichherziger Mensch. 
2. Ich würde mich schrecklich fühlen, wenn ich jemanden verletzen müsste. 
3. Ich habe Mitgefühl mit Menschen, die weniger Glück haben als ich. 
4. Ich versuche, Notleidende großzügig zu unterstützen. 
5. Ich versuche, die Gefühle anderer zu respektieren. 
6. Mir gefällt der Gedanke, dass nur die Starken überleben sollten. (-)  
7. Es würde mich nicht stören, jemandem zu schaden, den ich nicht mag. (-) 
8. Man hält mich für einen hartherzigen Menschen. (-) 
 
6.6.1.2.3. HEXACO: Fairness 
 
1. Wenn ich wüsste, dass ich niemals erwischt werde, wäre ich bereit, eine Million zu 
stehlen. (-) 
2. Ich würde eine Person nicht betrügen, auch wenn diese ein echter Trottel wäre. 
3. Ich hätte keine Probleme damit, Leute zu betrügen, die es zulassen, dass man sie 
betrügt. (-) 
4. Ich würde in Versuchung geraten, Diebesgut zu kaufen, wenn ich knapp bei Kasse 
wäre. (-) 
5. Ich würde meine Steuern auch dann zahlen, wenn ich mich davor drücken könnte 
ohne erwischt zu werden. 
6. Ich würde niemals Bestechungsgeld annehmen, auch wenn es sehr viel wäre. 
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7. Ich würde gerne wissen, wie man Dinge über die Grenze schmuggelt. (-) 
8. Ich würde in die Versuchung geraten, Falschgeld zu benutzen, wenn ich sicher 
sein könnte, damit durchzukommen. (-) 
 
6.6.1.2.4. HEXACO: Greed Avoidance 
 
1. Einen hohen sozialen Status zu haben ist nicht sehr wichtig für mich. 
2. Viel Geld zu haben ist nicht besonders wichtig für mich. 
3. Ich ziehe es vor, angesehene, erfolgreiche Leute zu meinen Freunden zu 
zählen. (-) 
4. Ich würde gerne in einer sehr teuren, angesehenen Nachbarschaft wohnen. (-) 
5. Ich würde gerne dabei gesehen werden, wie ich in einem sehr teuren Auto 
herumfahre. (-) 
6. Ich würde es genießen, Mitglied in einem exklusiven Kasino zu sein. (-) 
7. Es würde mir viel Freude bereiten, teure Luxusgüter zu besitzen. (-) 
8. Wenn ich durch etwas wahrscheinlich meinen sozialen Status verbessern kann, 
nehme ich dafür hohe Risiken in Kauf. (-) 
 
6.6.1.2.5. HEXACO: Sentimentality 
 
1. Ich könnte weinen, wenn ich andere Personen sehe, die weinen. 
2. Wenn jemand, den ich gut kenne, unglücklich ist, kann ich den Schmerz dieser 
Person fast selber spüren. 
3. Ich fühle starke Emotionen, wenn jemand, der mir nahe steht, für eine längere Zeit 
weggeht. 
4. Ich verstehe nicht, warum einige Leute bei Hochzeiten so emotional werden. (-) 
5. Wenn jemand, der mir nahe steht, um etwas besorgt ist, bin ich auch besorgt. 
6. Andere sagen manchmal, dass ich nicht sensibel in Bezug auf Gefühle bin. (-) 
7. Ich bleibe emotionslos, selbst in Situationen, in denen die meisten Leute sehr 
sentimental werden. (-) 
8. Ich werde manchmal ziemlich sentimental, wenn ich über Personen und Orte 
nachdenke, die ich kannte. 
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6.6.1.3. IBES Item: Trouble Avoidance 
 
1. Wenn ich jemanden für unfähig halte, dann sage ich es ihm auch. (-) 
2. Es macht mir nichts aus, mit jemandem in Streit zu geraten, wenn ich anderer 
Meinung bin. (-) 
3. Ich könnte niemals jemandem ins Gesicht sagen, dass ich ihn nicht ausstehen 
kann. 
4. Ich gehe Ärger aus dem Weg, wenn es irgendwie möglich ist. 
5. Es kommt vor, dass ich mir andere zum Feind mache, um einer Sache willen, die 
mir wichtig ist. (-) 
6. Ich bin eher ein Mensch mit Ecken und Kanten. (-) 
7. Mit Leuten, die Macht über mich haben, lege ich mich lieber nicht an. 
 
6.6.2. Insights into Experimental Participants 
 
 
 
Appendix 101: Demographic information about participants (T1 to T4) 
 
Participants
(number)
Age
(min-max, avg.)
Gender
(number)
Semester
(min-max, avg.)
Treatment 1 110 19-34
(Ø 22.56)
Female: 57
Male: 53
1-17
(Ø 4.27)
Treatment 2 56 18-37
(Ø 23.66)
Female: 28
Male: 28
1-12
(Ø 4.45)
Treatment 3 84 19-42
(Ø 22.81)
Female: 54
Male: 30
1-12
(Ø 4.04)
Treatment 4 84 18-34
(Ø 22.88)
Female: 46
Male: 38
1-16
(Ø 4.20)
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Appendix 102: Donation preferences of participants (T1 to T4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Options Frequency
Children 313 (94%)
Girls 6 (2%)
Boys 2 (1%)
Women 5 (1%)
Men 3 (1%)
Cultural heritage 5 (1%)
Total 334 (100%)
Which aid recipient do you prefer?
Responses
Options Frequency
Africa 220 (66%)
Germany 41 (12%)
Latin America 32 (10%)
South & Southeast Asia 26 (8%)
East Europe 15 (4%)
Total 334 (100%)
Which region do you prefer
for your donation?
Responses Options Frequency
Against hunger & poverty 143 (43%)
For children & education 124 (37%)
For animals / environment 27 (8%)
For others 21 (6%)
For peace and conciliation 16 (5%)
For cultural heritage 3 (1%)
Total 334 (100%)
Which aid projects do you prefer?
Responses
Options Frequency
1-3 times 148 (44%)
Once 77 (23%)
Never 65 (19%)
Regularly 44 (13%)
Total 334 (100%)
Responses
Have you ever donated to a charity?
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